BOĞAZİÇİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ DERGİSİ

REFERENCE AND COMMUNICATION

Arda Denkel [a]

ABSTRACT

Treating reference as an act of communication, this paper examines certain properties of referring as action description, and argues that the determining of the bearer of a name is unnecessary for successful reference by names. Lastly, an attempt to specify some minimal conditions of reference leads to an explanation of this concept from the point of view of human communication.

Reference can be treated as an act of communication. An account of reference from this point of view will provide a characterization in terms of the contribution of agents participating in an event of communication in which something is said about something. From the same point of view it is possible to regard the concept of reference-as-a-function-of-expressions as derivative. A proper account of reference in the way suggested must answer at least the following two questions:

a) What does the act of referring involve? (or: What must a speaker have done for him to be appropriately described as having referred to an item a?, and, given that the speaker is said to refer to a,

b) On what basis does the speaker do what he is said to do? (or: What are the conditions the fulfillment of which enable a speaker to refer to an item a by the action he performs (i.e., by using a referential expression in a sentence)? or: 'What carries the burden of reference?')

I

Question (a) is about what is done in communicating one's reference. The treatment of reference as an act of communication renders the communication of reference centrally important. Would it be proper to say of anyone that he referred

---

[a] Dr., Department of Humanities, Boğaziçi University.

unless he communicated his reference? If so, what minimal communicative effect must be achieved for it be true to say that an agent's act was an act of reference? Considering the same question, A. MacKay concludes that no such effect needs to be achieved: "how shall we characterize referring? As a first approximation let us say that referring is making known (to our audience) what we are talking about. This needs refining upon. In the first place our approximation is inadequate because it makes the question of whether or not a person is referring depend rather too much upon his audience, and not enough upon him and what he says. Must we succeed in making it known what we are talking about? This would mean that we have succeeded in referring to an object if, say, our audience happens not to have heard us, or perhaps, if unknown to us, the audience does not understand English. The question of whether or not reference is achieved cannot turn on our actually achieving an effect on our audience."[1] MacKay says that instead, referring should be characterized as 'making knowable to our audience what we are talking about (by way of using a referring expression).'

I shall argue that MacKay's proposal is unacceptable, and that something closer to what he rejects may count as an adequate characterization of referring. His proposal cannot be accepted since, according to it, a speaker issuing a referring expression 'which correctly describes the object in question'[2], or which is the name of it, should be said to refer. Using a referring expression in a proper sentential context is making knowable what one is talking about but is not necessarily referring. A speaker who makes knowable what he is talking about with the awareness that it cannot at least immediately be made known has not referred. Using a uniquely specifying description or a name with the awareness that the audience lacks the information necessary to connect the expression with the item intended cannot be referring.[3] Has one referred to a by giving a uniquely specifying riddle as a referring expression, or by giving a definite description of a in an outlandish tongue even if one also provided the relevant phrase-book? Merely making knowable what one is talking about is not sufficient to constitute an act of referring. Using a referring expression in a proper context is the act of making knowable what one is talking about and is necessary for the performance of any act of reference. But, as indicated, the mere act of making knowable cannot be described as referring unless other requirements are fulfilled.

If reference is a rational human act, and if the uttering of a referential expression in a sentence is a necessary ingredient of it, then reference by the use of such an expression must involve a further motive or intention than that of merely 'making knowable.' In uttering a referential expression the speaker's intention could not merely be 'making knowable..', since his intention could not be only that which by the uttering of the expression would already be fulfilled. A rational act is not one that is performed just for the sake of doing it. I submit that the speaker, in referring to an item, must use his referring expression with the intention of making it known

to his audience that he is talking about that item.

Can we show that in referring to a, a speaker must use a referential expression with the intent to make his audience know that he is talking about a? I believe we can do this by considering certain contexts where the use of a description is to be classified as 'attributive' or 'referential.'[4] 'Making knowable what one is talking about' equally characterizes the attributive use of a definite description. However, on such uses, although what fits the description (if it exists) is knowable, the speaker does not refer to any item in particular.[5] An interesting case from our point of view would be one in which the speaker knew the intended referent, and also knew that his audience did not know it. Consider the case of a teacher who read and graded exam papers and who is now returning them to his students: While handing back the papers he says, "The student who wrote the best paper got a B." What he says is true, he knows which student he is talking about, but cannot be said to have used the definite description referentially, as he knows that his audience does not yet know which person he is talking about. But again, it cannot be said that he has not made knowable whom he was talking about. The point is that on the occasion of utterance he did not have the intention to make the audience know whom he was talking about.

Have we got a formula which amounts to reference? Is reference the uttering of relevant expressions with an intention to bring about in a hearer the thought that the speaker is talking about such and such? Is reference the performance of a particular act with a particular forward-looking intent? That just this is not reference can be seen by the fact that we cannot attribute 'success' to it in an interesting sense of the term. For what would be the success of 'uttering a referential expression in a proper context with an intention to induce the thought that one is talking about such and such' involve? It cannot merely be successfully uttering a referential expression in a proper context, since, as we have seen, this is not referring. But it is not the intentional performance of the same act either; success is not to be attributed to such things. We can speak about the success of an intentional act either in terms of the fulfilment of the relevant intention, or as a lesser requirement, in terms of the successful performance of the same act of utterance interpreted or described differently, where the intention is recognized as being built into the action. (Thus 'pulling the trigger' may be interpreted as 'shooting', and while both acts may be successful performance, 'pulling the trigger with an intention to kill' may not, unless 'killing' is viewed as the success of it.) Therefore, unlike 'referring', 'uttering a relevant expression with an intent to make known that one is talking about such and such' is not anything that can be successful or unsuccessful, provided that we are not prepared to count as success the fulfilment of the intent.

Let us for a moment ask why people do not want to say that referring is the fulfilment of the purpose, i.e., the speaker's making known to his audience by what he does

that he is talking about a.[6] MacKay is right in saying that this is because we do not want it to hinge on the achievement of an effect on the audience. But on the other hand, we would not want to ignore the mutual communicative aspect, or the communicability of reference either. I suggest that if referring cannot merely be the act of uttering a sentence containing a referential expression with the intention to make the audience know that the speaker is talking about a, and cannot either be actually making the audience know this by the utterence (that is, achieving an effect on the audience by the utterance); then it is something the speaker can be said to do in performing the first act. That is, it is his issuing the utterance containing the referring expression, where his intention in doing it is recognized by the audience. In doing something a person can be described differently if his intention in doing it is recognized. My suggestion is that 'referring' is such a description: we say that a speaker refers to a in uttering a referring expression in a sentence if we recognize that by this utterance he intends to make known to his audience that he is talking about a.

Why should the speaker's own description of what he does not suffice? Intentions (unless behaviourally displayed) are not publicly observable. Reference, on the other hand, as an act of communication, i.e., as something done with the purpose of communicating, should at least be 'communicable.' But whether or not he has a communicative intent or is prepared to describe his action as referring, the speaker's behaviour will bear no feature that would distinguish it from his merely producing his utterance, without a justified referential intent. Now if there are no publicly observable features that distinguish the description of an act as referring from the same act with the relevant intent not described as referring, and given that the two are different descriptions (the difference being crucial to communication), then I suggest that the distinction is to be found in an audience's being in a position to describe (even if this is not actually done) the speaker's performance as an act of reference. And this, I think, clearly, presupposes the audience's having recognized the speaker's intention (or at least his having assumed it).

Looking at the issue from this point of view, we may provide an argument showing that 'referring' as action description could not be applied to anything less than the intentional performance of a speaker recognized by someone else as referring. Suppose referring was issuing a referring expression (in a proper context) with the intent to make known what is being talked about, excluding the recognition of this intent. How then would an audience's perceiving (i.e., the content of perception) the speaker as merely uttering that expression differ from the audience's perceiving him as doing the same with the intent to refer? If, in terms of what is seen, no difference can be given, then there is no account of why one induces (or, in a sense, communicates) a thought about something while the other does not. Moreover, since most of the time referring results in the inducement of such a thought (i.e., since referring does result in communication) and that mere utterance does not, referring could not just be utter-

ance with intent to refer (or: to make known, etc.). Because communication involves the inducement of beliefs or attitudes in an audience, our account of reference must be able to explain how, by its performance, a thought about something can be induced in this audience. And the above argument indicates that this will not be satisfied unless reference involves the recognition of the speaker's intent. The audience cannot form that thought unless it recognizes the speaker's intent.

It may be said that by recognizing the speaker's intention, the audience will have somehow satisfied this intention, for it will have acquired a belief as to what the speaker is talking about. But the recognition of the speaker's intent to make known what he is talking about cannot be the same thing as the speaker's actually making it known, since the recognition of an act is not an effect of the act recognized. Secondly, recognizing someone's intent to make known that he is talking about something in particular is at best necessary for forming the belief that this person is talking about the particular item a, since recognizing someone's action as an act of reference does not necessarily involve the knowing of what was meant to be referred to. How this can be known is the problem of our next section. Furthermore, when it is known, there is no necessity that what the hearer takes the speaker to be talking about be known by him in the same way as it is known by the speaker (that they both attach the same properties to it). Quite consistently with this, it is of course essential from the stand point of communication that what the audience takes the speaker to be talking about there must be a difference between reference and the misunderstanding of reference.

The parallel with illocutionary acts must be obvious. [7] The important point to note in this connexion is that just as in referring, the success of an illocutionary act cannot be judged solely by the speaker's performing what he can do towards the fulfilment of it: the uptake of the illocutionary force determines the success of the illocutionary act. An utterance with an unrecognized illocutionary force is not an illocutionary act.[8] Similarly, if a speaker meant to refer (intended to make known) by uttering a referential expression in a proper context, he did not necessarily refer since a further condition of this was the recognition of his referential intention by the audience. Thus if the present view is correct the declaration 'In saying " .... ", I referred to a, but was not understood' will make sense if it is interpreted as 'In saying " .....', I meant to refer to a but was not understood (my intention was not recognized)." However, I only wish to emphasize a parallel here, without this necessarily involving a commitment to the suggestion that reference is an illocutionary act.

II

I now turn to question (b). Being recognized as intending to refer to an item is one thing, succeeding in communicating which item this is is another thing. How is

the reference   communicated and what is it that carries this burden? I shall try to characterize two answers offered by the two major alternative views dominating the scene, and will criticise something they have in common.

In accounting for what the users of language do with referring expressions, the traditional Frege-inspired theories employ the notion of 'determining.' According to these, the question how reference is communicated is answered by the assertion that a speaker who is said to refer to an item by employing a referring expression in a proper context determines this item both for himself and for his audience through a certain property belonging to the expression he uses. This property is a body of information associated with the expression and which is true of the item referred to. Thus, in such contexts ' determining' is used roughly in the sense of 'uniquely specifying' or 'picking out' an item by means of the body of information at the speaker's disposal, without this necessarily   implying that for the speaker's having referred the particular item should be grasped or understood by the audience. Rather, if the item is determined for the audience it is made understandable; this avoids a conception of reference that is made to depend on the actual understanding of the speaker (i.e., on the fulfilment of the communication of the reference). On the other hand if, as suggested, a speaker is said to refer to an item at least partly by determining this item, then it would be inappropriate to say of an agent who has not determined the item which is the bearer of the expression he uses that he has referred to the item.

The proper working of a theory of reference of the above sort can be given by specifying the particular way in which it assures the determining of the referent. Indeed, without such a specification there could be no satisfactory account of how the speaker determines for his audience the item in the world by the means of the expression he employs. On at least one interpretation of Frege, and on what has been called 'the cluster theory,' the determining of the referent takes the form of the identification, by the speaker, of the item referred to. Hence on these theories, reference is made by identifying the referent.

'In grasping the sense of a proper name.   we connect the name with a particular way of identifying an object as the referent of the name. Hence two names may have the same referent but different senses: with the two names are associated different methods of identifying some object as the referent of either name.'[9] 'If a speaker refers to an object, then he identifies or is able on demand to identify that object for the hearer apart from all other objects.'[10] In the latter quatation the requirement of identification is left loose, in order to avoid a commitment to the actual identification of the item referred to: being prepared to identify it is here regarded as sufficient. I do not think that this commitment could plausibly be avoided, for if identification (in a sense of the term never quite clarified) is to be employed as the notion carrying the burden of reference it must be viewed as actually taking place; but if in the theory identification is presented only as a readiness, then the theory will need

another notion to carry this burden, and no such other notion is supplied.

Now, reference through identification indeed seems to be the essential way in which definite descriptions, in their referential use, function [11] ; and I shall no longer comment on these. From here onwards, the discussion will be limited to the consideration of reference by proper names. And the question is, whether the above, as an account of how proper names are employed in reference, is plausible. The negative thesis I wish to defend is that, given this concept of identification, no such thing is necessary, and that the identification of the item referred to is not an integral part of reference by proper names. This also amounts to the rejection of the view that the referent of a proper name is whatever item fits the backing decriptions.

I take the counterexamples offered by Kripke, Putnam, and Donnellan [12] to the Cluster of Descriptions theory as first-hand counterexamples to the above-stated target that reference is made via identification. These show that proper names refer successfully even when they are used in the following contexts: (i) where the associated information (backing descriptions) cannot uniquely specify (or identify) any particular item (i.e., more than one particular fits it); (ii) where the associated body of information may be properly used to identify an item, but the item thus identified is different from the referent; (iii) where the associated information does not (cannot be used to) identify anything: nothing fits the information. These are cases where reference diverges from identification, that is, from the body of information associated with the proper name, and thus refutes the view examined. I shall, however, offer an additional argument in support of my negative thesis.

A first point, acceptable to all, is that the body of information associated with the proper name (which may also be called the concept of the bearer of the name) is only instrumental in reference and not the purpose of it. When one is making a referential assertion one is saying something true or false about an object or something-in-the-world which is the bearer of the proper name employed. Concept limitation, that is, scarcity or inadequacy of information does not radically affect reference even on the traditional theory: both Frege inspired and Searle-type explanations would allow that Babylonians, too, in employing 'Morning Star' and 'Evening Star' separately, referred (unknowingly) to the same entity Venus. So I take it to be a general agreement among philosophers of reference that 'someone can use the name "Cicero" to refer to Cicero, and the name "Tully" to refer to Cicero also, and not know that Cicero is Tully.' [13] Suppose now that whenever a proper name is used the referent were actually determined by identification: suppose again that there is a speaker who associates with 'Cicero' something like 'the man who denounced Catiline,' and who is unaware that Cicero is Tully. Now if, as seen above, this speaker uses 'Cicero' and thus refers to Tully, we could ask the following question: what is it that the speaker is supposed to have identified on this occasion? Can we say, for example, that the

speaker knowingly identifies Tully as the man who denounced Catiline? Or, would we say that this speaker, in referring to Tully, just identifies a man (whoever), who denounced Catiline?

If we take the first interpretation, then it hardly seems possible that an identity statement of the form 'Cicero is Tully' should ever be informative. Indeed, if this were how identification of the referent were made in reference, and presuming that proper names are referential in such contexts [14] , any true identity statement would have to be self-evident and trival. The reason is that, on this interpretation referential identification determines the referent in such a complete way that one can draw new information from what is so determined − an untenable view. As to the second interpretation, it can be said that if it were the case, no particular man would be identified, and thus no unique identification would be made. Moreover, it is illicit to infer 'Someone has been identified' from the statement 'Cicero has been identified.'

Can't we think of a third interpretation on which the speaker using 'Cicero' would be viewed as having identified the man Cicero as the denouncer of Catiline (and this time more plausibly), not knowing that Cicero is Tully? So far, it seems easily acceptable; but could one also add that if the speaker identified the man Cicero, in effect he also identified Tully (as the denouncer of Catiline), for, although the speaker does not know it, the man Cicero is the man Tully. But this again is inadmissible: for someone who does not know that Cicero is Tully, Tully cannot be identified as the denouncer of Catiline. The reason can be given, using another example, by observing that one cannot identify Hesperus as the morning star, for the whole point of identification is to specify a particular by means of one's information associated with the name of this particular. What is known determines what a particular is identified as. Thus it is not admissible − indeed it is contradictory − to say that what is known solely as the morning star can be identified as a star not appearing in the morning. Returning to our case, on the information available, Tully is not the denouncer of Catiline: that is, Tully is not identified as the denouncer of Catiline.

We have a position in which a person is said to use the name 'Cicero' and refer to Tully, but cannot at the same time be said to identify Tully by the backing descriptions of 'Cicero'. If identification was indeed what secured the determining of the referent, then it ought to have reached at least as far as reference. As it does not, i.e., as one, on certain occasions may not identify what one refers to, identification cannot be a necessary ingredient of referring. While identification is limited by what is known, referring goes beyond, and reaches the source of this knowledge. While the former is referentially opaque, the latter is transparent.

III

We have observed that on certain Frege-inspired theories, given a speaker, a necessary condition of referring is this speaker's having determined the referent on the occasion of reference. An interpretation of how determining is to obtain in the sense we attempted to bring out has been 'the speaker's identifying the referent.' The argument of the last section has been that no such identification is necessary for reference. In response to our argument it may be said that any theory of reference must say something about how the user of a name can pick out an item, so any such theory will employ some relation which could be called determination. But if determination is not done by the identification of the item, it is indeed obscure how a theory that offers a content of information (e.g., descriptions) as that which makes reference possible will be able to provide another account of it.

There is of course, another way in which an item can be said to be determined on the use of a name, though it is unlikely that a theory of the above sort would adopt it. This sense of determining constitutes the account causal theories offer in explaining how a specific item is picked out when a name is used in a proper context on an occasion. I shall first briefly sketch what in the causal theory is relevant to our concern, and then explain why the Fregean theories could not use it as an account of how the referent is determined.

What Fregan and Causal theories of proper names have in common is that all consider the determination of the referent essential to any act of reference. For instance, according to Kripke, a basic problem of reference by proper names is the question 'how we can determine . . . the referent of a name, as used by a given speaker.' With the exception of rare cases where one can 'determine the references of certain names ostensively,' for other ordinary names the bearers of which cannot possibly be shown, the determining of the referent requires accounting for. [15] Kripke and Donnellan supply the variants on the causal theory to satisfy this requirement. Accordingly, the determining of the item is assured by a causal chain of reference or some other historical link. 'A certain passage of communication reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach the speaker. He then is referring to (the man) even though he can't identify him uniquely.' [16] Kripke describes the causal chain as a reference-preserving link of communication connecting the naming of the item with an actual speaker who has learnt the name. A link in the chain obtains by one speaker's learning the name from another, and thus the name's speading from person to person. This 'learning' is qualified as follows: (i) the speaker who starts to use the name must "intend... to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it," but on the other hand, (ii) there is no need for the speaker's remembering just from whom he acquired or learned the name, and, moreover, (iii) there does not appear to be a necessity that the speaker should know or remember any (unique or not) property belonging to the referent. Thus, on this view, the speaker could use the name with

the intention to refer to whatever item the teaching speaker uses it to refer to, without knowing anything uniquely true of the item. On Donellan's version of the theory we get a picture even less restricted. For a speaker to refer to something by using a name all that is required is that there be 'an individual historically related to (the speaker's) use of the name . . . on this occasion,' without a need for the historical connection to end with an initial naming of the item. [17]

Given the positive statement of the causal theory, apart from its declaring that he who refers does not need to identify the referent, nothing in it seems to contradict the assertions of the Frege-inspired theories. Surely, there is nothing that defies logic in a name's being causally (or historically) connected with an item, and at the same time, there being a body of information true of that item associated with that name. Now if it is shown that identifying an item is not necessary for referring to it, and therefore it is not necessary that the associated body of information be true or uniquely specifying of the item, and if determining the referent is considered as a basic trait of any act of reference, then the question arises as to why a Frege-inspired theory should not be supplemented by a causal-chain-component effecting the determination of the referent. There are two reasons why such supplementation will not be acceptable to a Fregan. (i) It would make the idea of an associated body of information otiose in that no theoretical need would be left for it. At least it would impose the requirement for an argument showing that there is such a need, and (ii) The way of determination the concept of a causal chain allows would not satisfy the Fregean, in that it does not explain how a speaker determines the referent on his use of a name.

Given that there is a causal/historical chain joining someone's present use of a name to an item, in what sense can we say that the item is determined? It seems to be in the sense that the connexion (which is factual and holds regardless of whether the present user knows it) connects the name 'a' with one particular item a, and with nothing else. But this, by itself, cannot explain how the speaker is said to determine a on the occasion of his use of 'a', since ex hypothesi he does not have to know the causal chain. If the purpose of the act of reference is to make known what one is talking about, then the way of determination the causal theory allows will be insufficient as an account of how the speaker determines an item a, the name 'a' of which he employs. But this point is more than just being an aspect of the causal theory that fails to satisfy the Frege-inspired expectations. If causal theory regards the determining of the item as the mechanism carrying the burden of reference, and if all it supplies is a connexion potentially independent of the agents' knowledge, then the theory is not sufficiently restricted, for it is unable to exclude certain cases of failure of reference. While the existence of a causal chain historically and metaphysically determines the referent on the use of a proper name, this does not guarantee that the speaker who uses this proper name can refer. Can this point be further substantiated?

A case showing that there being a causal/historical chain is not sufficient for

referring (i.e., establishing (ii) and providing reason to think that some information on the referent is needed (i.e., satisfying (i) has been supplied by Gareth Evans. [18] Consider the following illustration of it: suppose someone hears Cicero being talked about for the first time. The speakers he hears are referring by the name 'Cicero' to the Roman orator, but our man does not know this, and does not, by following the conversation he overhears, acquire uniquely specifying information about the referent. However, he forms the intention to use this name with the same reference, whatever it may be, as the speakers from whom he heard it. With this background (that is satisfying the requirements of tha causal theory) he comments: 'Cicero was a brave man.' It seems natural to say that the speaker indeed referred to the famous Roman, i.e., to whoever it was that these speakers were talking about. This assertion was taken by his audience to be about the Roman. But now suppose our man approaches another group of speakers this time completely ignorant of Roman history, and utters the same thing. I agree with Evans that in such a case no one can be said to have referred to anything in particular although the requirements of the causal theory were satisfied. The difference between the two cases is in there being, in the first, at least one person (the audience) who has a body of information about (a concept of) Cicero, and thus who knows the convention behind the proper name. We may therefore say that at least one hearer's having some (initial) information about the bearer, enough to acquire the convention surrounding the name, is another requirement, though this does not imply that this information should necessarily be uniquely specifying or true of the bearer.

What is important in Evans' case is that it shows the minimal requirements of reference. Among these minimal requirements the determining of the referent by the users of the name does not seem to be present. If someone can be said to refer to an item a even though he lacks a body of true (though not uniquely specifying) information about it such as to disable him from identifying a either visually or conceptually, then, I think, we can say he is able to refer to a without necessarily picking out or determining a. But now what is interesting is that among the minimal requirements we find traces from both the Frege-inspired and causal theories. For reference to take place there is need for a causal chain linking the use of the name and the referent and for some information, not necessarily true or uniquely specifying, associated with the name possessed by at least one person partaking in communication. Let us ask why the two theories were incompatible: the answer is that both theories offered their accounts, at least partly, as accounts of how the users of names determine the referents of the names they use. Freed from this requirement (which, in fact, is not satisfied anyway) both accounts can be said to reflect important aspects of the referential function of names.

IV

In the light of what Evans' example teaches us I shall try to sketch an account of a speaker's referring to something a , a thought about which he communicates.

First of all, as discussed in section I, for someone to have referred to something a, there is no necessity for this reference's being communicated to an audience, where such communication involves the inducement of the thought that the speaker is talking about a. However, this thought must have been made 'communicable' in the sense that the audience must have recognized, or assumed, the speaker's intent to refer by what he did. Given the distinction between 'making knowable what the speaker is talking about' and 'making it known', we have noted that while the latter may amount to the 'communication of reference', neither is reference. It is time for sharpening the distinction between 'reference' and 'making known,' etc.. Having communicated one's reference implies one's having referred; but having made known what one is talking about does not necessarily involve or presuppose any of these two. It is possible to make known that one is talking about a without referring to a or having communicated reference. The reason is that one can induce a thought without 'communicating' it. [19] Often we use the strategy of talking about someone without 'referring' to him: we talk as if we employ descriptions in their attributive use, and while we make our audience understand to whom our remarks apply we avoid the commitment of having referred to him. We do this by acting as if we do not have referential intent, and thus block its recognition. The point, therefore, is that whatever the mechanism carrying the burden of reference, for that which is induced to be reference, the speaker's intent must have been recognized. Of course, the case of proper names is less flexible in the sense that it is less easy to avoid commitment to reference when we use an item's name in our speech. Somehow, within the convention surrounding proper names an open declaration that they are used with referential intent seems included. However this can be overridden, and examples are available in the literature. [20]

Taking referential performance as the employment of a referring expression on a proper context with the intention to make known what one is talking about, we may now ask whether this is compatible with the conclusion of section III, namely that for referring a speaker need not determine (or even be able to determine) that which he intends to talk about. The answer is 'yes' since a speaker may intend to make known to his audience what he is talking about without its being necessary that he have a body of information uniquely specifying (or true of) it: he may be said to talk about that item which 'the other speaker' (from whom he heard the name) was talking about (the first Evans case). But now, can we also reconcile the conclusions reached in Section I with the audience's not possessing information about a referred to by the speaker? Can someone recognize the intention of another to make him know that he is talking about a if he does not possess a body of information about a? It seems he can recognize that the speaker is trying to make him know that he is

talking about something bearing the name 'a,' though not that he is talking about a. If we can characterize the relevant type of communication as conveying a thought/belief about a particular item, then we may suggest the following:

(i)   in cases where both the speaker and the audience possess some information about the bearer (though not necessarily true, or even the same) communication can take place in the full sense.

(ii)   in cases where neither of the participants possesses information about the bearer of the name employed (the second Evans case) we do not allow that anything has been referred to. The speaker did not say what he said about anything in particular, and, more importantly, he was not 'understandable' as talking about a particular item.

(iii)   in cases where the audience possesses a body of information about the bearer of the name employed, but the speaker uses it 'on the basis of the other spekar's intention,' again it is possible for a complete thought to be communicated. In the understanding of the audience there will be a particular item which the audience takes the speaker to be referring to. Although we allow that the speaker refers (see first part of the Evans case), there is something incomplete here, for the speaker does not know (at least directly) what he is talking about; he is, as it were, a mere vehicle in transmitting 'the other speaker's reference' to the audience in question.

(iv)   in cases where the speaker possesses information but the audience does not, we again encounter something unfulfilled, and, perhaps, this time more important than in (iii). The belief that can be communicated will be incomplete: the audience's understanding will not be about a particular item, but about 'a certain' item that bears a particular name. Of course, the speaker will be said to refer, as he is recognized as having a referential intention and knows what he is talking about, [21] (e.g. someone's hearing its being talked about Cicero for the first time), but he is not understood 'fully.' When the hearer here, in his turn, makes an attempt to communicate a belief about the bearer of the name, he will either fail to refer (as in (ii)), or will be said to refer(as in (iii)   ) with respect to an audience in the know, but will then perform as a 'stepping stone' in conveying the reference of 'the other speaker.' So this is how the suggestion that for reference to take place at least one person (speaker or audience) partaking in communication should know something about the referent is to be understood.

What is the significance of the causal/historical connexion between the name and its bearer if it does not assure by itself a speaker's referring to this bearer? This connexion provides a theory of reference with the historical fact that the name belongs to a particular bearer even if this is in some cases unknown to the agents employing it. When a speaker uses a name this will still be the name of a unique item even if neither

the speaker nor the audience knows the historical connexion, or anything about this item. The causal/historical connexion has the function of (factually) relating one unique bearer to each name. But for the communication of reference to be possible people using names must have some beliefs about what they are talking about. Given their points of view there must be something conceived by them about which they comment. The way they conceive of it (their body of information) does not have to be true or uniquely specifying, since it is not their use of the name or their referring that establishes the connexion between the name and the referent. This is why referring does not require a speaker's determining the referent for his audience.

For a speaker's referring to a by the name 'a' he uses in a proper context, the following must be present: a causal/historical connexion joining 'a' to a, a body of information associated with 'a' (by the speaker or audience) believed to be true but in fact not necessarily uniquely specifying or true, the speaker's intention to make the audience think he is talking about the bearer of 'a', and the recognition of this intent. It should be noted that the association between the name and the body of information will generally take the form of linguistic convention. Learning the name ordinarily involves the learning of this convention too. It is on the basis of such a convention that a speaker using a proper name is justified in having an intention to make his audience know what he is talking about.

The conventionally associated body of information can be culled from the beliefs of the members of a linguistic community, without this implying that the body of information possessed by a given member of this community should always (even roughly) correspond with the above or another member's concept of the same item. In fact, counterexamples to the Frege-type accounts amply demonstrate that there is no such implication. But if so, will the account suggested be committed to some relativity of reference given that the body of information about the referent differs from one speaker to another? This is excluded by the causal/historical connexion: the most one can say would be that a speaker who has the wrong body of information about a, by using the name of a, will still refer to a, but as an item having different properties than a. But this is exactly what we are doing if in fact Cicero is not the author of the deeds history records and books attribute to him.[22]

NOTES

[1]   A. MacKay, 'Mr. Donnellan and Humpty Dumpty on Referring' **The Philosophical Review**, 77 (1968), 197-202. I shall follow MacKay in employing 'talking about a' interchangeably with 'referring to a.'

[2]   **Ibid.**, p. 198.

3   See A. Denkel, 'On Failure to Refer' Mind, No 1, 1981.

4   K.S. Donnellan, 'Reference and Definite Descriptions', The Philosophical Review, 75 (1966), 281-304.

5   This point, essentially, is close to what Donnellan says when he answers MacKay: K.S. Donnellan, 'Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again', The Philosophical Review, 77 (1968), 203-215.

6   A.P. Martinich, in his paper on 'Referring,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, December 1979 issue, defends the view that reference is successful only if this effect is achieved, i.e., the purpose of referring is fulfilled. However, he offers no substantial argument in support of his claim.

7   Unlike Searle, who considers reference as a 'propositional act'(Speech Acts, Cambridge: The University Press, 1969, p. 24), Austin does at times treat referring as an illocutionary act (e.g., see list on p. 162 of How To Do Things With Words, Oxford University Press, 1962). Of course, he widely employs another notion of reference, too, which he views as being "ancillary" to the rhetic act (p. 97). I see this latter notion closer to the technical concept of denoting (the extention).

8   Austin, op. cit., pp. 115-116.

9   M. Dummett, Frege: The Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth, 1973, p. 95.

10   J. Searle, op. cit, p. 79. See also further statements by Searle towards the elaboration of this which strengthen our impression: pp. 81-82, and 85. For instance, consider the following remarks, " ... in definitely referring the speaker picks out or identifies some particular object which he then goes on to say something about, or ask something about, etc. (p.81)... Since the speaker is identifying an object to the hearer, there must, in order for this to be successful, exist an object which the speaker is attempting to identify, and the utterance of the expression by the speaker must be sufficient to identify it. (p. 82)" Consistent assertions by other authors may be found in Strawson, P.F., 'Singular Terms and Predication' and 'Identifying Reference and Truth Values' in Logico-Linguistic Papers, London: Methuen, 1971), pp. 59-64; and D. Wiggins 'Identity Statements' in Analytical Philosophy, Second Series, ed. R.J. Butler (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), p. 44.

11   Of course, Donnellan (see note 4) has shown that it is possible to refer without necessarily specifying the properties of an entity, especially if the description used does not apply to the entity intended. But even in such cases Donnellan thinks the speaker identifies the referent: (in the referential use) " ... it is quite possible for the correct identification to be made even though no one fits the description we used."

12   S. Kripke, 'Naming and Necessity' in Semantics of Natural Language, eds. D. Davidson and G. Harman, Reidel, 1972. pp. 252-255; H. Putnam, 'It Ain't Necessarily So', Journal of Philosophy, 59 (1962), pp. 658-671; K. Donnellan, 'Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions, in Davidson-Harman (eds.), 1972, pp. 356-379.

13   S. Kripke, op. cit., p. 306.

14   D. Wiggins, op. cit., p. 45. Otherwise identity statements would not be about objects,

15   S. Kripke, op. cit., p. 256. We find very similar remarks in Donnellan's 'Speaking of Nothing', The Philosophical Review, 83 (1974), p. 14.

16   S. Kripke, op. cit., p.299.

17   K. Donnellan, op. cit., p. 16, 19.

18   G. Evans, 'The Causal Theory of Names', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 47, (1973) p. 192.

19   See H.P. Grice, 'Meaning', The Philosophical Review, 1957; P.F. Strawson, 'Intention and Convention in Speech Acts', The Philosophical Review, 1964.

20   Articles by K. Donnellan and S. Kripke, op. cit., in footnote (11), and G. Evans, op. cit...

21   Of course, the speaker must not know that the audience lacks the information.

22   Of course, a case of exception is a speaker's overriding reference to an item perceptually present to him which he misidentifies. This issue has attracted considerable interest lately but its discussion requires greater space than I am able to provide here.

ÖZET

Bu yazıda, yönletim bir iletişim edilmi olarak çözümlendikten sonra, belirlemenin adlarla yönletim yapmanın bir zorunlu ögesi olmadığı gösterilmektedir. Bu tür yönletimin gerektirdiği minimal koşullar araştırıldıktan sonra, bunlarla bir açıklama önerilmektedir.