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## ON FORGETTING

Hilmi Yavuz <sup>a</sup>

### ABSTRACT

This essay is an attempt towards the substantiation of the verb 'forget' from the point of view of the philosophy of language. 'Forgetting' is treated as an act, or rather, a 'speech act', and inquiry is made into whether it belongs to the category of 'illocutionary acts', a concept first introduced to philosophy by J.L. Austin. According to the author, (1) 'forgetting' is an illocutionary act, (2) it is not coextensional with 'remembering' though it implies it. (The author recommends any reader wishing to acquire better grasp of the concepts employed in the essay to refer to the following sources: **Philosophical Papers** by J.L. Austin (ed. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock, Oxford Univ. Press, 1962); **How To Do Things With Words**, J.L. Austin (ed. J.O. Urmson, Oxford Univ. Press, 1965); **The Concept of Mind**, Gilbert Ryle, (Penguin Books 1966); and **Speech Acts** J. Searle, (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969).)

### I. INTRODUCTION

In ordinary language, forgetting; very often, is used in order to refer to 'not remembering'. According to the Oxford Dictionary, to 'forget' means 'lose remembrance of; fail to keep in the memory; or, fail to recall' something. In particular, it also has a number of other usages, each of which have completely different meanings. It means, for instance, neglect or failure to do something, e.g. Don't forget to post the letter, or it may mean: to put something out of one's mind and stop thinking about it, e.g. Let us forget our quarrels, or it on the other hand mean, to omit to pay attention to something or somebody, e.g. Don't forget to tip the waiter, etcetera. These are, grammatically speaking, the cases wherein 'forgettin' is used in imperative or semi-imperative forms viz., either as a command or as a suggestion;

<sup>a</sup> Lecturer, Dept. of Humanities, Boğaziçi University.

neither of which falls within the scope of my present concern. In other words, they are, philosophically speaking, far less interesting cases than those on which I am about to fasten. I must also add that in this essay I shall not be concerned with 'forgetting' in a way a psychologist treats it, as his subject-matter. How, for instance, a person can remember easily and accurately at one time, but he is less able to remember this same thing at another time, is a sort of question with which I will have nothing to do. But on the other hand, I believe 'forgetting' has been, and still is, very much neglected both as a memory-claim and as a proper subject to be analysed for the philosophy of language. This, I think, is mainly due to the fact that 'forgetting' is considered to be logically on a par with and grammatically synonymous to 'not remembering'. I hope I will be able, in due course, to show that this contention is false.

## II. FORGETTING AS PROMISE OR RESOLUTION

It is quite obvious, though rather trivial to assert that forgetting involves 'Time' and, basically, refers to the past, but there are cases in which 'forgetting' seems to refer not to the past, but to the future e.g. I shall never forget Chalapin's singing of Boris Godounov. That 'forgetting' in this sense, is not a memory-claim at all, would, I assume, go without saying, but if it is not a memory-claim, then what is it? I shall argue that 'forgetting' when used in the future tense is an utterance intended to induce belief which may well be regarded as implying either a promise or a resolution. A person, for instance, who is deeply in love might, in a moment of excitement, say 'I will never forget you' to his (or her) lover. This example serves my purpose perfectly. Because, this utterance, as far as the speaker is concerned, is a resolution, but as far as the listener is concerned, it is a promise. I emphasize the distinction between promise and resolution because, although a resolution is a sort of promise, i.e. promising oneself, it does not have to be uttered. One can make resolutions e.g. New Year's resolutions such as giving up smoking, without having to utter them either privately or publicly. If he utters them in private, then he is not making a promise, but a resolution. This distinction between 'promise' and 'resolution' has another important implication which should be emphasized. Suppose I am alone in my room and am thinking about a row I have just had with my girl-friend, who has now left the room. If I say: 'I shall never forget what she has said', I would not only be making a resolution, but would also be aware of my feelings in which I have made the resolution, viz., anger. But with a promise this is not always the case. Suppose someone wrote me a letter only saying: 'I shall not forget you. I, if I am not aware of the person's feelings with which this sentence was written, I would presumably be left baffled as to the meaning of this sentence. 'What on earth does he mean by that?' would probably be my first reaction. Because, the sentence on this piece of paper, could mean either that he, i.e., the person who wrote it, is grateful for something I have done for him, or it could equally mean that he is indignant for something I have done to him. In 'forgetting as a promise', it is logically necessary to be acquainted, antecedently, with the feelings of the speaker, whereas in the case of 'forgetting as resolution' this necessity would not arise at all; for the speaker would always be aware of his own feelings regarding a particular resolution.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Promise and resolution can, easily, be mixed up. The fact that resolution does not have an obligatory or binding force makes it essentially weaker than a promise. That is why, in order to make a stronger claim, we use it with 'I promise', e.g., I promise I will never do it again.

From what has been so far, we can see how 'forgetting' acquires a different sense, viz., a sense in which it performs an 'illocutionary act'. Therefore, if I am grateful, it would follow, when asked, to say "in saying 'I shall never forget him' I am expressing my feeling of gratitude.". Austin once remarked<sup>2</sup> that 'an illocutionary act has a certain force in saying something by securing uptake, taking effect and inviting responses.' In this example I have just stated, the locution e.g., 'I shall not forget him' has, in fact, all those necessary requirements. In ordinary language 'forgetting', when used in the future (usually negative) tense, has this illocutionary force in expressing feelings; but in order to be able to 'secure uptake', we must know antecedently the circumstances that led the speaker to utter this remark. As I have mentioned before, it is the knowledge of antecedent circumstances that secures uptake and qualifies the sense which it intended to convey.

But someone might object, for it could be argued that as regards 'forgetting as promise', it is not necessary for others to be acquainted with antecedent circumstances to know the speaker's feelings. The particular way in which it is uttered i.e., the tenderness or asperity of the speaker's manner (so the objection might go) makes it unnecessary; for if one says 'I shall not forget you' with a harsh and threatening tone of voice, then the fact that the listener has not previously been acquainted with the speaker's feelings which made him utter these words does not matter at all. For even if you did not know what made him angry, you would still know that he is angry, for some reason or other, anyway. But this objection is not valid. First of all, an illocutionary act does not insist on securing uptake, viz., that we should understand in which sense it is being uttered; but it also insists on taking effect, viz., that we should understand why it is being uttered. "Unless a certain effect is achieved, illocutionary act will not have been happily, successfully performed. This is to be distinguished from saying that illocutionary act is achieving of a certain effect. I cannot be said to have warned the audience unless it hears what I say in a certain sense. An effect must be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried out... Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution."<sup>3</sup> (Underlining is mine)

### III. FORGETTING AS EXCUSE

Forgetting has a rather peculiar place in the philosophy of language. We have already seen that it has an illocutionary force when used in the future (usually negative) tense. But it also has an illocutionary force when used in the past indicative tense. In what follows, I shall call the latter usage 'forgetting as excuse', as I called the former 'forgetting as promise'. But first, I must, rather briefly, explain what I mean by 'forgetting as excuse'. It is perfectly clear, I think, that in ordinary language 'forgetting' is frequently used whenever we want to be excused for some sort of failure on our part. A simple example would suffice to demonstrate this. Suppose I have made an appointment with a friend to discuss some important problem. But, although I was very anxious to keep our appointment, and despite of the fact that I had made

2 J.L. Austin : *How To Do Things With Words*, Ed. J.O. Urmson, (Oxford University Press, 1965) Lecture : X, p. 120.

3 J.L. Austin Ibid., pp. 115-116.

an entry to this effect in my diary, I had somehow forgotten all about it. Suppose also that he rang me the next day asking why I had failed to keep our appointment. Suppose further, that I apologized and said 'I am truly sorry, but I had forgotten it. You see I had meant to keep it, really, but....' Certainly this answer is intended to be an excuse for not keeping the appointment. In this case what I wanted was to induce a belief that, having failed to keep the appointment, I had acted in a discourteous manner, viz., I had done something unwelcome or bad; and I was sorry for that. But nevertheless I did not intend to shrink from the responsibility; on the contrary, I was prepared to accept it. Furthermore, I was not trying to justify what I had done, but I was, so to speak, pleading guilty. I did not use 'forgetting' in order to justify my impolite behaviour, though I did use it as an excuse. I was not only saying that I, simply, had forgotten it, but I was also giving it a special significance viz., I had intentionally used it as an excuse. Let me try to make this a little clearer: suppose I am asked, quite casually, whether I remember what the weather was like three days ago. If I do not remember, I, naturally, would, simply, say: "I do not remember" or "I have forgotten". I must emphasize that in saying this I was under no obligation whatsoever to remember what the weather was like three days ago, whereas in our first case, in which I have forgotten to keep the appointment, I was. It is quite clear therefore, that in the former case, the utterance 'I have forgotten' is not a simple straightforward memory-claim, it is intentionally made to account for my failure to keep our appointment, viz., it is used as an excuse. As an excuse, forgetting acts as a description viz., it provides a fuller description upon which the defence of my excuse insists.<sup>4</sup> In this sense 'forgetting' is a description of the speaker's mental state. We must note, however, that by claiming that I have forgotten to keep our appointment, I am not giving a justification so that my friend will cease to disapprove what I had done i.e., fail to keep our appointment; but am giving an excuse 'so that he will cease to hold me, at least entirely in every way, responsible for doing it.'<sup>5</sup>

#### IV. WHY FORGETTING HAS ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE?

Now, I think it is time to embark upon the task of explaining the reasons why 'forgetting' has this illocutionary force. We have seen that whenever it is used to express the psychological content of our feelings, it is used in an illocutionary way. We also know that 'forgetting' in that sense is not a straightforward memory-claim. What is meant by this is to be explained in the next chapter. It is enough, for the moment, to say that straightforward memory-claims are those which do not involve either a promise and a resolution, or an excuse. That is to say, that whenever we make a memory-claim we say, we either remembered, or did not remember something which took place in the past.<sup>6</sup> The object of our memory-claim does, sometimes have a special emotional or sentimental significance. When we remember an event or a person, the way in which we remember is determined by our emotional or sentimental state

<sup>4</sup> Professor Austin is right in saying that in case of both excuses and justifications, defence 'I very soundly insists on a fuller description of the event in its context. Suppose I dropped the teacup: certainly, but an emotional storm is about to break out; or, yes, there was a wasp. The first is a justification, the second an excuse.' (J.L. Austin: *A Plea for Excuses*, in *Essays in Philosophical Psychology*, ed. Donald F. Gustafson, Anchor Books, 1964, p. 2.)

<sup>5</sup> J.L.A. *Ibid.* p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> In this essay I am not interested in delusive memory-claims.

towards the object. An example would illuminate this point. Suppose a great man is dying. His wife is by his bedside. A doctor takes the dying man's pulse. In the background two more persons are discovered: a reporter who is present for professional reasons, and a painter whom mere chance has brought here. Wife, doctor, reporter and painter witness one and the same event. Nonetheless, this event -a man's death- impresses each of them in a different way. So different indeed that the several aspects have hardly anything in common. As to the difference between each of these four points of view, the clearest means of distinguishing them is by considering one of their involvements, namely the emotional distance between each person and the event they all witness.<sup>7</sup> Likewise, when I remember, for instance, the death scene of my father, I do not only remember an event, but I also remember it in a certain way, i.e., I feel sorrow and anguish. It is also the case that the description I give to this particular event should be different from that of any other person who happened to witness the same event.<sup>8</sup>

Now consider the following cases:

A) I shall never forget how my father died

B) I shall never forget that my father is dead.

It is quite clear that in (A), what I claim I shall not forget is how my father died, viz., in a car crash. But when I say 'I shall never forget how my father died', I am referring to the nightmarish and horrid experience I have gone through when I saw my father lying dead. I maintain that, in ordinary language, when we use 'forgetting' in the future (simple) tense, negative form, we refer not only to something that is the case but also to our particular state of emotions, and/or feelings towards what is the case. Not forgetting has this peculiarity about it: It refers to an object, viz., the car crash in which my father died **and** it refers to my psychological attitude towards this object, viz., the nightmarish and sad experience I have gone through. It is its second reference that not forgetting lends itself to being served as a psychological description, and this descriptive reference is precisely what replenishes not forgetting with an illocutionary force.

Similarly, in (B) 'not forgetting' refers to a fact viz., that my father is dead, and also to my psychological attitude towards **that** fact. But in this case the descriptive reference is not to the way in which the death of my father had taken place viz., the terrible experience I have had when I saw my father lying dead, after the accident. Not forgetting -as a description with regard to the fact- refers to my mental attitude whenever I remember him as dead. In this case descriptive reference is not to **how** my father has died, but to **that** my father is dead. This indicates that not forgetting with 'that-clause' i.e. when it refers to a fact has, an illocutionary force as well.

<sup>7</sup> This example is due to Jose Ortega Y Gasset.

<sup>8</sup> Of course, when the person is not emotionally involved, the expression which he uses may not be a psychological description at all. - These expressions are usually uttered through 'parenthetical verbs'. See J.O. Urmson: 'Parenthetical Verbs' in *Essays of Conceptual Analysis*. Ed., A. Flew. p. 194; Macmillan, 1966.

<sup>9</sup> G. Ryle: *The Concept of Mind*, Penguin Books, 1966, pp. 258-9.

## V. FORGETTING AS STRAIGHTFORWARD MEMORY-CLAIM

Now consider the following cases :

- (A) I forgot what the name of the capital of Turkey is
- (B) I forgot to put the kettle on.
- (C) I forgot seeing him in Paris.
- (D) I forgot how to ride a bicycle.

This sort of statements do, quite obviously, occur very frequently in ordinary language. People usually forget something either felt, intended, imagined, perceived, or forget such-such is the case when knowledge is involved. Or again, with desuetude, one may forget a skill e.g. I forgot how to ride a bicycle. Obviously, in each of these cases, forgetting involves a different mental act. Let me take each in turn. I hope it eventually will be clearer that forgetting as a straightforward memory-claim is not, logically on a par with **not remembering**.

I think it would easily be admitted that when I utter (A), forgetting implies a conjunction; first, it implies that 'I did know the name of the capital of Turkey', and secondly that 'I do not remember it now'. Forgetting in this sense is a conjunction viz., a conjunction of knowing and **not remembering**. (Note that one of whose conjuncts is necessarily a negation i.e., not remembering.)

In (B), on the other hand, forgetting does not involve a knowledge. It rather implies an **intention**, and also not remembering as it does in (A). In (C) and (D) it again implies different things viz., a **perception** (seeing) and a **skill**, respectively. In those last two cases forgetting implies, together with first conjuncts viz., perception and skill, it also implies a second conjunct, viz., not remembering.

But when we claim to have forgotten a **skill**, we usually use the verb 'to know' before the performative verb which indicates skill e.g., I used to know how to ride a bicycle. We can, therefore, include (D) in (A) as implying both knowledge i.e., **knowing that** and **skill** i.e. **knowing how**. But I must point out that it is by no means my intention to show that **only** those mental acts such as knowing, intending and perceiving are attached to forgetting. Rather, I have chosen (A), (B), (C) and (D) as typical examples. Once again I resorted, in so doing, to the rules of ordinary language such that when, for instance, I chose (C) as implying perceiving (seeing) I wanted to include feeling and imagining in it. It is interesting to discover that the syntactical structure of (C) would not change at all if it were made to refer to feeling or imagining instead of perceiving. In this case i.e. (C), the verb 'to forget' is always followed by the verb (gerund), indicating these mental acts, e.g. I forgot **seeing**, I forgot **feeling**; whereas in (B) the verb 'to forget' is always followed by the verb (infinitive present) indicating intentions e.g. I forgot **to put** the kettle on, I forgot **to meet** him, etc.

## VI. LOGIC OF FORGETTING

From what has been said at the end of the last chapter, we could safely reduce (A), (B), (C), (D) to three type-cases as follows :

(A) Forgetting<sub>1</sub> implies knowledge or skill viz., **knowing that or knowing how, and not remembering**

(B) Forgetting<sub>2</sub> implies **intending and not remembering**

(C) Forgetting<sub>3</sub> implies perceiving (or imagining, feeling) **and not remembering**.

In what follows I shall refer to those cases forgetting<sub>1</sub>, forgetting<sub>2</sub>, and forgetting<sub>3</sub> accordingly. But before going into the logic of forgetting, let me try to show, as I promised to do at the very beginning of this essay, that forgetting is logically on a par with not remembering is nothing, but a rather vulgar misconception of ordinary language. I hope I can now prove this.

Suppose I am introduced to someone, say X, at a party. Suppose further, the friend who introduced us asked afterwards whether I remember seeing him before. I can either say 'No. I do not remember seeing him before', or alternatively 'Yes, but I had forgotten seeing him before'. Now, if I choose the former answer, the hearer i.e. the person who introduced X to me, would be inclined to believe that I had not met (or seen) X before. But if my answer is the latter, the hearer would be inclined to believe that, in fact, I had met X before. 'I do not remember seeing X' means, or has a strong tendency to induce the belief that the speaker does not have any recollection of seeing X. On the other hand, 'I forgot seeing X' means that the speaker had met X before. Clearly, these two utterances have different meanings. The basic misunderstanding that led people to think forgetting as merely not remembering is, I think, due to the fact that, in all three type-cases forgetting, implies, *inter alia*, not remembering. We have seen that forgetting<sub>1</sub>, forgetting<sub>2</sub>, and forgetting<sub>3</sub> have only not remembering in common in their implications. But this is not sufficient reason to make forgetting logically on a par with not remembering. They differ because forgetting implies not remembering and not *vice versa*.

So far we have shown that 'forgetting' does necessarily involve a conjunction one of whose conjuncts is a negation. In all three type-cases forgetting implies knowledge, intention, perception and not remembering. Let us call forgetting *r*, the first conjunct *p* and the second conjunct *not-q*. We have the formula:

$$r \rightarrow p \cdot \sim q$$

Now, when *r* is false, either *p* or *not-q* is false, or '*p* and *not-q* is true' is false. We know that that '*p* and *not-q* is true' is false is logically equivalent to  $p \rightarrow q$ . Let us apply this to, say, forgetting<sub>1</sub>. It follows that if I know that such-and-such is the case, then I remember that such-and-such is the case. We can see that knowledge entails remembering; and not forgetting ( $\neg r$ ) entails  $p \rightarrow q$ , viz., If I did not forget then If I know then I remember.

### VIII. RYLE'S OBJECTIONS

But Professor Ryle does not seem to think so. He accepts that there is an 'important connexion' between the notion of not forgetting and the notion of not remembering (one of which he prefers to call as 'not recollecting'). But he goes on to say that "a person either actually is recalling something or can recall, or be reminded of

it, implies that he has not forgotten it; whereas to say that he has not forgotten something does not entail that he ever does or could recall it. There would be a contradiction in saying that I can or do recollect the incidents that I witnessed taking place at a picnic, though I no longer know what occurred there. There is no contradiction in saying that I know when I was born, or that I had my appendix removed, though I cannot recall the episodes. There would be an absurdity in saying that I do or can recall Napoleon losing the Battle of Waterloo, or how to translate English into Greek, though I have not forgotten these things; since these are not the sort of things that can be recalled, in the sense of the verb in which what I recall must be things that I have witnessed, done, or experienced."<sup>9</sup>

I think I can show where Professor Ryle has gone wrong. According to Ryle 'there is no contradiction in saying I know I had my appendix removed, though I do not recall the episode.' Ryle's mistake consists, basically in his omission of the distinction between **forgetting how** and **forgetting that**. For if I say 'I have not **forgotten how** to ride a bicycle', it entails 'I **remember how** to ride a bicycle'. On the other hand, if I say 'I have **forgotten how** to ride a bicycle', it entails 'I **do not remember how** to ride a bicycle'. Whereas if I say 'I had **not forgotten that** Ankara is the capital of Turkey', it entails 'I **do not remember that** Ankara is the capital of Turkey'. It would be false, therefore to assert that insofar as forgetting with 'that-clause' is concerned, not forgetting does not entail recalling or remembering. Can I say, for instance, 'I have not forgotten that my appendix was removed, though I do not remember that it was removed'? It is quite obvious that **forgetting that** entails **remembering that** whereas **forgetting how** does not entail **remembering how**. It is also the case that **not forgetting how** entails **remembering how** and **remembering that**. On the other hand, **not forgetting that** does not entail **remembering how**, though it entails **remembering that**.<sup>10</sup>

#### VIII. 'FORGETTING THAT' AND 'FORGETTING WHAT'

Apart from logical differences about which Professor Ryle is altogether silent, I shall point out another difference which plays an important role in the logic of forgetting, viz., the difference between **forgetting that** and **forgetting what**. In the process of discourse, I shall be talking about 'forgetting<sub>1</sub>', because it is the only one among our three type-cases that can be used with 'that-clause'. Forgetting<sub>2</sub> and forgetting<sub>3</sub> exclude such possibility. In this chapter I will try to show that forgetting that and forgetting what, do, in fact, correspond to different cognitive status.

Let me begin with forgetting<sub>1</sub> used with that-clause. Grammatical rules show that, whenever forgetting<sub>1</sub> is used in this way, it must be used with the past participle tense of the auxiliary verb i.e. to have. Simple reflexion upon this grammatical

<sup>10</sup> In *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle does not give a definition of 'forgetting', though he does elsewhere. It seems that in *The Concept of Mind* he thinks 'forgetting' mainly in terms of 'forgetting how'. But, in another article, he says this: 'A person who used to care may indeed, cease to care or to care so much. But ceasing to care is not forgetting any more than ceasing to believe something or to mistrust someone is forgetting. "Forget" is reserved, apparently, mainly for the nonretention of information and the loss of skills through desuetude, through it is also used for ceasing to notice things, e.g., for the oblivion brought by sleep or distractions'. G. Ryle, 'On forgetting the difference between Right and Wrong', in *Essays in Moral Philosophy*, Ed. A.I. Melden, University of Washington Press, 1958, p. 156.



fact, makes it quite clear, why this is so. The reason for this would be that, forgetting<sub>1</sub> with *that*-clause is, not a memory-claim, but it is a memory claim *about* a memory-claim. What I am maintaining is, simply, this: when I say 'I had forgotten that Ankara is the capital of Turkey' I am not saying I have forgotten what is the case; but rather I had forgotten that such-and-such is the case *and* (though, not explicitly) I do remember it now. That is to say 'I remember now I had forgotten that Ankara is the capital of Turkey'. So, when we use forgetting<sub>1</sub> with *that*-clause, it means we are using it in such a way as to make a memory-claim about a memory-claim, e.g., 'I knew in the past that Ankara is the capital of Turkey *and* I had forgotten it though, I do remember it now.'

To put it in another way: If 'I had forgotten that Ankara is the capital of Turkey' would have meant that 'I have forgotten it', then it would have followed that 'I did not remember it now'. But what I would have claimed not to remember would have been precisely what had been asserted in the first place i.e., Ankara is the capital of Turkey. Forgetting<sub>1</sub> with *that*-clause, therefore, does mean that 'I remember now what I had forgotten' viz., Ankara is the capital of Turkey. For forgetting<sub>1</sub> with *that*-clause (past participle) entails:

- (a) There is something i.e. a fact, say *p*, such that I did know *p* in the past, *and*
- (b) I had forgotten *p*, between now and sometime in the past *and*
- (c) I do remember that *p* now.

It is clear that why 'I had forgotten that *p*' is a memory-claim about a memory-claim. If I am right in asserting that 'I had forgotten that *p*' ought to induce a belief to the effect that (a) 'I did know that *p* is the case' *and* (b) 'I had forgotten that *p* is the case between sometimes in the past and now', and (c) 'I remember that *p* is the case now', then what is now remembered is not only '*p* is the case', but "the fact that *p*'s being forgotten' is also the case". That is to say, that '*p*'s being forgotten' is also remembered now. The distinction between a straightforward memory-claim such as 'I remember that Ankara is the capital of Turkey' and a memory-claim *about* a memory-claim such as 'I had forgotten that Ankara is the capital of Turkey' is that whereas the former entails 'I know that *p*' and 'I recall that *p*', the latter entails not only 'I knew that *p*' is the case, and 'I recall that *p*' is the case, but that '*p*'s being forgotten' is also the case. If I am right in thinking that 'that *p*'s being forgotten is also the case' is a memory claim, then 'I had forgotten that *p*' is a memory-claim about a memory-claim.

It seems that when philosophers talk about forgetting they tend to see it as simply 'forgetting,' in our sense, where forgetting implies a fact. Austin maintains<sup>11</sup> that with 'to forget', the *fact-form* entails *that-form* and conversely; and feels that 'this shows "to forget" is a success or achievement word' in Ryle's sense<sup>12</sup>, viz., to forget that is to forget a fact. This is true. In this essay I tried to show that forgetting<sub>2</sub> and forgetting<sub>3</sub> also entail something other than not remembering. I maintained that forgetting<sub>2</sub> is to forget an intention and forgetting<sub>3</sub> is to forget a perception or a feeling. I hope I have shown this successfully.

11 J.L. Austin: 'Unfair to facts', *Philosophical Papers* ed. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock, Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 115-6.

12 I think there is a *lapsus calami* here. Austin ought to have said 'failure verb' instead of 'achievement or success verb'.

## UNUTMAK ÜZERİNE

## ÖZET

Bu denemede 'unutmak' fiilinin dilbilim felsefesi açısından bir temellendirilmesi yapılmak istenmiştir. Bu fiil dilsel bir edim, ya da bir konuşma edimi ('speech act') olarak irdelenmekte ve J.L. Austin'in illocutionary edimler olarak adlandırdığı türden bir fiil olup olmadığı araştırılmaktadır. Yazara göre : 1° 'unutmak', illocutionary bir edimdir; 2° 'anımsamamak'ı içerse bile, onunla eşdeğer değildir. (Yazar bu denemede kullanılan temel kavramlar konusunda bilgilenmek isteyecek okurun, özellikle J.L. Austin'in *Philosophical Papers* [ed. J.O. Urmson ve G.J. Warnock, Oxford University Press, 1962] ve *How To Do Things with Words* [ed. J.O. Urmson, Oxford University Press, 1965] ile G.Ryle'in *The Concept of Mind* [Penguin Books, 1966] ve J. Searle'in *Speech Acts* [Cambridge University Press, 1969] adlı yapıtlarına başvurmasını önerir.)