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## TURKEY'S DIPLOMATIC POSITION AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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### ABSTRACT

During the war Turkey's policy was one of survival. All that had been achieved by the young Republic could easily be lost as the result of a single ill considered move. Therefore the Turkish leaders tried by all possible means to keep out of the war.

### INTRODUCTION

The period from the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty up to the signing of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty of October 19, 1939, saw Turkey go from a position of non-alignment to one where she had to admit the need for "powerful friends". In the early post-Lausanne days this role was filled by the U.S.S.R. But the U.S.S.R. was primarily a land power and the rise of Italy as a major threat led Turkey to seek the friendship of a naval power as well. This started the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement. Therefore Turkey sought for some time to balance these two "powerful friendships". Zhivkova points out an interesting interchange between the British Ambassador in Ankara Sir Percy Loraine and Kemal Atatürk which took place on June 17, 1934. Atatürk openly told the Ambassador that Turkey wanted to move closer to Britain. The Ambassador in return, pointed out that Turkey's "most intimate friend was Russia". At this the Gazi expressed displeasure and indicated that if the Ambassador considered the two friendships mutually exclusive there was nothing more to be said. "Atatürk's talk with the British Ambassador shows that the wish of the Turkish Government in 1934 to establish closer relations with Britain was not prompted by any intention to restrict Turkish contacts with the U.S.S.R."<sup>1</sup>

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In the late '30s although Anglo-Turkish relations drew closer there was a marked reluctance on the part of Britain to give Turkey concrete assurances which might be provocative to Italy who they still hoped to wean away from Germany. A telegram sent to Sir Percy Loraine dated 14 February, 1938, instructed the Ambassador to suggest some statement that would allay Turkish doubts about British reliability while stopping short of giving a formal guarantee.<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Secretary made clear that "this is a question about which we can take no risks". Ironically this situation was an exact reversal of the British and Turkish roles during the war years. Both Britain in 1938, and Turkey in 1943, wanted the benefits of support without risking its obligations.

#### Relations with the U.S.S.R. up to the Anglo-Turkish Declaration

It is all this juncture that I would like to comment on the second point in Weisband's "operational code". This author states that after self preservation, the second principle of the Turkish operational code was that "the Soviet Union represented the primary threat to the security of the Republic".<sup>3</sup> In what is otherwise an admirably documented work this point requires clarification. In his approach to Soviet-Turkish relations and his view of the U.S.S.R. as the "archenemy" of Turkey, I think Weisband generalizes on the basis of what is recognizably true for his period of study. He traces the history of Russo-Turkish relations which he points out were turbulent and punctuated by frequent wars. This is a historical fact. But he makes some important omissions. For instance, there is hardly any mention of Italy as one of the major points of concern of Turkish foreign policy. Admittedly, the Italian threat proved something of a non-event when she actually joined in the hostilities in World War II, but it must be kept in mind that she was the major factor in the evolution of the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement of the mid end late thirties. Also in terms of historical precedent, memories of Italian enmity were more recent and the Turks had not forgiven the attack on Ottoman Tripolitania in 1911, and the long cherished Italian dreams about expansion into Anatolia. In 1934 the Italians had heavily fortified islands just off the Turkish coast. Indeed Italian propaganda was very active. Bari radio, the broadcasting arm of Mussolini's propaganda frequently made Turkish broadcasts.

These did not fail to raise an echo in the Turkish press. The Turkish Columnist, Z. Sertel wrote on March 10, 1939:

"Why does Bari radio speak Turkish?  
We are not a colony. We are not involved  
in hostilities against Italy, we don't need

Italy's Turkish broadcasts. Nor are we particularly interested in Fascist Italy's domestic affairs. In that case, why these Turkish broadcasts?" <sup>4</sup>

It was after the Italian invasion of Albania on April 8, 1939, that Turkey openly aligned herself with Great Britain. For a significant time Turkey managed to carry on both British and Russian friendships simultaneously. This is not to say that Turkey did not keep a watchful eye on her big northern neighbour, but it would be wrong to say she thought in terms of "archenemies".

Russia was a power factor in Europe like Great Britain, France and Germany, and because of her geopolitical position a more vital power factor for Turkey. Also relations with Russia had been good since the early days of the Republic. Weisband says that this thaw in relations did not erase the traditional enmity. But Atatürk was enough of a realist to appreciate the value of friendly relations with so powerful a neighbour at a time when distrust for all things Western was at its height in Turkey. "In reality Republican Turkey conducted her foreign policy practically since her inception in the 1920s, leaning upon and with the support of one of the Great Powers, although she avoided formal affiliation with any one of them until 1939. Indeed until 1936-39, the Turkish foreign policy decisions likely to affect the U.S.S.R. were taken in consultation with the Soviet Union, as a result of good neighbourly policy initiated by Lenin and Atatürk, although Turkey maintained friendly relations with the West" <sup>5</sup>.

In fact Turkey only gradually drifted away from the Soviet Union, leading to the state of distrust prevailing after the unexpected Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939.

Zhivkova speaks of a "gradual and carefully phased out withdrawal of Turkey from the Soviet Union." <sup>6</sup> But it was more a realization in Turkish decision making circles that Turkey would not be able to act as a bridge between the Western Powers and the Soviets as she had hoped. Karpat calls the worn out view of "archenemies", "The Western stereotyped concept that Turkey's fear of the Soviet Union is so deep as to make her ready to undertake any sacrifice in order to assure her survival." <sup>7</sup>

There are now emerging schools of thought which argue that contrary to the "historic rivalry" concept of Turkish-Russian relations, it has been more profitable for Turkey to have good relations with the U.S.S.R. "One of these schools claims that Turkish modernisation and political progress in terms of national self-assertion has been more rapid during the periods of rapprochement and friendship with the Soviets". <sup>8</sup> By 1939 although Russia was no longer "the only pebble on the Turkish beach", relations were still good. <sup>9</sup>

The British too, appreciated the value of Turkey as a possible connecting link with Russia, although British distrust of Soviet Russia was strong. "To reach Moscow the British leaders took two paths: the southern route to Turkey and possibly through her, to Russia, and the direct road to Moscow".<sup>10</sup>

In fact, although British relations with Turkey continued to draw closer during the last days of peace and first days of war, two things became abundantly clear; Turkey would drive an extremely hard bargain, and she would try to maintain her ties with Russia.

Turkey could afford to name her price as both the power blocks fully appreciated the value of her strategic position. On April 12, Halifax wrote to his Ambassador in Turkey, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen that, "His Majesty's Government consider of the first importance that the Turkish Government collaborate in any project of common defence.."<sup>11</sup>

On April 10, Halifax told the Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee, "... that Turkey was much the most important country to us of the countries of south-east Europe, and it was imperative that we should do nothing to queer the pitch with her".<sup>12</sup> Similarly, after the Anglo-Turkish Declaration of May 12, the German Ambassador in Ankara, Von Papen wrote to Berlin: "If the position we occupy (in Turkey), is taken over in the future by Britain and France, our relations with the countries lying beyond Turkey, Iraq, Persia and the Arabian world will be mortally hit".<sup>13</sup>

After the Anglo-Turkish Declaration of May 12 stating that they would oppose any aggression in the Mediterranean area, the Soviet attitude remained favourable. Izvestia called it "a valuable investment in the cause of world peace."<sup>14</sup> Indeed, Russia had been kept informed of the development of Anglo-Turkish relations, and on April 27, 1939, Potemkin, the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs had visited Ankara. "He (Potemkin) had listened with pleasure and approval to the account of the negotiations undertaken with Britain and France and expressed hope that the edifice of peace in process now between Turkey and the West would be completed in Moscow by Russia joining it."<sup>15</sup> It is interesting that according to Zhivkova, İnönü told Potemkin at this meeting this meeting that the Western Powers had hoped Germany would turn against Russia and tire herself out, but now they were realizing that the situation was becoming very dangerous for them and were seeking to form alliances.<sup>16</sup> Later Saraçoğlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister told Hugessen that the Soviet felt isolated and were suspicious that they were intentionally being kept at arm's length. "This feeling even amounted to a considerable degree of mistrust".<sup>17</sup>

Relations between Turkey and Russia seemed close enough for the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Gafencu to request Turkish mediation between Rumania and the

U.S.S.R. "The relations between Moscow and Ankara seemed so good and so helpful that M. Saraçoğlu offered me his good offices to assist me in any way that I wished in establishing a closer contact with the Soviet Union."<sup>18</sup> However, the truth of the matter was Turkey's Balkan Allies looked non too eagerly upon the rapprochement between Turkey, a key member of the Balkan Entente, and Britain. They feared this would prove provocative to Germany. In fact, a problem which kept recurring during the Anglo-Turkish talks before the Declaration was Turkey's commitment to the Balkan Entente. Britain wanted Turkey to undertake concrete commitments in the form of guarantees similar to those given by Britain to Greece and Rumania. "The British Government was hoping that if Greece were attacked, Turkey would be involved in the war due to the obligations undertaken with the Anglo-Turkish Declaration".<sup>19</sup> But Turkey had always been wary of any commitment might involve her in problems in circumstances beyond her control. When the Declaration was read in the Assembly, Saraçoğlu emphasized that it stood independent of any commitments to the Balkan Entente. Therefore, even before negotiations for a Treaty-proper began, Turkey was making sure she did not give herself up into British hands. Furthermore, Turkey wanted to avoid giving any guarantee to Rumania which would involve her in problems with the Soviet Union. Thus the Turks, although providing for their security, sought to keep their options open.

### Anglo-Turkish Treaty Negotiations

Also it must be emphasized that during the earlier part of the war, until late in 1943, Turkey was seen as a source of manpower, which the British hoped could be tapped and actively employed in hostilities. It was in late 1943, due to American and Russian reluctance that Britain come to insist only on the use of Turkish territory for airfields and bases. In 1939, "Britain relied on substantial military help from Turkey rather than from the other Balkan countries"<sup>20</sup>

The copies of memoranda supplied to the British delegations at various stages of staff talks with the Turks in June 1939, are interesting from several points of view. Firstly, they show the importance given to the Turkish alliance by Britain and the Turkish reluctance to show their hand. Secondly, Russia was still considered close to Turkey. Thirdly, these memoranda show to what extent the British were unprepared for a war of speed and attrition: "The Allied position in the Mediterranean will be considerably strengthened from the outset by the intervention of Turkey as an ally. She is the most powerful member of the Balkan Pact and also the Saadabad Pact".<sup>21</sup> Turkey was thus seen as the connecting link between the two. British Officers however, complained that they found most of the Turkish answers to their questions "lacking in detail" and that the Turks were generally reluctant to give pre-

cise information regarding strategic matters. It is also interesting that the British saw Turco-Russian relations as close enough to suggest the basing of Russian air forces in Turkey: "In view of the close relations between Turkey and Russia there would presumably not be the same political objections to the employment of Russian air forces from Turkey as there are reported to be against them being based in Poland and Rumania".<sup>22</sup> Nor were the Turks mistaken in "making a point of insisting that immediate necessities be sent them as soon as possible...", in view of the total lack of preparation on the part of the British for the events that were to follow.<sup>23</sup> The British instructions bear out this view:

"If German and Italian forces were to overrun Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania, and Rumania, and join in the attack from Bulgaria, Turkey might be forced to withdraw from her frontier, but she would be able to hold-out almost indefinitely on the line of the Bosphorous Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles".<sup>24</sup>

The British obviously were not informed about what Blitzkrieg warfare could do. The British delegation was instructed to tell the Turks that they need not worry about the Dodecanese as "their reduction to a innocuous state in a future war will only be a matter of time..."<sup>25</sup> But Rhodes proved in 1943 to be an impossible nut to crack, even at that late stage. According to the same instructions the British and French navies could easily control the Italian navy thus protecting the Turkish coast. The British talked about the "moral effect" of being at war with France and Britain enormously increasing the strain on German's resources. The Poles were expected to relieve pressure on the West, by staging, "... some form of offensive in the East..", "... The whole of the French frontier opposite to Germany is covered by the Maginot Line which consists of probably the strongest fixed defences now in existence. In these circumstances a direct attack on France is almost unlikely."<sup>26</sup> The whole tenor of these instructions indicates how far the British were from the facts. The French navy had to be destroyed by the British themselves because France collapsed, Maginot Line and all. The Poles did not stage any offensive because they were destroyed in three weeks. All during the military talks France was considered as a very real factor. The Turks, comparing statements like these with the way events did turn out were all the more firmly convinced that they did not want any part of it.

### **The Nazi-Soviet Pact and its effect on Anglo-Turkish Relations**

It is against this background, at a time when Russo-Turkish relations seemed to be good enough for Turkey to offer air force bases for Russian use that the news of the Nazi-Soviet Pact exploded in Turkey.

The news was received in Turkey with apprehension and surprise. At first, however, the Turks tried to put as good a face on it as possible. F.R. Atay commented in the official *Ulus*: "The news of a Non-Aggression Pact between Soviet Russia and Germany had led everywhere to profound amazement. Everyone's attention was turned to the staff talks in Moscow. The news that was expected these days from Moscow was the result of the military and political negotiations between the Great Democracies and the Soviets... Because of this the telegram announcing the signature of the Pact of Non-Aggression has had quite the effect of a blow . . . . It is not yet time to express conclusive views on this subject. In order to be able to judge the true nature of the Pact, it is necessary to wait for details beyond the general statements, particularly those indicating the mentality dominating the discussions. Therefore, we still trust that the further news we receive will show us the results of an attempt not to endanger peace but perhaps to save it."<sup>27</sup>

The Turkish press showed a mixture of disillusionment and caution. Asım Us wrote in *Vakit*: "The last ten years of European history had showed us that words like promises, principles, and ideology are only useful in fooling naive nations; in practice there is no belief, principle, or ideology that cannot be sacrificed for material advantages. . . In this case the whole matter depends on Soviet intentions. If as some believe, the Soviets want to wear down the European powers by provoking a war which would drain their resources, she can make use of this situation. But if the Moscow Government has no such intention, she can serve world peace by joining the peace front. The move expected from Russia, which has until now been on the front line of peace efforts, is just this service in the interests of peace".<sup>28</sup>

Z. Sertel in the pro-Soviet *Tan* stated that the Democracies were unable to give Russia the security she wanted and therefore she was forced into seeking it in an agreement with Germany. Now war was inevitable:

"We are confronted by a *fait accompli*. The peace front has lost its most important element. And this loss will strengthen Germany. Now Hitler will speak more bravely, be more warlike in pursuit of his aims, and give less importance to the threats of the Democracies. These psychological conditions will increase the tension which is already rife in Europe and bring war nearer."<sup>29</sup>

Yunus Nadi in *Cumhuriyet* used stronger language, although even he implied that the Soviets might have had peace in mind:

"The Statement of these non-aggression obligations without any condition or regulation, so openly and unconditionally is beyond comprehension. In that case one is forced to believe that there are hidden motives behind this move. To accept that the Soviets who split hairs over the little Baltic States, should

give the Third Reich freedom of action all along their western and southern frontiers, is not just difficult, but inconceivable... It is because of this that it is necessary to wait to see the realities of the situation..."

Nadi pointed out that the Soviets did not hesitate before the danger of appearing to the world as having relinquished their major principles. This led one to believe that there was no faith that could not be sacrificed to urgent interest. He concluded:

"... Given that we have been confronted with the most incredible surprises, we shall certainly see in time its even stranger developments. Let us remain calm and await the events to come".<sup>30</sup>

Nadi echoed the sentiments of Asım Us in his disbelief of fine words and promises. In another *Cumhuriyet* article he reiterated the conviction that the world was still ruled by self-interest and greed:

"Poor Collective security...; One cannot be sorry enough that this League (League of Nations) was never able to function effectively and actively, and has finally fallen into the weak and near-dead state it is in now. One can only come to the conclusion that hidden conceit in people's thoughts has rendered impossible their development to a level where they would be able to unite around an ideal of peace and justice. The error lay in the attitude of most of the Nations joining the League, who joined it as a token gesture, and thinking that they would find there a source of strength without having to sacrifice anything of themselves. But the strength of the Leagues of Nations could only be the strength that its members themselves invested in it".<sup>31</sup>

The Russo-German Pact certainly deeply disturbed and surprised Turkey, whose orientation in foreign policy now entered a new phase.<sup>32</sup> She found herself isolated with the two Western Democracies. This dealt a very damaging blow to her relations with the Soviet Union. Even after the Nazi-Soviet Pact however, the Turks still did not give up hope of being able to bridge the gap between the West and Russia, and Saraçoğlu went to Moscow with this aim. The Germans and Italians now hoped that the new situation would cause Turkey to shift from her pro-West policy. The British were in fact very afraid that this would happen. The Turks, although now more than ever dependent on British, drove a hard bargain in treaty negotiations and stalled until the most favourable conditions could be torn from the British.

Nor were the British wrong in assuming that Hitler would use this new situation to draw Turkey away from them. Hitler wrote to Mussolini on August 25, "Even Turkey under these circumstances can only envisage a revision of her previous position".<sup>33</sup> Mussolini replied, "A new strategy on the part of Turkey would upset all



the strategic plans of the French and English in the Eastern Mediterranean". The Germans were indeed also hoping to use Turkey's good relations with Russia for their own benefit, just as Britain had done. The German Ambassador in Moscow reported on September 5 that he had again asked the Soviets "to work on Turkey with a view to permanent neutrality"<sup>34</sup> "Molotov replied that the Soviet Government had considerable influence with Turkey and was exerting it in the sense desired by us".<sup>35</sup> When on September 17, Molotov suggested a Pact of Mutual Defence should be proposed to the Turks including a clause which would absolve the Soviets from any involvement against Germany, Voroshilov added that, "such a Pact would be a hook by which Turkey could be pulled away from France."<sup>36</sup>

This was exactly what the French were afraid of. The British Ambassador in Paris telegraphed the Foreign Office on August 26, that Quai D'Orsay had informed him they thought the situation in Turkey, since the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, extremely delicate. The arrangements with Turkey were not solid. They referred that the Germans would dangle the same sort of "share in the spoils" in front of them as they had done with Stalin.<sup>37</sup>

In the same vein, Sir M. Palairt reported from Athens on August 25, 1939, that the Yugoslav Minister in Athens stated that he was worried by the change of attitude of the Turkish Chargé since the signature of the German-Soviet Pact. He had previously been almost aggressive and was now decidedly moderate. Palairt added, "I trust that this attitude is not significant."<sup>38</sup> If so insignificant why did the Ambassador pass on to a second-hand impression? The fact that the British were watching so closely surely indicates that they too did not feel that they could fully trust the Turks. The fact that even so small a factor as this was reported to London suggests strict official briefs about keeping eyes and ears open.

The British Foreign Office and its French equivalent, the Quai D'Orsay were in fact very sensitive during this period to the slightest hint of possible change in the Turkish attitude. After the Nazi-Soviet Pact the British desired to push through a firm treaty as soon as possible as war loomed nearer. The Turks however, opposed this with caution and stalling tactics.

"On the very eve of war, the Turkish Government still awaited the development of international events and was not in a hurry to sign a treaty. Therefore it made high financial and economic demands, hoping that this would delay the signing of an Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty".<sup>39</sup>

On August 24, Halifax wrote to Hugesson saying that in view of the deteriorating international situation the treaty should be signed as soon as possible:

"Please impress upon his Excellency the necessity of making rapid progress

so that we should be in a position to afford the world proof of the solidarity of our governments in face of the common danger. It is for this reason and not of course, that I doubt in the remotest degree Turkish good faith, that I am so anxious to publish our agreement".<sup>40</sup>

The British were extremely anxious at this juncture to appear accommodating in the face of all Turkish demand, as Germany stepped up her pressure after the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Halifax again wired Hugessen on August 25, "Retention of Turkey in the peace front is obviously vital at this stage and His Majesty's Government are ready to make great sacrifices to attain this end". He said if the Turks made any suggestion which did not appear wholly impossible the Foreign Office should be informed immediately: "In the present circumstances and those that may shortly develop, have not doubt that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to go to great lengths..."<sup>41</sup>

The Turks could hardly fail to make use of such an accommodating attitude. Turkey insisted on a credit of £35,000,000 for war materials, a gold loan of £15,000,000 for solving the country's pressing economic problems and about £2,000,000 for liquidating the clearing deficit.<sup>42</sup> The Turks, in their best bargaining tradition, knew they were needed desperately by Britain and this exploited their position of strength between the two sides. The Germans immediately after announcement of the Russo-German Pact put heavy pressure on Turkey to cancel all existing contracts for war material with Germany, and said they found it unsuitable to ratify the credit agreement, particularly since the credit provided for war material. Saraçoğlu told Hugessen that he found himself unable to resist this pressure.<sup>43</sup>

Halifax, on August 25, asked Hugessen's advice on any means by which such pressure could be counteracted, and wanted to know if there were any means which could induce the Turkish Government to an early signature of the treaty: "Could it in any way be made more palatable for them in the light of the new Russian development? ... Or do you hold that the only reason for their holding back is our failure until now to meet them on economic and financial issues?" The Foreign Secretary went on to say that he was in close touch with Mussolini and that the latter would do his utmost to avoid being dragged into war over the Danzig issue. However, the Secretary felt that it would not be a good idea to tell this to the Turks for it might incline them to compromise with Germany and Russia: "You should report at once any indication coming to your notice of any change of attitude on part of the Turkish Government..."<sup>44</sup>

This document reveals that the British still considered Italy to be a determining factor in the Turkish attitude, and that the Foreign Office was noticeably unsure of the Turks, although they tried to give the opposite impression. On August 26, Hugessen asked for urgent instructions regarding Turkish demands for bullion and purchase of

their tobacco crop, and requested full powers. He also said that a military mission sent to Turkey now would give the impression of mistrust, and added that if the Turks were to reverse their position a mission would not arrive on time.<sup>45</sup>

On August 25, the British Ambassador in Athens reported that the "fantastic rumour" had reached him that the German-Soviet Pact had been arranged in Ankara by Papen with the corollary that Turkey would defect from the peace front.<sup>46</sup> There were also rumours that Britain had made concessions to Italy at Turkish expense. The Ambassador in Turkey was instructed to make clear that the Anglo-Turkish alliance was "the basis on which the whole of our Mediterranean policy rests".<sup>47</sup> These days immediately after the Nazi-Soviet Pact seemed rife with sinister rumours and a general air of worry-cum-panic pervaded relations. Ambassadors requested instructions urgently and surprise pacts were sprung. One gets the impression that there was a general aura of mistrust, although official denials and reassurances were not in short supply.

The Foreign Secretary also worried that there were indications that the Turks preferred to have Italy in the opposite camp, rather than as a neutral conserving her energy or an ally with dubious intentions. "They (The Turks) will fight if Italy does", summed up Huggessen on August 26, adding, "I have heard vague rumours of neutrality talk ... but have not seen any reason at present to take them seriously."<sup>48</sup>

To the Turks the Italian threat was still very real, and the British attempts to wean Italy away from Germany into a neutral position or into the position of an ally were seen badly. The ambassador wired on September 5, that the Turks were much more inclined "to try conclusions" with Italy.<sup>49</sup> In the drafting of the Treaty therefore, the Turks were insisting on the wording, "as a result of aggression in the Mediterranean area," making the Treaty operational. The British felt this was needless provocation. The British Ambassador said that Turkey – felt "quite sure of herself in a duel with Italy".<sup>50</sup>

In the last days of peace and immediately after the outbreak of the war, the Turks tightened up on their bargaining. They were aware of the unsettled frame of mind of the French and British. A Foreign Office minute of August 27 stated:

"The Quai D'Orsay are much impressed with the necessity of asking every sacrifice to keep Turkey on the side of Britain and France and to hasten the conclusion of the agreement .."<sup>51</sup>

On September 2, the German forces invaded Poland and thus started World War II. The Western powers were alarmed that the arrangements with Turkey had not yet been concluded. As the tension increased the adamant attitude of the Turks became more so in relation to their requirements if they were to conclude a treaty. The Ambassador reported on September 3, "The Secretary General's remarks tonight

suggested that there will be more pressure for larger gold loan and further credits for war material. It seems most unlikely that they will sign the Treaty until they have at least obtained more than we have so far offered".<sup>52</sup> The Turkish delegation insisted on a "suspensive clause" whereby treaty obligations could only become operative when the stipulated demands had been met in full. The Embassy reported on September 15:

"The Minister of Foreign Affairs sticks to his proposals under which Turkey will carry out her engagements from the moment when provisions in special agreement (i.e. regards financial and economic points) have been entirely executed".<sup>53</sup>

On September 4, the War Cabinet were informed the Turks were increasing demands for financial assistance and that they were unlikely to sign any agreement unless their demands were met. The Cabinet agreed that it was of the utmost importance to conclude the Agreement with Turkey as soon as possible.<sup>54</sup> On September 5: "Reference was made to dangers and difficulties we had created for ourselves in the last war by not securing Turkey's friendship or neutrality beforehand. There was no difference of opinion that at this juncture it would be worth paying a stiff price to avoid a repetition of similar dangers and difficulties." The Cabinet stressed on September 6 the need for agreement with Turkey because of the deteriorating position in Poland. The Turks were still demanding a gold loan of £ 15 millions. The Cabinet believed that the failure to grant the loan was the main reason for failure to reach an agreement. The Cabinet then agreed that because the situation in Europe was working against Britain it would be desirable to secure a treaty with Turkey as soon as possible.<sup>55</sup> The Turks were well aware of this and consequently once again demonstrated their aptitude for using the European situation as a bargaining counter to secure the best possible arrangement. The Turkish negotiators were also aware that Saraçoğlu's coming visit to Moscow raised fears in Britain that Turkey might come to some understanding with Russia. So the European situation, plus the possibility of an agreement with Russia were artfully exploited by the Turks. The Ankara Embassy reported that it would be possible to secure agreement on the signature if the British Government increased the armaments credit by £ 11 millions. The Cabinet agreed and concluded on September 18:

"It was vital to bring the negotiations to a successful issue, because there was a danger that if not brought to a head, Turkey might sign a Pact with the U.S.S.R."<sup>56</sup>

Huggesen's letter to P.B. Nichols on September 22 sheds considerable light on British reaction to Turkish demands. Although the Ambassador was prepared "to bet his official and personal shirt" on Turkish loyalty he conceded that they were being

difficult on some points which he stated were "worrying". He said, "they have been very sticky in their financial and economic demands, but I attribute this to bazaar instincts." Even Hugessen however, saw that the Turkish insistence was also due to, "a feeling that they are in a position to push us hard, which they certainly do."<sup>57</sup> He reported that the hardest bargaining occurred with Menemenciöglü, which he said could be due to his "hard bargaining tactics" or "a desire to slow things down until the situation becomes clearer".<sup>58</sup> On the suspensive clause he asked "Was it put in to provide a way of escape by facing us with impossibilities, or does it represent genuine (and I think justifiable) anxiety about their state of military preparedness". The answer to Hugessen's question was both, the Turks did feel that they needed time while things were uncertain with Russia, but they also knew that they were hopelessly unprepared for war, which even Hugessen was prepared to admit as he insisted on early arrival of military supplies". "It is no use asking the Turks in their present state of defence in Thrace to come in and face a mechanical attack. They have seen the disasters which have happened in Poland ..."<sup>59</sup> Yet only recently the British had spoken in terms of a Polish "offensive".

In the Cabinet discussion of the Turkish negotiations on September 23, it was felt that Turkey was making "unreasonable demands" in asking for £15 millions in gold in return for a treaty which would be rendered inoperable by a suspensive clause. "The Turks appeared to contemplate that we should hand over the bullion practically unconditionally. After this we should be requested to supply them with war materials in large quantities, despite the fact that it was urgently required by our own troops".

The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs was now on his way to Moscow and it was possible that on his return things would be more disadvantageous for Britain. There was the belief prevalent in Cabinet that it was now more urgent than ever to have Turkey on Britain's side, even if only in name, rather than on Germany's side, "... £15 millions in gold was a heavy price, but it was not too heavy a price to pay for Turkish neutrality". The failure to reach an agreement with Turkey would be a serious diplomatic defeat, just as an agreement would be seen as a great success.<sup>60</sup> Even at this stage the British still half expected a Turkish defection as a result of Russian pressure.

As R. Fischer states, in negotiations of any sale in foreign relations the seller may put up his price because he;

"realistically hopes that the buyer will pay that price: he weighs the risk of not making the sale against the advantage of getting more money if he does make the sale."<sup>62</sup>

Menemenciöglü correctly estimated what price the British were prepared to

pay and set his figure accordingly. He was not mistaken in thinking that the Allies would be quite prepared to grant most of what he asked.

Hugessen telegraphed on September 20, that it was better to sign a treaty with a suspensive clause rather than waste time with details, the French Ambassador he said, was in agreement. They both felt that the Turks would be reasonable and not make impossible demands. Both Menemencioğlu and Saraçoğlu had told them that they were under pressure from their General Staff who in light of the late arrival of help for Poland were seriously worried about the defence of Thrace. The British and French Ambassadors also agreed that Thrace was in no state to resist mechanized attack.<sup>63</sup> By pointing to the plight of Poland the Turks justified their demands for the delivery of armaments prior to any undertaking on their part.

On September 28, P. Nichols of the Foreign Office wrote to the British Ambassador in Paris that the French Ambassador in London was worried about the delay in initialling the treaty. He was afraid that Ribbentrop and the Russians might put pressure on Saraçoğlu.<sup>64</sup> The French were in favour of working out details later, which gave the Turks the advantage of using just those details as part of their strategy. Hugessen seemed to have been quite taken in by M.Menemencioğlu's tactics. The Secretary General told him on September 21, that pressure might be put on Saraçoğlu in Moscow and that it would look bad if the British looked like they were holding back now. Hugessen in turn, emphasized to London that the delay might cause the Turks to "yield points in Moscow".<sup>65</sup> Menemencioğlu, using the possibility of pressure on Saraçoğlu in Moscow, ably and subtly accelerated the process whereby the British accepted his position.

This is not to say that the Turks were not genuinely concerned that pressure would be brought to bear on Saraçoğlu. This is why they wanted to keep the news of the initialling of the Treaty on September 30 quiet, in order to avoid prejudicing Saraçoğlu's chances while he was negotiating. Hugessen derived the impression from Menemencioğlu that "He attaches the greatest importance to leaving the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs every possible opportunity for ascertaining definitely what is the true policy of the Soviet Government..."<sup>66</sup>

The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs wanted to make use of this trip to determine whether the German-Soviet Pact was a measure only for the partition of Poland, or if this move had only been a prelude to further conquests.<sup>67</sup> "This was a revealing example of the vigilance with which the Turkish Government guarded and attempted to further good relations with its Northern neighbour..." Thus Turkey found herself in the position she had so long sought to avoid: boxed in between two contradictory friendships.<sup>68</sup>

Saraçoğlu therefore went to Moscow to bridge the gap between Britain and

Russia. Despite the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Turkey still hoped to be able to forge the crucial link that would join Russia to the "peace front."<sup>69</sup> As late as October 7, the Turks still hoped for a satisfactory outcome. Aras, the Turkish Ambassador in London told Dr. Jackh of the Ministry of Information that he expected a Turkish-Russian agreement compatible with the Anglo-Franco-Turkish alliance, both to be signed at the same time. Dr. Aras said the ultimate Turkish aims were "to be a bridge between Great Britain and Russia" and to isolate Hitler.<sup>70</sup> But this proved to be an impossibility. As seen above, even in August it had been feared that Russia would exert pressure on Turkey to draw her away from the Allies. This was the Russian aim in inviting Saraçoğlu to Moscow. "The Turkish and Russian reasons for negotiating were therefore fundamentally opposed".<sup>71</sup>

Ribbentrop wrote to Shulenberg, the German Ambassador in Moscow on October 2, telling him that he was, "particularly anxious for the Russian Government to proceed in that direction (pressure on Turkey) in order to dissuade Turkey from the final conclusion of assistance pacts with the Western Powers, and to settle this at once in Moscow".<sup>72</sup>

The extent to which the Russians followed German instructions demonstrated the difficulty of the Turkish position. On October 7, Shulenberg again received instructions from Ribbentrop. The Minister was worried that a Russo-Turkish agreement would be arrived and he stipulated that if Russia could not avoid making such a Pact, "we would regard it as a foregone conclusion that she should make a reservation in the Pact whereby the Soviet Union would not be obligated to any kind of assistance aimed directly or indirectly at Germany".<sup>73</sup> The demands made on Saraçoğlu by Stalin reflect the German desiderata:

- a) Turkey would change the article in the Tripartite Pact whereby she promised to give the Western Powers "all the aid and assistance in her power", if they had to activate their guarantees to Greece and Rumania, to "consultation" only with the Powers.
- b) An addition to Protocol 2, which absolved Turkey from taking any action which would involve her in war with the U.S.S.R. The addition desired by Stalin went: "And moreover these engagements cannot oblige Turkey to support Great Britain and France if these countries go to war with the U.S.S.R. In this case for the duration of the said war the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact would remain inactive".
- c) Russia wanted an "exclusion clause" analogous to Protocol 2 which would absolve her from intervention to aid Turkey if this country were attacked by Germany".<sup>74</sup>

Ribbentrop had written on October 2: " In my opinion, as already stated several times, it would be in the Russian interest, on account of the question of the Straits, to forestall a tie-up of Turkey to England and France." <sup>75</sup>

Accordingly Stalin's proposals at his first meeting with Saraçoğlu contained a detailed list of changes he desired in the Montreux Convention. These included a joint Turkish-Russian approval for passage through the Straits of warships of a non-riparian power, in peacetime or in war. Also the Soviet Union demanded the rights to approve passage for all war ships of powers acting under the League of Nations. They also included the reduction of the permitted tonnage by one fifth. Saraçoğlu replied that any alteration in the Tripartite Pact was beyond his power, the Treaty had already been initialled and the French and British would rightly object to any amendment. As to the "German Clause" Saraçoğlu vehemently declared that such a clause would deprive that the Pact of its *raison d'être*. As for any revision of Montreux, Saraçoğlu strongly denied any possibility of bilateral revision of a multi-lateral convention and said Turkey would never allow Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi. <sup>76</sup>

How much importance the Turks placed on a satisfactory outcome of the negotiations is demonstrated by their efforts to get France and Britain to modify the article pertaining to Rumania and Greece. Saraçoğlu summoned the French and British Ambassadors in Moscow and asked them to support an appeal he was making to their governments. He talked about the disastrous effect a break in the negotiations would have, and Stalin was not reknowned for his patience. <sup>77</sup>

When talks began again on October 14, Saraçoğlu could inform Molotov that the British and French had agreed to change to "consultation" the article in question. The Russians then immediately brought up the German reserve clause. In the face of Saraçoğlu's repeated and unequivocal refusals to consider it, Molotov always returned to the charge with the statement that this was a promise he had made to Ribbentrop. <sup>78</sup> This indicated to what extent the Russians were committed to Germany. Saraçoğlu again refused to consider any illegal revision of the Montreux Convention.

During the final session on the 16 October, Molotov insisted on the German reserve clause and on the revision of Montreux. Saraçoğlu's intransigence obliged both sides to concede that the talks had ended in failure. But there is evidence that as early as October 9, the Russians had given up sincere negotiations with the desire to reach a satisfactory conclusion. Shaulenberg wrote to Berlin on October 9: "Molotov expressed the view that in all likelihood a mutual assistance pact with Turkey would not be concluded". <sup>79</sup>

While Ribbentrop was in Moscow Stalin deliberately ignored Saraçoğlu and the latter was shunted from Opera to ballet to football match, until he refused to go



anywhere until Stalin saw him. This humiliation left its mark on Saraçoğlu who became renowned for his anti-Russian attitude.

On October 17, Sir S. Hoare, the British Ambassador in Bucharest, reported that the Turks were very angry at the way they had been treated, and if the Turkish Ambassador reflected in any way the felling of his government "... they will at the first available opportunity make manifest their resentment at the insolence of the Russian demand" <sup>80</sup>

But the Turks did nothing of the kind. Quite the contrary they made placatory statements about "useful talks". The prominent journalist, Y. Nadi wrote in Cumhuriyet:

"It is our sincere belief that Turkish-Russian friendship is strong enough not to be affected by the signature or non signature of any document, for this or that reason. ... During all these tremendous events, all of Turkey's attention has been focused on avoiding doing anything which would harm others, especially her neighbours. She has done nothing more than look to her own security, nor can she do otherwise in future". <sup>81</sup>

But these words disguised the deep unease felt in Turkey during those days. Saraçoğlu's failure in Moscow to reconcile Turkey's two big friends marks the end of the period during which Turkey attempted to juggle the two relationships. This marks a new phase in the development of the foreign policy philosophy with Russia now becoming a major worry. But Saraçoğlu's Moscow negotiations are also revealing of some lines of thinking in this philosophy.

Saraçoğlu was prepared to give ground on Turkish commitment to aid Britain if she had to activate her guarantees in Rumania and Greece. But this was really no sacrifice for Turkey as she had been reluctant to agree involvement in someone else's problem which ran counter to her foreign-policy. The points on which Saraçoğlu stood firm indicate the issues which Turkey considered vital to her well being. The German reserve clause would have taken away her very reason for seeking an alliance with the U.S.S.R. Saraçoğlu's attitude when faced with Russian demands for the revision of Montreux also illustrates how far relations had deteriorated since 1936 when Turkey had proposed an agreement whereby she would not allow ships hostile to the Soviets to pass through the Straits.

And although Zhivkova maintains that "the Turkish Government failed to seize the opportunity of signing a treaty of mutual aid with the Soviet Union", it was more a case of the Turkish Government finding themselves confronted by impossible demands on the part of a power they had once considered a friend. <sup>83</sup>

The treaty signed on October 19 gives further indications of the Turkish outlook. Although Turkey had to put Article 3 concerning Greece and Rumania back into the Treaty, on other points she resisted admirably. The British wanted complete reciprocity of commitments, but paragraph 1 of the Treaty which committed Britain and France to aid Turkey if she were attacked by any European State did not contain any element of reciprocity. Although Britain insisted, the Turkish Government refused to enter into such obligations toward the Western Powers. Paragraph 3, giving Turkey's obligations to Greece and Rumania had long been a bone of contention. A new element was introduced in the form of Article 4 which committed Turkey to maintaining benevolent neutrality towards Britain and France if they were attacked by a European Power.

The Turks also insisted on the inclusion of Protocol 2 which absolved them from any action likely to lead to war with the U.S.S.R.

In a special agreement on financial matters, Britain and France granted Turkey a credit of £25,000,000 for war materials, a gold loan of £16,000,000 and a loan of £ 3½ million for the transfer of Turkish credits.<sup>84</sup> The Turks therefore had secured a treaty very much in keeping with their foreign policy philosophy. They would become actively involved only if attacked, in the meantime they would be given large sums of money, great quantities of arms, and if their Allies were attacked in the West they only had to promise benevolent neutrality. Nor did they have to undertake any action at all until all the war materials promised had arrived.

### Turkish Reactions to the Outbreak of the War

At this stage it would be useful to examine Turkish public opinion at the outbreak of war. Initial caution about Russia eventually gave way to the admission that the Soviets had been instrumental in encouraging Hitler to act. But Turkey was still very much preoccupied by Italy and her attitude in the conflict. A. Daver wrote in *Cumhuriyet* announcing that war had broken out and added:

"War was a certainty ever since the German Soviet Pact had been signed. History will place the responsibility for this war on Germany and partly on Russia who gave her encouragement and thus increased Germany's impudence."<sup>85</sup>

The same article mentioned that for now Italy was outside the conflict. This signalled the departure from the cautious attitude of "wait and see," which the Turkish press had first adopted to the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The official *Ulus* columnist F.R. Atay commented:

"... The non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia did not save peace as was thought in Moscow, quite the contrary, it provoked war... If Russia had joined the peace front, it is unlikely that Germany would have launched herself on this terrifying game of change".<sup>86</sup>

When Italy maintained her neutrality, some tentative hopes were raised in Turkey. Sadi Ertem in *Vakit* generally encouraged Italy to stay out:

"... The Peninsula is surrounded by sea dominated by the allied fleets, leaving it to bombardment and blockade... The result will be that her coasts will be ruined, she will go hungry, she will lose her islands, and become out-off from her Colonies. Will the Italy coming to the peace table in this condition be more effective than the victorious Italy of 1918?"<sup>87</sup>

Not all assessment of Italy was positive however, Asım Us wrote in the same paper that when the Germans, having disposed of Poland, began their expansion into the Balkans, Italy would then find it expedient to discard her mask of neutrality and emerge as a belligerent.<sup>88</sup> Germany got more stern treatment than Italy. H. Ocaklıoğlu wrote in *Yeni Asır* that the German methods of invasion and aggression had continued to swallow smaller nations, but warned Germany that there were countries which would resist her to the end; he then went on to say about Italy:

"If Italy shows sobriety and intelligence by remaining neutral, the holocaust might be contained between four nations. To prevent the fire from reaching the Balkans or the Mediterranean remains Italy's responsibility. If Mussolini shows the reason and judgement which Hitler failed to show, the spread of the great catastrophe will be limited."<sup>89</sup>

Italy was in fact the major point of interest in much of the press of this period. E.İ. Benice wrote in *Son Telgraf*:

"Whether Italy remains neutral, in relation to the position resulting from the British and French declarations of war is of very great importance. It is in fact the major issue today. If Italy remains neutral there is no change that war will spread to the Mediterranean. ... There is a definite need for the complete clarification of Italy's intentions..."<sup>90</sup>

N. Sadak in *Akşam* voiced suspicion and cynicism when he wrote:

"Is Italy going to remain neutral or will she coming at the moment most advantageous for her? This is the question occupying most minds today. We are in an age when neither promises given nor documents signed have any value. The only factor determining nations' decisions is the profit factor as it appears at

any given moment. We have seen countries announce their neutrality at the outbreak of war, or even remain a spectator to the dismemberment of an ally... Particularly in a war such as this whose length and breadth is as yet unknown, we cannot say now which nation will find itself obliged to intervene and which nation will conserve its neutrality. Nor is the thing called neutrality always dependent on a nation's own will and circumstances."<sup>91</sup>

The nervous glances cast in the northern direction were also evident in some writers' articles. F.R. Atay in *Ulus* wrote that negotiations failed with Russia because of the clash between obligations to Britain, the Russian position and the Montreux Convention. But he stressed that this did not mean the end of the Turco-Russian friendship. He underlined that an undertaking Turkey went into would be to preserve peace and security in its own area: "This unchanging principle of Turkish foreign policy is sure to be appreciated by our friends the Soviets".<sup>92</sup> H.C. Yalçın in *Yeni Sabah*, said that Turkey had tried hard to reconcile Anglo-French views with those of the Soviets, unfortunately this had proved impossible.<sup>93</sup>

The views of the press on related subjects in this period are also enlightening. On the subject of the Russo-Finnish war, which the Turks closely followed R. Emeç wrote in *Son Posta* that Russia had made claims on Finland and negotiations were in process. Of the Finns he said:

"Because they are a long way from nourishing illusions, while negotiating with the Russians on one hand they have been taking the precautions necessitated by circumstances.. Finland wants to live in peace with the World. But nor does she seem at all likely to make sacrifices of her national integrity and freedom".

Emeç hoped negotiations would lead to a satisfactory solution.<sup>94</sup> The Turks obviously saw a potential parallel between Finland and themselves.

As the long-expected war came to Europe the Turks found themselves solidly placed, on paper, in one of the belligerent camps. Yet they had nourished strong hopes of including the Soviet Union in this arrangement, but now they found her not only outside but also in a position of co-operation with Germany.

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- 2 F.O. 371 / E 640 / 135 / 44 – Foreign Office 371 is the Foreign Office Correspondance

File kept in the Public Record Office in London. It comprises most of the telegrams, reports, and yearly assessments sent by the British Diplomats to London.

- 3 E. Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, p. 3.
- 4 Zekeriya Sertel, *Tan*, 10 March, 1939.
- 5 Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, p.3. Indeed after the conclusion of the Montreaux Convention, Turkey proposed to the Soviets an agreement not to allow the warships of agressor powers hostile to the U.S.S.R. to pass through the Straits. The Foreign Office took a very serious view of this. They told the Turkish Ambassador to London on October 14, 1936, that this would, "amount to something very like a Russo-Turkish alliance". The Foreign Office were worried that now that the Straits were being remilitarized this situation could be dangerous for them: they said on October 1, 1936, "If this agreement goes through, Russian influence will again become paramount at Angora and our own diminish proportionately". The Admiralty made it known on October 23, that they felt this development could gravely endanger the British strategic position in the Mediterranean, and recommended most strongly that, "every endeavour should be made to prevent Turkey entering into an arrangement with Russia on the lines envisaged..." These views were made known to Menemencioglu who emphasized on October 25, that it was important to give Russia a "soft answer" because "Turkey wished to do nothing that might cool friendship with Russia which was the cornerstone of Turkish policy. See FO.371.E623/E6467/E6499/E7711/E6707/E6712/E5280/44.
- 6 Zhivkova, p. xi.
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- 10 T. Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1939-1945*, p. II.
- 11 FO.371/R2688/661/67
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- 18 G. Gafencu, *The The Last Days of Europe*, p. 131.

- 19 Zhivkova, p. 107, Britain had given guarantees to Greece and Rumania that she would come to their aid if they were attacked.
- 20 Ibid, p. 92.
- 21 FO.371/E4151/143/44, Saadabad Pact. concluded in 1936 between Turkey, Persia and Iraq.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ibid. The Dodecanese Islands, Italian Islands off the Turkish Coast.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Ulus, 25 August, 1939.
- 28 Vakit, 25 August, 1939.
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- 30 Cumhuriyet, 25 August, 1939.
- 31 Cumhuriyet, 31 August, 1939.
- 32 Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, p151.
- 33 Nazi-Soviet Relations, August 25, 1939, p. 81.
- 34 Ibid, September 5, 1939, p. 87.
- 35 Ibid, p. 88
- 36 Ibid, September 17, 1939, p. 97.
- 37 FO.371/E6044/9/44.
- 38 FO.371/E6061/9/44. Palairat was the British Ambassador to Greece.
- 39 Zhivkova, p. 109.
- 40 FO.371/R6759/661/67.
- 41 FO.371/R6794/661/67.
- 42 D.B.F.P., 3rd series, Vol. 7, No. 635.
- 43 FO.371/E5932/7213/44, In January 1939 Turkey had signed a Credit Agreement with

granted her a credit of 150 million Reichmarks.

44 FO.371/R6757/135/44.

45 FO.371/R6797/661/67.

46 FO.371/R6872/661/67.

47 FO.371/R6873/661/67 .

48 FO.371/R6757/R6784/135/44.

49 FO.371/R7146/2613/67

50 Ibid.

51 FO.371/R6855/661/67.

52 FO.371/R7063/661/67. The fact that the Turks pushed so hard for this gold loan was a measure of their economic weakness.

53 FO.371/R7517/R720/44.

54 CAB.65/I WM 2 (39) 1.

55 CAB.65/I WM 3 (39) 2, 5 (39) 2.

56 CAB.65/I WM 19 (39) 13.

57 FO.371/R8250/7378/44.

58 Ibid, Menemencioglu, as Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry was chief negotiator.

59 Ibid.

60 CAB.65/I WM 24 (39) 14.

61 Ibid.

62 R. Fischer, *Basic Negotiating Strategy*, p.87.

63 FO.371/R7820/661/67.

64 FO.371/R8144/661/67.

65 FO.371/R8117/661/67.

66 FO.371/R8317/661/67.

The Turks tried hard to create an auspicious atmosphere for the visit. The İstanbul news-

paper *Vakit* emphasized that Saraçoğlu was going to Moscow to discuss, "ways of increasing the ties of friendship and peace" which united the two countries: "The Turkish friendship, which is indeed ordained by nature, will bear further fruit during this visit.." Sadi Ertem, *Vakit* , 23 September 1939.

67 F.C. Erkin, *Les Relations Turco-Sovietiques*, p. 158.

68 *Ibid*, pp. 158 - 159.

69 *Olaylarla*, p. 151.

70 FO.371/R8603/2613/67.

71 *Olaylarla*, p. 141.

72 *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, October 2 1939, p. 110.

73 *Ibid*, October 7, 1939, pp. 117-117.

74 F.C. Erkin, *Les Relations Turco-Sovietiques*, p. 162.

Protocol 2 of the Anglo-Turkish-French Treaty absolved Turkey from any action which could involve her in a war with the U.S.S.R.

75 *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, *Ibid*, p. 110.

76 The Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, 1833, *Les Relations Turco-Sovietiques*, p.164 gave Russia the right to participate in defence of the Straits.

77 PRO.FO.371/R8563/661/67.

78 F.C. Erkin, p. 167. *Les Relations Turco-Sovietiques*.

79 *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, p. 120.

80 FO.371/R8954/328/37.

81 *Cumhuriyet*, 19 October 1939.

82 D.B.F.P. Series 3, Vol. 5, Nos. 310, 311, pp. 364-267, No. 394, p. 477.

83 Zhivkova, p. 114.

84 Treaty of Mutual Assistance between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom, the President of the French Republic and the President of the Turkish Republic, Ankara (October 19, 1939), Cmd. 6155 (Treaty series No. 4, House of Commons Sessional Papers, Vol. XII (1940).

85 Abidin Daver, *Cumhuriyet*, 4 September 1939.

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İKİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞI BAŞLANGICINDA  
TÜRKİYE'NİN DİPLOMATİK KONUMU

ÖZET

Savaş sırasında Türkiye'nin amacı varlığını korumaktı. Genç Cumhuriyetin tüm kazanımları bir tek hata yüzünden yitirilebilirdi. Dolayısıyla Türk yöneticileri her türlü yola başvurarak savaşın dışında kalmaya çalıştılar.