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CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

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

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THE OPEN COURT

Volume XLVI (No. 5) May, 1932 Number 912

THE NEW ORIENT SOCIETY MONOGRAPH SERIES NUMBER THREE

MODERN TURKEY

A Scion, not a Stage of Ottoman "Turkey."

BY MARTIN SPRENGLING
The University of Chicago

THIS monographic number of the *Open Court* is dedicated by the New Orient Society to the task of setting before the intelligent and interested public of America a fair picture of the rise, growth, and present state of modern Turkey. By way of a brief introduction to the excellent and expert articles through which this task is admirably performed in the body of this monograph, the writer will here limit himself to the attempt to set forth and to emphasize two points, not generally known, but indispensable to a real understanding of the rise of modern Turkey.

The first is that modern Turkey is the first and only real Turkey that ever was. The Ottoman Empire was "Turkey" only in the mind and speech of the West not uninfluenced by subject races within the Empire.

The second is that however sudden and miraculous the birth and early growth of modern Turkey may seem to us, it is actually the product of a long and natural historical process which leads up to it.

I.

Old "Turkey," the Turkey of our childhood days, that Turkey out of whose chrysalis present-day Turkey has largely worked itself, was not properly Turkey at all. Few Americans realize that up to less than fifty years ago it was a deadly insult, worse than the epithet "dog," to call any member of the institution which we called Turkey a "Turk." In the language of Constantinople, Turkish though it was, the name Turk designated dirty and ill-smelling nomads who ranged from the wild wastes of inner Asia Minor to Turkestan, which means "Turkland," eastward of the Caspian Sea. To their own mind and in their own speech the proud effendis, beys, and pashas of Constantinople were not Turks.

What were they? Osmanlis, englished from gallicized Arabic

into "Ottomans." The nature of the group and institution designated by this term is not easy to grasp for minds accustomed to our Western notions of nations, states, and churches. To speak of it even as the Osmanli or Ottoman *Empire* all too easily conjures up before our minds faulty conceptions, which had a way of leading astray even great European statesmen in their dealings with it. We may come nearest to the truth, if we coin a word out of words known to us and designate it as the Osmanli Church-State. Advisedly we do not say state church, but exactly the reverse. A group, an institution embodying features of church and state, inextricably intermingled to an extent that the West has never known, has, indeed, never approached except perhaps in the Europe of the days before the Crusades. The adjective Osmanli designates not a people, but a dynasty, a royal house developed from a family of chiefs of a little, and in its beginnings, not very important tribe which came to settle in the northwestern corner of Asia Minor in the troubled times which mark the end of the Crusading era. What there is of church and state, of government and army, is closely grouped about this royal line—is, indeed, throughout the history of this institution not much more than its court, largely its creation.

This grouping and management worked very well indeed, in the beginning, as long as its affairs were relatively small, late in the thirteenth and in the early fourteenth centuries. Osman, founder of the dynasty, from whom it takes its name, is just a little chief of an apparently still partly nomadic tribe of a type that still exists in Asia Minor. Neither he nor his people feel the need to settle permanently or to expand, until Osman comes—or perhaps it were better to say, until he becomes Osman. Osman is an Arabic-Moslem name. His forebears bore quite other names. Osman, in Arabic pronounced Othman, is the name of the third caliph to succeed Mohammed at Medina; he is the caliph who ordered the redaction of the Koran, which remains officially authoritative to the present day. The adoption of this name by the Turko-Tatar chief probably means conversion to Islam, at any rate to active participation in serious Islamic life, which was then fostered and represented, especially in Asia Minor, by the newly rising Dervish orders. With the adoption of this name there comes immediately a change of policy for himself and his people in close connection with Dervish and lay orders. His people, his little army, do not appear to set any great store on being considered Turks, though they speak a Turk-



OTTOMAN IRON HELMET XVI CENTURY

ish dialect. They are a little Moslem army and court grouped about Osman and call themselves after him Osmanlis. As they expand they absorb without scruple or compunction Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs and others; they maintain no racial purity; they all are, or become, Osmanlis, Osman-people. While they are still small, with leader, court, army, and people all in close touch with each other, it is easy to see that this works beautifully.

As they expand—and their appetite for expansion grows with each conquest—this organization still seems perfectly good as long as the expansion lasts. Up to 1550 in round numbers—(personally expressed, to the reign of Sulaiman the Magnificent)

they are knocking at the gates of Vienna, they are pressing Persia back into its own mountains and deserts, their banners wave over Mecca and Cairo, Tunis and Algiers.

Then comes stoppage and stagnation, and presently the current sets the other way. The thing has become a big, unwieldy affair, whose boundaries cannot with the then known means of travel be reached in a day, nor in a week—nay, not in a month, from the capital. Within its confines are all sorts of racial and religious groups, subject to it, but not truly members of it—foreign, indigestible masses, that cannot be absorbed as were the non-Turks in the early days. The royal house has learned in Byzantine Constantinople that luxurious, capricious, *fainéant* seclusion in the pomp and circumstance of their little city of a palace,* which we are wont to associate with our notions of an Oriental potentate. The dynasty, the heart of the system, becomes a rotten harem-ridden shell and shadow of its former self. The son of Sulaiman the Magnificent is Selim the Sot. Both are typical. For a while—an astonishingly long while—the far-flung, loose-hung creation grouped about them still lasts. The Constantinople of that day was a glorious Oriental capital. The furs of Siberia, the teas and silks of China, the tapestries of Persia, the teak and spices of the Indies, the coffee and perfumes of Araby, all flowed through its gates onto the European market. Only slowly and by imperceptible degrees was all this changing. But the day of awakening was bound to come. And it is to the credit of the ageing dynasty, that there at the very heart of the old Osmanli church-state we see its first stirrings. And this leads us to our second major point.

II.

The Turkey of today is not an ephemeral creation conceived and brought into being yesteryear, but the natural outcome of a process that rises and grows for at least a century, and then produces, in place of the mediaeval structure, in this modern world not a mere further stage, but a true scion of the great Osmanli Empire.

To many, even to Toynbee, it seems odd that the first glimmerings of reform, the first awareness of the need of reforms appear at the top of the old heap. To the writer this seems absolutely natural, so far as the Osmanli body politic, especially the Turkified superstructure of it is concerned. What other place was there

*On this great palace or *seraglio*, our readers should consult the excellent story and description, *Beyond the Sublime Porte*, by Barnette Miller, Yale University Press, 1931.

for it to appear in, if one discount the non-Moslem subject races? Constantinople—with officials streaming out and streaming back, —*was* the Osmanli church-state, as, a little later, the keen, shrewd eye of the elder von Moltke saw.

With Russia and Austria encroaching seriously upon the domains of his empire, and France and England lending a hand, as opportunity offered, in the disintegration of the crumbling structure, the enlightened Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) was the first to see and act upon the need of reform. Without entering into details let it suffice to say that serious and much needed alterations were effected both in the central administration at Constantinople and in the government of the provinces. A promising attempt was made to institute a useful and for that time modern system of education. The antiquated army-organization of the Janissaries, dangerous in its weakness against European armies *without,* and in its will and power with closely allied Dervish orders to foment disorders and block the path of progress *within* the confines of the Ottoman commonwealth, was at least supplemented by a corps of new troops drilled and instructed by foreign officers. The thrusts of Europe, among them Napoleon's harebrained attack on Egypt and Syria, impeded this well-meaning sovereign's work, and an internal revolt of reactionary forces brought it to an ill-timed and unfortunate end.

Nevertheless a strong man was found to continue on the road to progress now definitely entered, when Mahmud II, sometimes called, not without reason, the Reformer, became Sultan in 1808. His reign, too, was a troubled one and presents to us, looking back, clear evidence of the fact that the structure he tried to repair was crumbling away beyond help. Russia maintained the pressure from outside by another war disastrous to Turkish arms. England and France destroyed the Turkish navy at Navarino as Greece was winning her freedom. Serbia was in revolt. Presently Moslem Egypt under Mehemet Ali rose against her caliphal overlord. Despite all this the modernization begun under Selim did not come to a full stop. It was in this reign that the Janissaries were finally disbanded and largely wiped out, though their Dervish aids and agitators had to be allowed to continue for another full century. In connection with this modernization of the Ottoman army came the first adoption of European dress, for the army at least, in the ill-fitting and not very picturesque uniform which the elder

Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art
TURKISH TILE PANEL XVII CENTURY

Moltke describes in his letters. It is very interesting to note that in this connection the introduction of the so-called Turkish fez was a Europeanizing improvement over the old Janissary turban, and that its introduction falls almost exactly 100 years before the introduction of the thoroughly European hat and cap.

In the very year of Mahmud's death (1839) the Ottoman com-

monwealth received its first constitution of Western type issued by imperial ukase. The Arabs call it the Tanzimat, the putting in order, the reform. Its official name is the Hatt i Shereef of Gylhane, which means simply "the imperial rescript promulgated at Gylhane." It declared all races and religions equal before the Sultan and in other ways had an enlightened Western ring. But it left the antiquated church part of the Ottoman commonwealth pretty well unchanged, and so side by side with this modernistic rescript there continued the mediaeval canon law of Islam pervading every nook and cranny of human life throughout Ottoman territory.

In the same reign which saw the birth of this attempt at legal reform, that of Abd ul-Medjid (1839-1861) a literary revival begins to take shape. Its creators are young men of army and court circles who have been sent to Europe (in those days chiefly Paris) to learn Western lore, or who, at any rate, have access to European instructors (chiefly French) at home. This is the origin of the "Young Turks" and their movement. There is much that is Western in it. French and English plays, novels, philosophizing essays are translated outright. Presently Turkish plays, novels, and essays are written. Ideas and words quite new to the Ottoman world are embodied in its pages: fatherland, nation, freedom, constitution. Presently, however, genuine Turkish folk-life and folk-thought are brought to the fore. And if, as yet, there is no new, popular alphabet, there does now appear a new language, true Turkish, the Turkish of the people, to replace the old Arabo-Persian-Turkish and the stilted phrases of the previous leisure-class literature. All this is started rolling about 1850 and continues lavine-like with increasing speed, volume, and independence right down to our own day.

The next reign initiates at Constantinople and at Khedivial Cairo the perilous modern art of borrowing money against the security of governmental resources. This introduces the tentacles of modern business and banking into the vitals of the weakening Ottoman body politic and leads to foreign monopolies in addition to the old capitulations. At the same time the aspirations of subject races to independence such as Greece had attained, stir ever more strongly, especially in the Balkans.

It is, perhaps, but natural that all this leads to a final, futile, but flaming reaction in the thirty odd years of Abd ul-Hamid (1876-

-1908), the last great Osmanli sultan-caliph. Great is not quite correct, unless we add the adverb grotesquely great. Even in the sunset glow of imperial pomp and circumstance that surrounded him in the Europe of his day this little, apelike, Armenoid mannikin, determined in diabolical desperation to hold back the hands of his world's clock, stands out as a grotesque purple patch. Some of us still remember the sly, bitter cunning, the insidiously energetic pertinacity with which he held off the great European powers converging upon his boundaries, playing them off against each other or against their favorite fears. Many of us recall him as the instigator, perhaps the originator, of the first vile Armenian massacres for reasons of state. Few of us know that his mysterious court in the fastness of Yildiz Kiosk with its spies and taxeaters lay quite as heavily upon and was as heartily hated by his Moslem and even his Turkish subjects.

How the repression was finally broken by the Young Turk revolutions of 1908-09, how it issued in the curious triumvirate of Talaat, Enver, and Jemal, the difficulties which their not always consistent policies and their halfway measures encountered—these things are recent history and may best be seen and felt in the first volume of Halidé Edib's *Memoirs*, in which this great Turkish writer reached the high point of her literary activity up to the present.

What has been said will suffice to show the American reader that the gigantic figure of the Ghazi, Mustapha Kemal Pasha, which rises with the New Turkey out of the storm and murk of the World War and its aftermath, is not so grotesque and impossible an innovator and revolutionary as without this background he must appear. Against the background we have sketched he appears, in contrast to most, if not all, of his reforming predecessors or contemporary opponents, as a man who sees with a clear eye and cool head, what the steps are which his country and people must take if they would secure for themselves a proper place in this modern world. And having seen what is necessary his indomitable energy and unshaken courage lead him to seek for his country and people as straight a road as possible toward the desired goal.

Viewed in this light it is easy to see that there is nothing revolutionary or wild-eyed about the innovations introduced by the Ghazi's régime. The reduction of the Ottoman royal house first to an ecclesiastical rank and then to innocuousness; the complete excision



VELVET, RED ON GOLD GROUND, XVI-XVII CENTURY

of canon law from affairs of state and its replacement by tried and tested civil codes; the shift from fez to hat; a new alphabet for a new language already in process of formation; the abolition of the Dervish orders,—all these are clearly perfectly natural and correct steps in real progress. The clean dropping of inherited and inflamed hostilities against Greece, the Balkans in general, Russia, England, and France, and the amicable and intelligent regulation of Turkey's international situation is another case in point. The complaint of foreign business and capital against the new régime are intelligible, when one remembers the wholly impossible privileges these factors used to enjoy in the rotting Ottoman commonwealth. The caution of the Ghazi and his government against falling into anything resembling these entanglements is likewise intelligible. The fact that foreigners can do business there, if they behave themselves at least as well as at home, is attested by the continued activity of American tobacco buyers on the one hand,

and by the new venture of the Ford automobile interests in establishing a great assembly plant for the entire Eastern Mediterranean territory on the northern, Tophane shore of the outer harbor of Constantinople.

The job undertaken by the Ghazi of leading no longer merely a royal house and its court and its army, but an entire, extremely poor and backward people out of the mediaeval shadows into the sunlight of modernity is a terrific undertaking for any man in any life span. This fact stands out clearly from what has been said and is doubly clear to anyone who has seen not merely the cities of Constantinople and Angora (Ankara), but even in small measure any part of the Asiatic hinterland. No one, doubtless, knows this better than the Ghazi himself.

If to us in America the glamor of the ancient riches of Stamboul is vanishing, we have yet an appreciable stake in the new venture. However much or little this may have been its intention, American education, selflessly given, has its share in the rebuilding of the Turkish mind already accomplished, as it has its share in the same accomplishment all over the Near East. Our business ventures and the stake to be gained are no longer as large and fantastically gainful as they might have been in Ottoman days; but such as are there make up in solidity and decency what they lack in glamor and adventure. But though we had no stake at all, scientific, educational, or commercial, the valiant attempt of a poor and downtrodden people under extraordinarily capable leadership to find its way by its own efforts out of a slough of despond onto solid ground and a passable road to an endurable future, commands the respect and sympathy of every American worthy of the name.

THE REDUCTION OF TURKEY FROM AN EMPIRE TO A NATIONAL STATE

BY HARRY N. HOWARD
Miami University, Oxford Ohio

I.

THE partition of the Ottoman Empire was the necessary prerequisite to the political, economic, and social reforms which have made possible the evolution of the modern Turkish republic. For it is almost inconceivable to think of fundamental modernization in an empire at the continental crossroads, with the religion of Islam at its basis and a population of such great diversity. Only in a *national* republic are the great basic reforms of a Mustapha Kemal Pasha possible—though more than a century of precedent had prepared the way even for the making of the republic.

The dissolution of the old empire immediately following the great war was one of the most important developments in recent world history. No less astounding has been the regeneration of the Turkish people and the advent of the new Near Eastern state. At its zenith the Turkish Empire was larger than the Roman Empire ever was. It included territory extending over three continents, contained more than 1,700,000 square miles of territory and had a polyglot population of almost 40,000,000. In the days of Suleiman the Magnificent the empire compared favorably in every respect with the states of western Europe, and in a day when dynasties conspired to produce outstanding sovereigns, Suleiman had no superior on a Western throne. Since the treaty of Karlowitz the empire had been on the decline, and had been preserved through the years as much by the existing balance among, and the conflicting interests of, the European powers, as by its own internal cohesion, unity, and strength. Dubbed the "sick man of Europe" by Nicholas I, throughout the nineteenth century the downfall of the Sublime Porte and the crumbling of the state had more than once been signaled. But it was not until the decade immediately preceding the Great War that the fate of the ancient empire finally was sealed.

The reasons for the decadence and the destruction of the Turkish Empire are not far to seek. Internally the state was made up of many diverse peoples, none of whom had been effectively assimilated under the military and sometimes corrupt rule of the government at Constantinople. The social, political, and legal or-

ganization of the state was based on the *Sheriat,* the sacred law of Islam, as founded upon or expounded from the Koran. It was therefore difficult and at times impossible to reorganize the state system in order to meet the demands of modern life. Economically the state became increasingly fettered by the capitulatory régime and was threatened with becoming the prey of world imperialism as represented by the great European powers. In 1875 it announced its bankruptcy, while a few years later its economic and financial life was placed under the control of the European bondholders. Moreover the geographical position of the Ottoman Empire made it ever subject to aggression on the part of the European powers, even as earlier it gave the Turkish rulers obvious advantages for world conquest. Turkey was at the great crossroads of the continents—a crossroads which is strewn with the wrecks of empires. Strategically and politically as well as economically the Great Powers were interested in the region. Great Britain desired not only economic penetration, but what is more, protection of several routes to India, whether through the Straits, the Suez canal and Egypt, or through Anatolia and into Mesopotamia. The Bagdad Railway system symbolized Germany's prize in the imperial struggle in the Near East. France not only had the largest financial investment in Turkey, but long had been interested in the cultural and material development of Syria—ever since the days of Suleiman and Francis I, if not as far back as the crusades. In the year preceding the outbreak in 1914, Austria-Hungary and Italy reached out for a share of the expected spoils of empire. For Russia the dominating concern lay in the fact that fifty per cent of her export trade went through the narrow and strategic waters of the Straits—the "key of her house" was in other hands.

The first great step in the partition of the Ottoman Empire in recent years came in the early days of October 1908 when the Austro-Hungarian government formally proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria announced her independence. And the abortive, centralizing, political reforms of the Young Turks, well intentioned as many of them were, but hastened the further decomposition of the empire. Following closely on the Bosnian episode, the European center of gravity seemed to shift toward the Near East, and in 1911-1912 came the Italo-Turkish war, in which the Turks finally lost not only Cyrenaica and Tripoli in North

Africa, but the islands of the Dodecanese as well. A modern Rome was retracing more ancient paths in a new imperialism.

But the Italo-Turkish struggle had far deeper consequences. Almost instantly the Balkan states, which hated the Turks only more than they did each other, saw the golden opportunity to settle accounts with the Sublime Porte, free their "brothers" in Macedonia, and solve the age-old Eastern Question. By their own efforts, and with the assistance of the diplomacy of tsarist Russia, they at last succeeded in constituting a Balkan league, composed of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro. The first Balkan war, which broke out on October 8, 1912—and which Austria and Russia tried to prevent—was of short duration, since Turkey soon was defeated by the allies. The conference of London achieved a treaty by May 30, 1913, but it did not bring peace. Serbia had been blocked from the Adriatic by both Austria and Italy, and now sought compensation in Macedonia, with the result that internecine war broke out between the allied Greeks and Serbs and the Bulgarians on June 29, 1913. Rumania participated in this second Balkan war, and peace finally was made at Bucharest on August 10, 1913. During the second struggle the Turks once more seized Adrianople from the Bulgarians, and with the signing of peace Serbia and Greece partitioned Macedonia. Greece received both Cavalla and Salonica, while the question of the Aegean islands, as provided in the treaty of London, was to remain at the disposition of the European concert. Rumania assumed control of the Black Sea outlet of the Danube through the annexation of the Silistria-Balchik district in Bulgarian Dobrudja. Thanks to Austria and Italy, Albania, never too dependent on the old empire, now became an independent state. Some six weeks later Bulgaria formally retroceded Adrianople, Kirk Kilissé and Dimotika to Turkey. At the end of the Balkan wars, Turkey still was mistress of the region of the Straits, but her territory in Europe was confined to the portion of Thrace from Adrianople east to the Black Sea and south to the Aegean.

The events of 1913 only presaged the storm which was ahead. Already the Ottoman Empire appeared to be crumbling to pieces. Without heroic efforts on the part of the government and people, Turkey could not be preserved. Moreover all the European powers would, and did, watch every move of Constantinople, no matter in what direction the Porte might turn, since general imperial interests were involved in the fate of the Turkish empire.

PRAYER RUG, CONSTANTINOPLE, XVI CENTURY

And numerous turns were possible. At last, perhaps, the "sick man" might make vigorous efforts at recovery, for he had yet much vitality. Turkey needed, and sought, reforms of a fundamental nature—in the realm of national defense, financial support and civil and economic reorganization. Britain sent a naval mission to Turkey as well as some administrators. Germany dispatched the military mission of Liman von Sanders, against which Russia made such grave protest. France supervised the *gendarmerie* and gave financial assistance in the form of a 500,000,000 franc loan. There were developments in civil reconstruction. But the fate of the empire was in other hands—in hands not so much interested in the rights of peoples as in the spoils of imperialism.

Then during the spring and summer of 1913 there began a series of manoeuvers on the diplomatic chessboard which prepared the way for the division of the Ottoman estate into spheres of influence and interest, a step toward political partition. In March, 1913, Great Britain and Turkey reached an agreement whereby Turkey recognized British interests in southern Mesopotamia. In July of that year the German government outlined its *desiderata* in a possible partition of Turkey to both Italy and Austria—all of which centered about the *réseau* of the Bagdad railway. Negotiations which had been carried on for a year finally culminated in the famous Bagdad railway agreements which Germany made with France and England in the winter and summer of 1914. In these arrangements France and Britain not only recognized the German *"zone de travail"* in the Bagdad system, but secured their own positions in Syria and southern Mesopotamia. The partition of an empire was being discounted in advance, and the powers were calculating both interest and principal together. Russia, it appears, did not favor the demise of the Turk, and was opposed to having such strong neighbors in close proximity to the Straits. The government of the tsar "struggled only to barricade eastern Anatolia from European concessionaires."

II.

If the question of of the breakup of the Turkish Empire was on the carpet when the World War came on, the great struggle itself, in which four great empires passed into history, was to bring about the final dissolution. On August 2, 1914, the ruling clique in Turkey signed an alliance with Germany, and from that time until her entry into action Turkey essentially was under the dominance of Ger-

man military and naval officers in the country. There was a chance, however, that with proper unity of policy and action, the Allies might have kept the Porte neutral, or even might have brought Turkey into the war on the side of the Entente. Russia appeared the only country among the Entente ready to make the necessary and proper concessions—including not only a guarantee of the German economic rights in Asia Minor, but Turkish sovereignty over the islands at the entrance of the Dardanelles, and abolition of the hated capitulations. But on October 28, 1914 the combined Turco-German fleet, now under the command of a German admiral, attacked the Russian ports on the Black Sea without a war declaration, and precipitated imperial Turkey into the struggle which was to seal her doom.

Plans already were evolving as to what should be done with the component parts of the old empire. As early as November 4, Great Britain formally announced the annexation of Cyprus and about six weeks later she proclaimed a protectorate over Egypt, but these regions long had been in the actual control of England. It was not until the opening of the Dardanelles campaign in February, 1915, however, that the serious schemes for the partitioning of the empire were thrown into sharp relief. There were now to be several claimants to the heritage. Among the Balkan states there were Bulgaria and Greece, whose aspirations in Thrace and Macedonia were so fundamentally opposed. And now Greece, under the direction of the imaginative and brilliant Venizelos, offered assistance to the Entente, providing proper guarantees against Bulgaria were offered and the Asiatic territory of Smyrna were accorded her. But Russia, fearing Greek entry into Constantinople as a British puppet, not only forbade Greek action in that region, but for the first time in March, 1915, made an outright demand for control of Constantinople and the Straits. On March 12, Great Britain assented to the Russian proposal, lest the Muscovite be driven out of the war, but Russia was to recognize British and French commercial interests, and Britain was to receive the neutral zone in Persia (as of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907). It was not until one month later that France gave belated consent to the Russian demand, receiving in return assent to her own rights in Syria. At last the "historic task" would be achieved in *Tsargrad*.

The Constantinople issue, however, raised other problems involving the entire question of the future of the Turkish Empire.

When Italy signed the treaty of London of April 25, 1915, whereby she was to enter the war against Germany, she did so not only with the understanding that Austrian territory on the Adriatic should be hers, but that she would retain the Dodecanese islands and receive the district of Adalia on the coast of Asia Minor. At the same time both France and Great Britain were drawing the blue prints of their claims in Asiatic Turkey. The rights of peoples did not count when the great stakes of imperialism were at play, or when a world war was to be won or lost.

After more than a year of bargaining the famous tripartite agreement of April, 1916, between Great Britain, France, and Russia was worked out. Under this arrangement England was to obtain southern Mesopotamia with Bagdad and access to two ports on the Syrian coast, and an added zone of influence to the north and west of Bagdad. France was to have Syria and the Adana vilayet, western Kurdistan and Mosul, with a zone of influence in the desert east of Syria. Russia would receive Armenia and a part of southern Kurdistan. Palestine temporarily was to be placed under an international régime, and only later was designated to become a Jewish national "home" (November, 1917) under British control. France and Britain were to construct Arab states or confederations in their spheres of influence. Another document, known as the Sykes-Picot accord, May 9-16, 1916, embodied these terms.. Such were the plans for the inheritance of the Ottoman estate. It did not matter that Britain already had made promises to two groups of Arabs which were in fundamental disagreement with the Franco-British schemes. The Arabs did not know this until the Bolsheviks published the documents, and the "independence" of the Arabs was little more than a division of Arab territory between France and Britain.

But the war did not go so well for the Allies. Bulgaria entered the struggle on the side of the Central powers in October, 1915, after being promised Macedonia, and access to the Aegean Sea through western Thrace. The Dardanelles campaign ended in failure and resulted in the evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula in December, 1915-January, 1916. Greece finally entered the war against Turkey when there was not much left to be done, expecting to share in the spoils of victory on the coast of Asia Minor near Smyrna.

The year 1917 witnessed noteworthy events which had their effect on the future of the Turkish Empire. In March the tsarist

government gave way before the bourgeois revolution and a provisional government was established in Russia. And in April the United States entered the fray on the side of the Entente. Even under the provisional Russian government, the foreign ministry adhered to the secret treaties and to the policy of acquiring control over the Straits and Constantinople. The cabinet, however, under the hard pressure of the Petrograd Soviet, finally enunciated the doctrine of no annexations and no indemnities, and stated that Russia sought imperial domination over no foreign territory. President Wilson was known to be opposed to the policy framed within the secret agreements, but the Allies promised Italy additional territory in Asiatic Turkey through the treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne shortly after the American entry into the war.

When the Bolsheviks came into power in November, 1917, they denounced the entire edifice of the secret treaties and began to publish their contents to a rather startled and disillusioned world. The communist pronunciamento had much to do with the Lloyd George statement of January 5, 1918 that Britain would not molest the Turkish "homelands" in Anatolia and Thrace, but would insist on internationalization of the Straits, and would not return the liberated areas of the old empire—Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine—to the "execrated" rule of the Turk. This was a liberal commitment, but neither France nor Britain was giving up territory to which it aspired. Three days later President Wilson announced his "fourteen points" and declared that "the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule" should be allowed an opportunity for autonomous development. The Straits, of course, were to be internationalized.

But the war went on, and despite increasingly liberal pronouncements, Britain and France reached an agreement in December, 1917, which bade fair to complete their schemes of partition, when France was given control of southern Russia, and Britain was assured control of the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia and Kurdistan. This was accomplished almost at the very time that the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was being framed and forced on a beaten and distracted Russia! By the end of the war the Allies were almost in complete control of Asiatic Turkey. Bulgaria's surrender in September, 1918, prepared the way for the Turkish capitulation in the armistice of Mudros of October 30, under which the Allies were to occupy all the



WOOLEN RUG, ASIA MINOR, XVII CENTURY

forts of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and Turkish troops throughout the empire were to be demobilized. Provision was even made for Allied occupation of almost any part of Turkey which they desired to seize.

Shortly after, and only four days before the world conflict came to an end, France and England announced the emancipation of Syria and Mesopotamia from the Turks as the rôle which "the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories." Then in December, on the eve of the Paris conference, Great Britain secured both Mosul and Palestine, the latter to become a Jewish "home," though it had been Arab and Moslem for 1300 years! France needed British support for her Rhenish and other aspirations, and was willing to make the trade. Britain no longer had to fear Russia on the north of Mosul in Kurdistan, and no doubt the London government felt that a British Palestine was a better safeguard for Egypt and the Suez canal than a Palestine under international control.

III.

No more important problem came before the Paris conference than that which the Turkish question raised. The powers were agreed that the Ottoman Empire should be partitioned, but so conflicting were their aims that a settlement was impossible for more than a year, and even then it proved abortive. The question of the Straits alone concerned all the European powers at the conference; and it involved the peace of the world as well. There were other issues: Thrace, the future of the "Turkish homelands," Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan and Palestine. Nor should the struggle for economic rights in general, nor the contest for Mosul oil in particular be omitted from that chronicle. That there would be a future Turkish state was to be taken for granted. What should be done with it was a very different, as well as a very difficult question. In the end it was to be answered only by the miraculous rise of the Turkish nationalists themselves. As to the former subjugated peoples, Mr. Wilson favored the mandate system as the only solution whereby peoples not yet ready for freedom might be placed under political tutelage pending complete independence. It was under the mandate system eventually that the old empire finally was divided up at the San Remo Conferences of April and December, 1920. As the United States had frowned upon a mandate for the Constantinopolitan state in the region of the Straits, so now the

American government rejected the Armenian mandate. But France received control over Syria, while Britain took over the Palestine mandate, as well as the new Iraq kingdom which was created in the land of the two rivers. The American government, however, held up final action on the eastern mandates for more than two years until an adjustment could be made with reference to certain American economic claims in those regions.

The policy of partition reached its apogée at Sèvres on August 10, 1920. Now both the Hejaz and Armenia became "independent," and the British once more sought to detach Kurdistan from Turkey. Britain and France registered their control over the mandates already awarded, and promised Italy a sphere (which never materialized) in southern Anatolia. Greece, already detailed to "enforce" the peace against the Turks, was to receive not only Smyrna and the Dodecanese, but the islands at the entrance of the Dardanelles, Thrace and Gallipoli. In addition, the Straits were to be placed under such "international" control as to render them ever subject to the menace of British sea power. This was a threat not only to Turkey, but to Soviet Russia, the southern geography of which had not been altered by the revolution. Finally, through the continuance of the capitulatory régime and the insertion of very serious restrictive financial and economic clauses, what was left of Turkey would be deprived of all real independence. But the treaty of Sèvres miscarried, and brought not peace but the sword.

The treaty of Sèvres was broken before the ink of the signatures had dried. The Turks could not be pressed any farther. The grasping policy of the Allies drove them to violence and they now prepared for desperate resistance. The "sick man" was to rise from his bed and defeat his enemies. The landing of the Greeks at Smyrna on May 15, 1919, turned loose a destructive force which lit the burning torch of nationalism on the plateaus of Anatolia. In the far places of Erzerum and Sivas, Mustapha Kemal Pasha summoned his hosts to do battle for the defense of the fatherland. For the first time, perhaps, a *national patriotism* had been aroused. The story of what followed is one of the most amazing dramas of our recent history. On March 16, 1920, British troops took possession of Constantinople, adding more fuel to the fire. In the following month—April 23—the newly organized Grand National Assembly, led by Mustapha Kemal met at Ankara and adopted the "national pact," modern Turkey's declaration of independence. It

decreed freedom for Turkey, signed away the phantom of empire, stipulated commercial freedom for the Straits, and guaranteed the rights of the peoples of Turkey. But accept the old political, judicial, and economic capitulations which had bound the empire hand and foot, it would not. There were now two governments in Turkey: the one at Constantinople under definite British control; the other at Ankara engaged in a life and death struggle with the Greeks, which lasted from the fatal landing in May, 1919, to September, 1922.

Of that struggle we shall say but little. The adventurous policy of Venizelos and Lloyd George, now seeking dominance in the Near East through Greece, had produced the conflict. The Turk was fighting for the right to live; the Greek for empire. Both Greece and Turkey, as a matter of fact, were struggling to utter exhaustion, though the Greeks had the better of it throughout 1921. But in March,1921, the Ankara government brought about a veritable diplomatic revolution in the East. After settling accounts with her neighbors, Turkey succeeded in making an agreement with France (March 9) and three days later with Italy, providing for the economic development of southern Anatolia. At odds with Britain ever since the Paris conference, the French were now alienated over the Rhenish policy, and almost literally at the point of the sword with Britain in the East. Great Britain would now have to achieve her Eastern policy without either French or Italian aid. Finally on March 16 Turkey and Soviet Russia, whose fundamental interests in the Turkish question did not differ from those of the tsarist régime, signed an agreement providing for regulation of the Straits and ceding Kars and Ardahan to Turkey. Once more a common danger brought the Turk and the Muscovite together, and it did not matter that the one was now nationalist, and the other in the vanguard of the communist revolution. In the fall of that year (October 13) the Kemalists signed the treaty of Kars with the Caucasus states. With the signature of the Franklin-Bouillon agreement with France in October the breach between France and Britain in the East became complete.

Little wonder is it that in the following year Turkey succeeded in driving the Greeks into the Mediterranean sea at Smyrna—in September, 1922. Fearful lest the victorious Turks might enter the

zones of the Straits, the British government rushed reinforcements to its troops at Chanak, and called on the dominions, the former allies, the Balkan states, and even the American government to help defend civilization at the Dardanelles. But the world did not answer the summons. On October 11, the armistice of Mudania put an end to the Greco-Turkish war, and a few days later the Lloyd George coalition came to an end. After eleven years of constant fighting, the Turks had won their war for independence. Thanks to their fighting capacity, their organizing ability, their moral vigor, and to the military genius of Mustapha Kemal winged victory perched on the Turkish standards.

The call was now issued for a peace conference which was to meet at Lausanne, and which was to consider all the ramifications of the Eastern question, provide a new régime for the straits and bring peace to the Orient. The conference was one of the most important diplomatic conclaves of the post-war period in Europe, and all the great powers, including the United States and Soviet Russia, were represented. Since the Allies invited representatives from both the Constantinople and Ankara governments, the Grand National Assembly, almost on the eve of the gathering—November 1, 1922—replied by abolishing the sultanate, and the Constantinople government came to an ignominious end. Henceforth Anatolia would rule in Turkey!

Having won independence on the battlefield, the Turks, led by the astute, shrewd Ismet Pasha, had yet to win their freedom at the conference table. But again peace was delayed, for the Turks were not to be browbeaten at Lausanne. And the great powers—Great Britain, the United States, France, and Soviet Russia in particular—were in such opposition that the first conference broke up on February 4, 1923, without reaching a settlement. Questions of imperialism, of territory, of concessions and oil (in which the United States was seriously interested) and of water routes were very difficult to settle—especially when selfish interests played the dominant note . Nor did the Turkish ratification of the American Chester project ease the situation. Finally, however, the conference reconvened in April, and after a bitter fight over concessions and the problem of the capitulations, it produced a treaty on July 24, 1923. By the new treaty Turkey surrendered all claims to practically all the territory which the war had torn from her, though she disputed Britain's pretentions to the Mosul vilayet and its riches.

Courtesy of The Art Institute of Chicago

BOTTLE FROM KUTAHIA IN ASIA MINOR XV CENTURY

But the new republic received all of Anatolia and in Europe, not only Constantinople but eastern Thrace with Adrianople and Gallipoli. Greek inhabitants were to be exchanged for Turkish inhabitants of Greece, a cruel but perhaps necessary solution of that issue. Non-Moslem minorities were to be protected, but the Greek

patriarchate in Constantinople was to be shorn of its political power. War indemnities were renounced mutually. Finally, in return for the abolition of financial, economic, judicial, and political capitulations, in existence since the days of Suleiman—which alone would enable them to live in independence and freedom—the Turks agreed to the internationalization, freedom, and demilitarization of the Straits. These waters were to be placed under an international commission responsible to the League of Nations. Alone among the Central powers, the Turks had made a *negotiated* peace, and they had done it well.

Lausanne had sounded the death knell of an ancient empire, but announced the birth of a new Turkish republic! By 1923 the old polygot empire, with its antiquated political and social structure, which had failed to solve its national problems, had given way to a national republic, which already had set its sails toward the West. Torn from a time-honored anchorage, some 14,000,000 people, most of whom lived on the Anatolian plateau, now set out on the difficult seas of modernization. Unwittingly the process of partition of the empire became a part of the development of the national state which was becoming modern under the guidance of the republican dictatorship of Mustapha Kemal.

Whether Lausanne means complete peace to the Orient remains for the future to tell. The strategic geography of the Near East remains unaltered. The problem of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus continues, though the region has been "internationalized" and demilitarized. Nor has all been tranquil in the "liberated" regions which France and Britain took over from the old empire, as Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Egypt bear ample witness. But modern Turkey is free from the corrupting influences of a worn-out empire. Out of the crucible of the most terrible war in history a new Turkey has emerged—a new Turkey in a new Orient, a modern state which may teach many lessons in that new Orient. The epic of war and carnage has given way to the epic of modernization. But the story of the modernization of this old Moslem land remains yet to be told.

THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF TURKEY

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I

AMONG many important transformations which have taken place in the political organization of the peoples of the world since the beginning of the twentieth Century, that effectuated by Turkey has been one of the most complete and most significant in its historical importance. During these years three distinct forms of actual government have been used: The first was a despotic imperial system, which derived from the original powerful organization of the great imperial days, with substantial modifications in the course of the nineteenth Century; the second, which prevailed from 1908 to 1919, with a partial prolongation until 1922, was a constitutional monarchy headed by a sultan who exercised very limited power, and a cabinet of older and younger statesmen who worked with a Parliament elected by two stages; the third form of government, which started in 1919 and became fully effective in 1923, was an extremely democratic republic, with the theoretical concentration of all powers in an elected National Assembly, modified, however, progressively in the direction of actual monarchy by the supreme influence of President Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

In spite of these apparently radical changes, a high degree of continuity prevailed, based upon old fixed characteristics of the Turkish people. It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that Turkey originated at the close of the thirteenth Century from a nucleus of Turkish-speaking nomads who came from Central Asia with the primitive organization of a tribe under a chief. A Turkish people grew from this through natural increase, the addition from time to time of Turkish and Turcoman groups newly arrived from the East, and the incorporation of non-Turkish individuals and groups who took the Turkish language and the Mohammedan religion. The adoption of this religion by the Turks affected their character, mental outlook, and national organization profoundly. In fact their government soon became practically a double one, with two great parallel institutions, corresponding generally to church and state in mediaeval Western Europe. The Ruling Institution carried on the duties of civil and military government, while the Moslem Institution took care of religion, law, and education. At the head of

both was an emir who later became sultan, and who from the time and fact of the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks attained quite consciously a position of imperial dignity.

From the beginning of their organization, the Turks had to reckon with other peoples, differing in language or religion or both, who were brought in through subordinate relationships. Such groups were allowed a considerable degree of autonomy, regulating their internal quarrels and such questions as concern religion, marriage, and inheritance. Recognized groups were known as *Millets,* which may be translated as "nationalities."

This system is usually considered to have reached its best development and most successful operation in the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520 to 1566). The period from this great sovereign's death to 1683 was on the whole a time of equilibrium, although it was marked by very considerable vicissitudes of upheaval and pacification. The form of the government was not greatly changed before the nineteenth Century, although there was a considerable modification of spirit, in such directions as growing conservatism in both the Moslem population and the subject peoples; decline in military effectiveness in comparison with other powers; economic division of labor with active business more and more controlled by Greeks, Armenians, and Jews: a growing consciousness of practical inferiority; and a relative hopelessness of adequate recovery. The officials of both great institutions were drawn more and more exclusively from the Turkish population. Their system of training, extraordinarily advanced in the Sixteenth Century, failed to take into account progressively the changes in world affairs, alike military, political, and intellectual.

In spite of settled conservatism, the more active minds in Turkey became convinced early in the Nineteenth Century that the Empire's destruction lay no great distance ahead, unless considerable adjustments to the rest of the world could be effected. This idea came to expression in the various "Reforms," which were pushed both by the sovereigns, in particular Mahmud II (1807 to 1839), and by the party of "Young Turks," who exercised much influence from the time of Mahmud to the beginning of the reign of Abdul Hamid II (1876 to 1909). Various opinions have been held of the effectiveness of these reforms. Undoubtedly legislation ran well ahead of practice, so that the aspect on paper of Turkish institutions was regularly considerably more than actual practice.

Nevertheless in the fifty years from 1826 to 1876 a very great practical transformation of Turkish institutions was effected. The old Ruling Institution, including practically the army organization of Spahis and Janissaries, was destroyed. In its place a Council of State and an army of modern type were organized. Local government was also thoroughly reorganized, so that governors and mayors, assisted by councils, controlled public affairs. The Moslem Institution of the Turks and the parallel *Millets* were far less easily modified.

A great group of changes in the Nineteenth Century was related to the world-wide movement toward nationalism, which appeared successively among the peoples of Turkey, reaching the Turks themselves last. The Christian groups in particular advanced by various methods of revolution and foreign aid through the phases of autonomy to independence. Thus Servia, Greece, Rumania, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Albania appeared. The Moslem nationalities were similarly detached in Algeria, Tunis, Egypt, Tripoli, and Arabia. The Kurds alone have so far failed to complete the process.

The reign of Abdul Hamid II in a number of ways delayed the process of change. While the "Young Turks" succeeded in the first month of his reign, with the negative assistance of a Conference of Ambassadors at Constantinople, in drawing up and proclaiming a Constitution, this document was suppressed with the outbreak of war against Russia in 1877, and remained mere paper until 1908. Abdul Hamid supported the Moslem institution, maintained the *status quo* as regards the remaining *Millets,* and while retaining the forms of the Council of State and local government, built up a system of personal government through secretaries and spies. By emphasizing skillfully the differences between small neighboring powers and also between the great powers of Europe, he retarded visibly the disintegration of the Turkish Empire. It was a time of little progress, during which, however, there was a considerable accumulation of forces pushing toward modernization of government and of life generally.

II

Among the forces working for improvement in Turkey was a continuation under the same name of the "Young Turk" group of the time of Abdul Mejid and Abdul Aziz. Late in 1907 Turks of this ilk and moderate Armenian reformers agreed in Paris to or-

ganize a "Committee of Union and Progress" (later called for short "C. U. P."). A central executive committee was established at Salonika, and affiliates were built up from materials already known and recruits in various parts of the Empire. The army corps in Macedonia and Thrace were particularly labored with, and many young officers joined the movement. In the summer of 1908 the Sultan extended his spy system into the Army. The time moreover was very critical, because in the previous year the ten-year understanding between Russia and Austria had expired, while a new understanding had been reached between Russia and England. Various utterances led to the belief that fresh measures were contemplated looking toward the withdrawal of Macedonia from Turkish control. The two majors, Niazi Bey and Enver Bey, raised the standard of revolt. The army at Salonika accepted their point of view, and on July 24 a telegram was sent to the Sultan, requesting him to put into force the Constitution of 1876. The Sultan was wise enough to realize that he must yield or fall, and so he consented to the request.

Thus began the ten years' rule of the "Young Turks," a time of great vicissitudes. The Constitution required to be brought up to date, because in particular the responsibility of ministers was rather to the Sultan than to the Chamber of Deputies. This was corrected. An important question was where the actual guiding will should reside. For nine months it remained with the executive committee of about seven persons residing at Salonika. A "Party of Union and Progress" was organized in the Parliament to express the will of the Committee. In April of 1909 a Conservative "Liberal Unionist" Party, supported by the Sultan, inspired certain soldiers to surround Parliament House and compel a change of Cabinet. The C. U. P. members of Parliament fled. Within three weeks the armies of Salonika and Adrianople were brought up to the capital. The rule of the C. U. P. was restored, the executive committee moved to Constantinople, and the policy of "Ottomanization" was changed to one of "Turkification." Abdul Hamid was deposed and his brother became Sultan under the name Mohammed V. The change was of large importance because the new Sultan, though about sixty years old, was possessed of no political experience. He wished benevolently that his people might all be free and happy. The "Young Turks" decided and controlled policies, gradually introducing some of their own members into the Cabinet.

Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art

TURKISH MINIATURE PAINTING XVI CENTURY

An Italian ultimatum in October, 1911, led to war, which brought about the downfall of government by the C. U. P. in July, 1912. Another group thus guided Turkey into the first Balkan War, claiming to be more constitutional than the "Young Turks" had been. Their rule, however, was overthrown by a *coup d' état* in January, 1913. Enver Bey later became Minister of War. Talaat Bey was first Minister of the Interior and later Grand Vizier, while Jemal was Minister of Marine. These three men were largely responsible for bringing Turkey into the Great War, after which, although the Constitution was nominally enforced and Parliament functioning, power was more and more centralized in their hands. Turkey's defeat and surrender in October, 1918, caused the triumvirate to flee the country, but the form of government was not changed. Sultan Mohammed VI, who had succeeded his brother in 1917, worked with a cabinet, which presently arranged for the election of a new Parliament in order to make peace with the victorious powers. The Sultan remained in Constantinople as nominal head of the State until November, 1922.

But another system of government for Turkey had its beginning in 1919. Mustapha Kemal Pasha, already distinguished as a military commander and administrator, was sent in May to disband Turkish troops in the interior. At the same time the "Big Three" at Paris authorized the Greek government of M. Venizelos to occupy Smyrna. This action, accompanied as it was by some unnecessary violence, sent a thrill through all Turkey, which provoked distrust of the victorious powers, revival of hatred toward the Greeks, and a firm resolve to resist threatened national destruction. With Mustapha Kemal as leader, conferences were held at Erzerum and Sivas, and an army began to be gathered at Ankara. Early in 1920 the Parliament of Constantinople adopted the "Turkish Pact" which had been formulated at Erzerum. The British occupational authorities then decided to arrest nationalists. A number of these and many deputies from the interior of Asia Minor escaped from Constantinople and gathered at Ankara. They took the position that the Sultan and his government at Constantinople were under coercion and so were not to be obeyed. But acting in the name of the Sultan, a new constitution began to be formed and national resistance was organized apace. By September of 1922 the Ankara Government was able to defeat the Greeks and to turn toward Constantinople. In November the Sultan, alarmed at the growing

strength of the new Government, fled on a British warship. Ankara declared him deposed and his office abolished. Fifteen months later the Caliphate was also legislated out of existence and the way was clear for a republic of very liberal character.

III

It is perhaps the case that the leading principles of the present government of Turkey have been determined from the first by the political ideas of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. Certainly the government began to take shape from the time of the conference at Erzerum in July, 1919. The theory is extraordinarily simple. All power rests primarily with the Turkish people, of whom males of eighteen years and above, possessing no special disqualifications, have the right to vote. Women were later admitted to voting in local elections and the hope has been held out of establishing complete female suffrage. The voters choose either directly or by two stages a Grand National Assembly, in which resides all powers of government of the Turkish State. The Assembly makes the laws, elects a president of the nation as chief executive during its term, and creates courts of justice. It possesses and has exercised authority over all individual citizens and over all organized groups, not excepting the Mohammedan, Moslem, and Christian church organizations.

The Constitution, gradually built up during five years and promulgated in complete form on April 20, 1924, replaced completely the Constitution of 1876. The first article declared that "The Turkish State is a Republic": this article alone is not subject to amendment. Article Two formerly provided that the religion of the State was Islam, but this provision was rescinded in 1928. The one official language is Turkish: this was, in 1924, written in Arabic characters: since 1928, it must be written in Roman characters. The seat of government was established by fundamental law in Ankara. Constantinople, officially styled Istanbul, lost its preëminence primarily because by the peace settlement the straits are open to all warships of all nations, whose cannon might control the government if located there, but obviously cannot reach as far as Ankara; furthermore the new capital is centrally located for all national purposes, whereas the former capital was practically on the circumference of Turkey proper.

The Constitution declares that sovereignty belongs without re-

striction to the nation, and is exercised by the Grand National Assembly as the sole lawful representative of the nation. Deputies may be chosen from all citizens over the age of thirty, with usual exceptions, such as persons condemned to penal servitude or for fraudulent bankruptcy, persons of foreign nationality or in service of a foreign power, and citizens who cannot read and write the Turkish language. Elections are held regularly every four years. For the election of 1927, the People's Party, which alone is recognized, chose a committee to nominate candidates for the Assembly. This Committee transferred all its powers to President Mustapha Kemal Pasha, and the slate he made was elected *in toto*. In 1931, after the President had made a tour of the country, the Assembly voted a new election six months before the expiration of its term. For this election thirty places were left open for free choice by the voters, but they actually filled only twenty of these places. Deputies are held to represent not only the constituency which elects them but also the whole nation. The Assembly must sit during at least six months of each year. Deputies have complete immunity, except that a vote of the Assembly may surrender to judicial authority a member accused of flagrant crime. Debates are public and reported to the public without modification, except that the Assembly may vote to meet in secret session and may withhold the proceedings of such meetings. Deputies may hold no other office.

A number of powers are reserved to be exercised only by the Assembly. Among these, besides complete power over legislation (except for the President's suspensive veto), are the right to declare war and conclude treaties of all sorts, to pass on all concessions involving financial responsibility, to grant pardons, and to expedite judicial investigations. The Assembly may impeach one of its own members by a vote of two thirds or more. A deputy loses his seat if he absents himself from sessions for two months without permission.

The President of the Republic is chosen by the Assembly from among its own membership. He is eligible for reëlection. He is considered as head of the State and in this capacity may preside over the Assembly on ceremonial occasions. But he may not take part in the discussions of the Assembly and may not vote. In case of his death or disability, the president of the Assembly takes up his duties provisionally. The President is required to promulgate laws within ten days of their enactment, except that he may before

the expiration of that time return a law for reconsideration, stating his objections. If the Assembly again passes the law by a majority vote, the President must promulgate it. He presents an annual message upon the opening of Parliament in each year. His decrees require to be signed by two designated officials. He is not specifically declared Commander-in-Chief of the Army: "Supreme Command of the Army is vested in the Grand National Assembly, which is represented by the President of the Republic." He is responsible to the Assembly only in case of high treason.

The President designates a President of the Council of Commissioners, or Premier of the Cabinet, from among the deputies. The President of the Council selects the other commissioners subject to the approval of the President of the Republic. The government must present its program within a week if the Assembly is in session, and may then remain in office only if given a vote of confidence. The members of the Cabinet or Council are responsible collectively and individually to the Assembly. A Council of State is also established, chosen from among the deputies, "to decide administrative controversies and to give its advice on contracts, concessions, and proposed laws drafted and presented by the government."

Courts of justice are to be organized and regulated by law. Judges are subject only to the law. They may hold no other office. A High Court may be constituted for trying great officials on questions arising as regards the performance of their duties.

The constitutional provisions in section five ("Public Law of the Turks") are of very great interest, inasmuch as they represent a wide departure from general custom in Moslem lands and particularly in the old Ottoman Empire. Among the "natural rights of Turks" are held to be: "Inviolability of person; freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech, of press; freedom of travel and of contract; freedom of labor; freedom of private property, of assembly, of association; freedom of incorporation." All privileges are abolished. Life, property, honor, and the home are declared inviolable. There shall be no torture, corporal punishment, confiscation, or extortion. While the right of eminent domain is reserved, actual value must be paid for all property taken. "No one may be molested on account of his religion, his sect, his ritual, or his philosophic convictions." In order however that individuals may not be considered entirely outside the power of the State, it is provided



Courtesy of Demotte, Inc.
LEATHER BOOKBINDING XVI CENTURY

that the Assembly may by law limit the liberties of the individual "in the interest of the rights and liberties of others": in particular religious observances must not disturb public peace or violate law. Law may control the press and in special circumstances the

government may restrict freedom of travel. Law determines conditions of contract, labor, property, assembly, association, and incorporation. Letters, documents, and packages may be opened upon order from the Attorney General and approval by a competent court. All Turks have the right of petition to competent authority or to the Assembly and are entitled to a written reply. The Cabinet may decree martial law in appropriate circumstances but not for more than one month at a time. The Assembly may prolong or diminish the duration of martial law. Martial law suspends the inviolability of the person, the home, freedom of the press, correspondence, association, and incorporation. Education is regarded as free except that it must conform to the law and be subject to the supervision and control of the State. Primary education is obligatory and gratuitous in the government schools.

Evidently considerable inconsistency appears in the declaration of rights and the reservations on behalf of the law. It may be said that in this Constitution a theory of extreme liberty of the individual is in conflict with practical rules to retain a full measure of social control for the State. Laws are not to be made in contradiction to the Constitution, but no Supreme Court is set up to decide such questions as may arise. Amendments may be made to any part of the Constitution (except Article 1) by a simple process: at least one third of the total number of deputies must sign a proposal to amend; after adequate discussion two thirds of the total number of deputies may adopt the amendment.

IV

Mustapha Kemal Pasha has been the central figure in Turkey since 1919. From the time of his graduation from military school in 1902, he was a reformer and an organizer of secret societies in the interest of governmental improvement. He worked his way up in the army, and distinguished himself in the defense of the Dardanelles. He was not in favor with the C. U. P. and the "Young Turks," because, it appears, of a greater uprightness of character and a superior integrity of purpose. His leadership was confirmed by the victory at the Sakaria River in August, 1922. It was but natural that he should be made the first President of the Turkish Republic. The people had been accustomed to monarchy during their whole existence. Their experience with Parliamentary and Constitutional government had been limited in time and badly

broken up by warfare. The guidance of a strong benevolent hand suited their circumstances well. Mustapha Kemal was then made not only President of the Republic, but President of the Assembly, and of the Council of State, and of the People's Party. The Triumvirate of the C. U. P. had disappeared after the Armistice of 1918. Less selfish leaders remained, such as Javid, Rauf, Adnan, and Madame Halidé Edib (wife of Adnan, but in her own right feminist, novelist, patriot, and statesman). Some of these and others desired a two party system and made some efforts toward the organization of an opposition party. The result was fatal to Javid: his name was connected in 1926 with a plot against the life of the President, and he was tried, convicted, and hanged. Adnan and Madame Halidé found security in exile. The attempt in 1930 to start another opposition party with the approval of the President was not successful.

The President has had the services of a number of devoted and competent men, among whom Ismet Pasha stands out prominently. A Colonel and then a General in the war against Greece, Ismet was appointed chief of the delegation to negotiate peace at Lausanne in 1922 and 1923. Since his laurel-crowned return he has usually been premier. While theoretically the whole governing power of Turkey rests in the Grand National Assembly, practically it has been confided to President Mustapha Kemal Pasha, who has in effect personally appointed not merely the members of the Cabinet, but nearly all the members of the Assembly. All important laws and regulations have emanated from him. Nor has he proved unworthy of the nation's confidence. He has lived in only moderate comfort, without any accusation of amassing wealth for himself, and he has given all his time and energy toward improving the political and economic condition of his people. Being childless, the question of heredity of office has not arisen. He has not followed the example of George Washington in laying down the Presidential office after two four-year terms. If this be made a charge against him, the rejoinder may be made that he is not surrounded by as large a group of capable substitutes as was the first American President, and that he was only fifty-one years of age as against Washington's sixty-five upon the completion of the second term. In pursuing the comparison further, he leads a people about twice as numerous as those in George Washington's America, with a greater foreign trade. On the other hand, instead of leading a

new people, expanding over a comparatively empty country, Mustapha Kemal is the head of an old people in a much older land.

From their origin (if the previous story of Asia Minor be taken into account) until the last ten years, the Ottoman Turks had been the controlling people in an empire, but now they have become a national state. Thus in a sense their nation is as new as was the United States after 1789. The results of ten years of warfare have been on the one hand to lose territories in which a non-Turkish majority dwelt, and on the other hand to expel from the remaining territories nearly all of the non-Turks. The new Turkey is therefore well above the average of modern states in homogeneity of population. It suffered serious disadvantages from the loss of young manhood in the recent wars and from the fact that the Turks themselves, except for the peasantry of Anatolia, have been largely a people specializing in government and war. They were obliged to take up industry and commerce as unfamiliar tasks. Another serious handicap was the age-old tradition of corrupt government. The relative hypocrisy of the "Reform Period" had established habits of wide discrepancy between the texts of laws and their observance. The incapacity of the former Turkish government to establish and maintain a financial system by which salaries might be paid regularly, made difficult a transition from the old system of government by personal payments hardly distinguishable from bribery, to a modern régime by whose theory officials paid regularly by the State, put their ability at the service of the public.

The new Turkey inherited from the old a readiness to borrow and promulgate laws which might be only partly applicable to the local situation. The old government had translated large portions of the Code Napoléon, and made these the law of the land. The new Turkey similarly took the Civil Law of Switzerland, the Commercial Law of Germany, and the Criminal Law of Italy, and translated them into Turkish and made them the law of the land. This process was of course much quicker and more systematic than an attempt to codify and modify the Turkish law. The adoption of the Swiss Civil Law solved speedily two serious problems of social reorganization. The ethics of Islam sanctioned plurality of marriage on the part of men, and personal slavery. Natural evolution had greatly reduced polygamy, and slavery had been declared illegal. But the Swiss Code immediately eliminated the possibility of lawful polygamy and likewise omitted slavery. Adjustment in

the former case was made by recognizing that plural marriages already in existence were not invalidated, but no more could be contracted.

The new Turkey has replaced its old political system by an incomparably superior governmental machine. In fact, the new Turkish government challenges comparison with any in the world at a number of points, such as simplicity of theory and practice, ease of amendment, adaptation to the circumstances of the nation, and freedom from entanglement of political with economic regulations. As regards the last item, the Constitution does not hinder the Assembly from any action it pleases to take for the economic reorganization and advancement of the country. Control of education and religion is restricted only by provisions emphasizing individual freedom.

The government has worked steadily toward the establishment of good relations with other nations. Treaties of amity and commerce have been concluded with neighboring and distant powers. Non-aggression pacts have been signed with some. While not a member of the League of Nations, Turkey joined in the Briand-Kellogg pact. Turkey likewise took the lead lately in organizing a Balkan Conference, which promises to replace the vanished forcible maintenance of unity by voluntary agreements, so as to take advantage of permanent geographical and economic features common to the Balkan and Turkish countries.

Among the great tasks at which Turkish statesmen must continue to labor are the political education of the people, comprehension and assimilation of the best Western political ideas, recovery from the damages of war, utilization of the resources of a varied land, emergence from the effects of the world-wide depression, leadership of less advanced Islamic peoples, and the building up of a more and more respectable place among modern nations.

MOSQUE OF SELIM I 1570-1574
(From G. Migeon, *Les Arts Musulmans*)

TEN YEARS OF THE NEW TURKEY— AN ECONOMIC RETROSPECT

BY LOUIS E. VAN NORMAN
Washington, D.C.

ONE of the most picturesque and impressive chapters in the history of the modern world was opened on November 1, 1922. On that day the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, in session at Angora, soon to be the capital of the Turkish Republic, adopted the following resolution:

> After having struggled for centuries against the heavy calamities incurred through the ignorance and dissipation of the Palace and the Porte, the Empire had almost disappeared from history, when the Turkish Nation, its real founder and possessor, rose against both its foreign enemies and the Palace and the Porte which had joined them, and formed the Grand National Assembly. Its armies entered into actual armed conflict with its foreign enemies and the Palace and the Porte under known conditions of difficulty and privation, and has this day attained freedom.

This Declaration of Independence of the new Turkey was followed by the completion of the organization of a Republic under the Presidency of Ghazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha, one of the most forceful characters of our times. Now, almost exactly ten years

after this declaration of independence, what has been accomplished by the new Turkey?

The new nation was set up at a very difficult period in the life of its people. The country had been weakened by decades of war. The treasury was depleted. Foreigners held control over part of the finances. Agriculture was depressed. Business and commerce were almost entirely in the hands of non-Turks, many of whom had been forced to leave the country, carrying with them the skill, the intelligence, the capital, and the initiative which was so much needed for reconstruction. Finally, the Republican leaders themselves were mostly soldiers, untrained in the business of statesmanship and unschooled in economics. It is not to be wondered at that they made many mistakes. Inexperience in fiscal affairs, which had been largely under the control of foreigners, resulted in some serious blunders in handling the revenue system. Then perhaps almost equally serious was the attempt at an extreme policy of "going it alone," without foreign advice or foreign loans. This latter policy, however, was soon modified, especially as regards technical advice in construction work.

Turkey's territorial shrinkage may be realized when one remembers that, up to the beginning of the World War, the Ottoman Empire (as it was then called), included a territory in Europe and Asia of more than 700,000 square miles, with more than 21,000,000 population. Turkey in Europe is now only slightly larger than the State of Massachusetts, and the entire Republic just about the size of California and New Mexico combined, with a population of perhaps 14,000,000.

It looked for a time as if Kemal, who carried the burden of the transformation largely on his own shoulders, would share the fate of the last Sultan. The obstacles he faced were almost without number and the situation seemed hopeless. Kemal, however, had courage, patience and the capacity to "say nothing" in four or five languages.

It was a revolution in every sense of the word that he had staged, a moral as well as a political and economical one and, thanks to his high qualities and the backing of his people, he has been able to triumph.

The Western world has been surprised at the young Republic. It has almost been astonished at itself. What it has accomplished in the past decade in outward appearance is only equalled

by the inward change in its citizens. This is not merely a question of putting on new garments. It has evidently been a real change of heart.

The disappearance of the fez and the veil have only been symptomatic of what has been going on slowly in the minds and habits of the people. The adoption of the Western garb for their bodies and of the Latin alphabet for their words has gone deep psychologically. Not even the thoroughness of the system of education carried on by Moscow to make Communists out of all young Russians can exceed the thoroughness with which the new system of education in Turkey will make over the coming generations in accordance with the new ideals.

The seat of an ancient despotism, for many years the home of the Caliph, the head of the Moslem faith, Turkey for long centuries was typically Oriental in customs, traditions, and outlook. She is now resolutely shaking off the encumbrances of a worn-out social and economic order. Kemal insists that this is not with the intent to imitate other lands. It is consciously to expedite broad-gauge, constructive measures, necessary to the economic readjustment and advance of a vigorous, progressive modern State, old politically but new economically.

Volumes have been written on the rebirth of Turkey. The story can be put in a phrase: The Turk is now looking Westward, no longer towards the Orient.

With the fez gone from the heads of the men and the veil slowly but surely leaving the faces of the women, even down to the peasants, with universal suffrage (without distinction of sex), and the Latin alphabet, the Western calendar and the 24 hour clock, reformation of the school system and a public works program for the construction of railways, ports and breakwaters, as well as irrigation, reclamation and highway construction, the new Turkey is already on the road from Asia toward Europe—economically and politically, if not geographically.

Like other countries, with damp coastal plains and dry uplands, the new Turkey (Anatolia) has a variety of climate to offer to human life and agriculture. While the entire coast, along the Mediterranean and Black Seas, is mild and rather too humid for comfort, in the interior there are extremes of heat and cold. On the whole the uplands are favorable to agriculture and certain special crops—such as fruits and tobacco—do very well, especially in the

A RUSSIAN REAPER NEAR ANKARA

west. With irrigation, the new nation will be enabled to assume an almost enviable position. It is true that the water supply in Turkey has always been imperfectly utilized, but the arid lands present conditions not very different from those found in our western States and the solution of the problem is no doubt the same. This means that with a greater supply of water a larger population can be supported and sustained on a higher plane of living and culture. Due to war and backward political conditions as well as changes in water supply and lack of rain, there has been an apparent decrease in agricultural fertility. Under the blessed influence of irrigation, however, tobacco, wheat, fruit, wine, silk and livestock flourish in Anatolia and cotton does rather well.

In ancient times, extraordinary civilizations flourished in these valleys of the Near East. Later, climatic shifts buried empires under feet of sand. Who knows in what nearby future, however, extensive irrigation projects (some of them already under way) may bring into being modern replicas of Chaldea, Babylonia and Assyria.

The Turk is preëminently a farmer and a fighter. He came out of the East a thousand years ago as a fierce conquering warrior, but

OLD BURNT TOWER OF ANKARA

when he settled in Europe and in Asia at the gates of Europe, he became a tiller of the soil. He produces excellent tobacco and cereals. In 1930, cotton of a kind quite unlike our American varieties, was grown to a total of more than 75,000,000 pounds.

Numerous agricultural reforms are under way, many of them dependent on irrigation. So is diversification of crops. Even more pressingly important is a rather elaborate scheme for the expansion of credit to agriculture. At Angora, President Mustapha Kemal is developing a model farm incorporating many new American ideas. An excellent quality of wheat is produced, more than 100,000,000 bushels representing the 1930 harvest.

The Turk is more of a farmer than anything else. His country has mineral resources not yet developed—zinc, manganese, copper, asphalt, salt, gold, silver, and petroleum are to be found. But he is preëminently a cultivator of the soil.

Although he still has troubles with his subject peoples—including particularly the turbulent Kurds—even this problem he is facing courageously. There has been an attempt to lighten taxes on the peasants so long and so ruthlessly exploited under the Ottoman Empire. The old, crude legal system of the Moslems has been entirely discarded and a new system has been established on the basis of advanced European practice. Church and State have been completely separated. There is an ambitious and energetic Child Welfare Association; clinics for children have been opened; American experts have been employed.

Another far-reaching social "reform" has been the abolition of polygamy. It is true that having plural wives was never so general

a practice as believed in the Western world. But the Koran permitted it and many Turks who could afford to maintain several households did so. The prohibition against polygamy has had an important effect on the social situation.

Industrially, the new Turkey is as yet very young. The rug business, which, up to a few years ago, represented its chief contribution to modern manufactures, was practically destroyed by the Greeks during the "war" of 1923. Textiles now are the foremost industry. Today there are a few textile mills in Anatolia, some sugar factories, leather tanneries, fruit canneries, oil presses, cotton



AN ANATOLIAN OXCART

gins and some fig and raisin packing establishments. In 1927 (the latest figures available) there were some 65,000 manufacturing establishments with perhaps 250,000 workers in the country.

Obviously, Turkey needs development of her transportation system not only for the movement of men and goods, but as a necessity for the exploitation of her natural resources such as petroleum and other minerals, and cotton. In transportation facilities, however, she is as yet very poorly equipped. At the end of 1930, there were just short of 4,200 miles of railway in the country, of which some 2,000 were operated by the government and the remainder by concessionary companies. Some 800 more are now under construction, planned to tap the economically profitable sections. Angora, the new capital, is now rather well served by rail connection with Istanbul. Considerable impetus has been given to industrial expansion by the new law "for the encouragement of industry" and, more

recently, by import quotas which restrict foreign purchases. Electrification projects are being carried out, and we are now told that today 96 towns and villages are equipped with electric power. This is in a very dramatic contrast to old-time conditions in the days when Sultan Abdul Hamid was almost fanatically opposed to electricity for his people. He had got in his head the notion that "dynamos" and "dynamite" were, somehow, related and that electricity meant the end of his reign.

The new Turkey is trying hard to reform its finances in every way. Several exchange control measures in 1931 have been helpful in keeping capital at home and permitting its utilization in important business enterprises. Imports have been restricted in the interest of maintaining the currency. In 1930, Turkey realized a loan of $10,000,000 at 6½ per cent from the Swedish Match Company in exchange for a match monopoly for a period of twenty-five years.

As to foreign financial relations there is still the hangover from the days of the Sultans. It would be tedious to go into a restatement of the always complicated and much discussed question of the "Ottoman Debt." The Turkish Republic, by treaty agreement with the foreign bondholders, has resumed the service of this debt. Beginning with 1929, the full installment stipulated was paid. Last year, 1931, owing to general business and financial conditions, only about one-third of the installment was met. Further settlement negotiations are pending and the bondholders have not lost faith in their ultimate satisfaction on this score.

In other respects, the foreign relations of the new Republic are on a better footing. This is particularly true of relations with the Balkan countries, including Greece, so recently an enemy. Now that the "Capitulations" have been abolished (by the Treaty of Lausanne) foreigners in Turkey are for the first time subject to Turkish laws. For many years a non-Turk believed it impossible to reside or do business in Turkey unless special safeguards were accorded him. Now he is finding the same protection (and it is an increasingly satisfactory one) as the Turk himself. Closely allied to this position is the opposition to the old regulations concerning education under foreign auspices. We now hear that Turkey may become a member of the League of Nations.

Reform of government administration is also progressing. Only last December two new ministries were created by law, one of

Agriculture and one of Customs and Monopolies. The former is self-explanatory. The latter will have charge of all government monopolies, excepting the postoffice, telegraph and telephone. Radio broadcasting is now a State monopoly.

As yet, the new Turkey has only a comparatively small foreign trade. In 1930, this was represented by a total of about $140,000,000 both ways. Most of the imports in that year came from Germany, with the United States considerably behind. We sent to Turkey some $2,900,000 worth of leather and manufactures, clothing, motor vehicles, rubber and rubber goods and agricultural machinery. We bought tobacco, rugs, furs and skins, opium, wool, certain fruits and gums valued at somewhat over $8,000,000. Although there has been a decline in Turkish-American trade (at least from our standpoint) since 1922, when we sent them $16,000,000 worth and bought $21,000,000 worth from Turkish merchants, we may probably expect to have an increasing business with Turkey in the near future, especially in the form of motor cars, farm machinery and leather goods.

As a matter of fact, we have been doing business with Turkey for a long time, at least a century. Commercially, we have always been good friends with the Turks, largely, perhaps, because of the fact, acknowledged on both sides, that we are known to be interested only in business as business, with no ulterior political motives.

Since the Republic has been a going concern, we have sold goods to the Turks we never expected to sell before. Take, for example, the fact that the American typewriter manufacturers could never sell their machines in Turkey. The Turks had always used the ancient Arabic script, enormously difficult to work out on a machine because it needed more than 480 letter combinations. When Kemal ordered the abandonment of this Arabic script and the Latin alphabet substituted for it, he did so, of course, in the interest of a higher standard of literacy in his country. But he also had in mind to facilitate business dealings with the rest of the world and to make it easier for modern ideas to soak into Turkish popular consciousness.

This change was even more revolutionary than the disappearance of the fez and the veil. It went deeper into the habits of the people. But it has worked. The Western alphabet is now in the schools all over Turkey. It is also in the press, the "ads" and the



A VIEW OF OLD ANKARA

Courtesy of The Oriental Institute

signs all over the cities. As a result of this "reform" the demand for American typewriting machines is steadily increasing.

The abolition of the fez, the national head-gear, has been another item in the Westernization program. For ages the bright red head-gear, known in Turkey as the fez and in Egypt as the tarboosh, was distinctive of the Near East, at least of the Turkish part. The new régime at Angora, however, looked upon the fez as a symbol of the old order, even associating it with the Moslem hierarchy, the union of church and state. This union had to go and the fez went with it. This created a big demand for ordinary hats and caps. Some of the orders went to continental Europe, but many came to the United States.

The veil (both the picturesque yashmak and charshaff) which had concealed the faces of the Turkish women from time immemorial was also

disapproved. Mustapha Kemal is said to have diplomatically suggested to the local authorities that they intimate that the beauty of the Turkish women should no longer be concealed from the world. This helped to get rid of the veil—and incidentally, is gradually opening a market for cosmetics and other beautifiers, so-called, from the Western world.

Exports during recent years have suffered decline because of diminished foreign demand. Several years ago there was a very healthy trade out of the Straits and Mediterranean. The writer himself has seen enormous cargoes of rugs, tobacco and figs, which the Turks were then calling the tripod upon which their prosperity rests, come out of Smyrna and be carried on American and French ships to Europe and the United States.

An almost equally revolutionary change was the abandonment of Constantinople as the capital. Constantinople (now Istanbul) was built as the capital of the Byzantine Empire. On one Christmas Day fourteen centuries ago, it saw the dedication of Saint Sophia, a splendid temple. With the coming of the Turks, this became a Mohammedan mosque. Its beauty still commands our admiration. Its glorious domes are now actually covered with patent American roofing.

Kemal chose Angora (Ankara, the Turks call it) as capital, primarily, in order to get his countrymen away from the dangerous seductive influences of European diplomacy. Trade and industry have probably suffered financially, but also psychologically by the removal. For centuries Constantinople was to the commerce of Turkey what London is to that of Great Britain and New York to that of the United States. It was more. Because of its geographical position, it has been even more a trade center, favored by nature, than either of these other great cities. It has also been a center of political, religious and historic importance. However, because it had royalist and reactionary tendencies, it was abandoned by the young Republican government.

Politically justifiable, perhaps, the choice of Angora as the capital of the new Turkey is nevertheless not beyond question. It is aloof from the commercial life of the country and will have to be quite made over before it can realize its mission. With the exception of the rail connection with Constantinople, it is badly isolated. However, perhaps this very isolation will enable the new leaders

to maintain, untainted, their ideals of independence. Moreover, Angora is progressing along the road of modern nations with seven league boots.

Angora, the capital of the new Turkey, is in the racial heart of the Turkish nation. In a recent address, Dr. Julius Klein, assistant Secretary of Commerce, thus describes the city as he saw it in the year 1930:

> A curiously arresting, fascinating town, of 75,000 people, this Angora—full of fantastic contrasts, an embodiment of violent ancient epics and of surging modern aspirations.... Angora today is the seat of a government which has its eyes riveted on the future and which "means business" in every conceivable sense of that term. When I was there last winter, I was struck by the enormously varying aspects of the place. The old town, rather dingy, with narrow streets and houses of sun-dried mud-bricks, clusters about the base of a towering rocky citadel or acropolis crowned with mementos of every conqueror whose hordes have swept over that Anatolian plain. How utterly different this is from the new Angora that has been rising only a short distance away—a town laid out with much of the simplicity and precision and broad vision that we find in Washington, a city with splendidly planned boulevards, pleasant parks, broad spaces, and fine new government buildings.

While the new Turkey has still a long way to go before she can take her rightful place among modern nations, she is on the way.

The rapid economic progress in the new Turkey during the decade is especially notable when it is remembered that most of the reconstruction work has been carried out by means of the country's own limited funds, and with scarcely any aid of foreign capital. If it is difficult for Westerners to understand why the Turks should have permitted their extremely—almost fanatically—nationalistic policy to extend even to foreign investments for economic development, it must be recalled that, in the days of the Sultans—particularly the late ones—foreigners controlled practically everything in the Ottoman Empire. The new Republic does not intend to repeat this mistake.

"It is a tremendous undertaking to awake a sleeping people," said Mustapha Kemal recently to a friend from the West. "But," he continued, "we are determined to awaken ourselves and remain awake. Modern science is international. We shall use it to the full. But we shall take good care to remain Turkish."

MUSEUM AND STATUE OF MUSTAPHA KEMAL

FACTORS IN TURKEY'S CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION

BY HENRY E. ALLEN
Lafayette College, Easton, Penna.

WHEN Mustapha Kemal and the Grand National Assembly at Ankara began their sweeping reform program in Turkey less than ten years ago, many observers expected failure for what they saw as dictatorial imposition on a sullen and conservative populace. Historians recalled that Peter the Great had barely scratched the surface in his attempt to Europeanize Russia; that most of the paternalistic innovations of Joseph II in Austria had died with him; that Japan had "westernized" more gradually, less comprehensively, and under quite favorable circumstances; and finally, that Turkey had long since been given up as hopeless. A French writer, André Servier, had summed up the opinions of many Christians when he wrote, "The Musulman, bound by his religion, cannot accept Western progress; the two civilizations are too different, too much opposed, ever to admit mutual interpenetration."

But to the confusion of such doubters the Kemalist reforms have taken root, and the world has witnessed the unprecedented phenomenon of a state which had long stood proudly as a proponent of Islam abandoning many of the most characteristic features of that civilization and espousing in their place elements of an alien civilization which it had for centuries viewed with hostility and contempt. Turkey, geographically the westernmost country of Asia, has cut the ties which have bound her so intimately to the East and seeks

to become, outwardly at least, connected with Europe, the West.

Some one may now properly raise the question whether the term "Islamic" is still applicable to modern Turkey. If Turkey has gone over so precipitately into the camp of the West, might the conclusion not be justifiable that there had been a complete substitution of one civilization for another, thus bearing out the exclusivists' essential concept of incompatibility, the impossibility of blending Islam and Western progress? The answer to this question will gradually appear as we examine the history of the reform processes. But first for the sake of clarity let us see what the words "Islamic" and "Western" include when they refer to civilizations.

As most commonly interpreted, the term "Islamic" refers to the whole complex of practices, beliefs and attitudes which have grown up around the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed. In a narrower sense, however, "Islamic" may be considered to apply specifically only to the nucleus of religious beliefs and doctrines which gives to the Moslem his characteristic world-view. In the West we are accustomed to differentiate the broader and narrower corresponding meanings by the terms "Christendom" and "Christianity."

Now where does the term "Western" fit in with the other concepts we have been discussing? The Turk would probably consider it the balance remaining if one were to subtract from the totality of "Christendom" one part called "Christianity"—the beliefs and doctrines of the Christian religion; in other words, the materials and techniques of our civilization.

Two formulas might be invented to make plain the relationship between the parts and wholes of the two civilizations: 1) Christianity plus Western ideas and practices equals Christendom; 2) Islamic religion plus Arab ideas and practices equals Islamic civilization. This distinction which Turkey chooses to make between a religion and other parts of a civilization is important to understand before one reads the story of Turkey's Westernization. Turkey apparently feels no qualms over the substitution of Western ideas and practices for her inherited ideas and practices, since she considers the latter a bequest from nomadic Arabia, which she professes to despise as less civilized than Europe. Toward religion, however, there is a different attitude, for she has failed to perceive during centuries of rivalry and conflict any superiority of Christianity over her own religious forms and doctrines. To change religions would needlessly arouse a fanatical opposition, and be-

sides, the Turkish leaders have felt that their traditional religious organizations and beliefs might be purged of undesirable qualities and reshaped so as to contribute distinctively to the new Turkish nation. The formula as conceived by Turkey's republican leaders might then read: Purified Islamic religion plus Western ideas and practices plus a newly awakened nationalism equals modern Turkey.

Although we have spoken casually of Turkey's willingness to abandon ideas and practices which she considered of alien Arab origin and supplant them with Western counterparts, let no one suppose that the change occurred rapidly or painlessly. Had it not been for the constant erosion of Turkish society over many years by powerful forces, had not Turkey been made acutely conscious of her own shortcomings, had not the Great War and its aftermath thrown Turkish society into a suitable state of flux, and had there not been aggressive and inspiring leadership by bold patriots, Turkey might still be floundering about uncertainly as are many other parts of Asia. The point is, however, that all these conditions did occur and that the radical reconstruction of Turkish society did take place. Our task now is to consider in some detail the factors and processes which contributed to the change.

Mention has been made of a long continued erosion of Turkish society. Let us study this as the first of the important factors leading up to the adoption of Western ways. Any one acquainted even superficially with Turkey's history over the past hundred and fifty years knows that interplay was taking place between Turkey and the nations of Europe. Outside forces were pressing in on "the sick man" with stringent diplomatic demands and strange new practices. Here the process seems to be that of an external insistent force battering with its novelties against a surly, resisting mass. But the process had another aspect, for individuals within that resisting mass were reaching out to master for themselves certain features of the alien civilization, thereby acting as conductors in the transmission of Western ways into Turkish society. Both aspects of the process, the battering and the conducting, are important.

The battering impact of the West may be illustrated concisely, bearing in mind the fact that Turkey's geographical position as the westernmost country of Asia and in a direct line between Europe and important regions of the Near and Middle East made it inevitable that she should be struck early and severely by Europe's eastward-looking imperialist expansion. Aggressive warfare car-

ried on by nations which sought to appropriate Turkish territory caused Turkey to realize the superiority of Western war materials and methods. Diplomatic interference in the governmental affairs of the Sublime Porte kept officials unpleasantly conscious of the assertive West. Industrialists and engineers skillfully exploiting Turkish railways and natural resources impressed the Turks with the value of Western technique. The system of capitulations, which permitted foreigners to live in the country subject to their own laws, kept constantly under Turkey's eyes communities with customs differing from her own. Partly as a result of the capitulations, mis-



MEDJLIS OR PARLIAMENT HOUSE AT ANKARA

sionary and other philanthropic enterprises were given considerable freedom in Turkish domain. Manned by devoted and able workers, foreign schools, hospitals, and publication societies were powerful agencies in the onslaught of the West.

The insistent impact of these Western thrusts might not alone have been able to effect the erosion in the Turkish mass. Had the ranks of Turko-Islamic society held firm, a stubborn and fanatical resistance might have been offered which would have delayed indefinitely the adoption of Western ways. But this was not to be, for certain individuals and groups within the ranks manifested receptive inclinations toward the West, and the channels were opened for the infiltration of new notions. These channels were provided by two types of Turks: 1) those who remained at home but became interested in Western ideas through reading or through contact with the Westerners in their midst; and 2)those who left home

to visit Europe, voluntarily or as exiles. It is true that both the stay-at-homes and the travelers were chiefly of the aristocracy and upper strata of society, the official and military classes. They were important, however, in performing the function described by E. A. Ross as that of the "social stand-pipe" for the diffusion of advanced ideas.

With this brief presentation of the double-action process of erosion as it affected Turkey's Islamic civilization, we must turn next to the second important factor which made reform a possibility: a tendency toward bitter self-criticism resulting from a consciousness of the shortcomings of her inherited civilization. This sense of inadequacy which grew up in the nineteenth century under the shadow of the insistent West was aggravated by the abortive attempt of Abdul Hamid II to stir up a Panislamic movement. Far from settling the problems of Turkey and the rest of the Islamic world, this futile flurry of fanaticism served only to intensify Turkey's distress when she finally came to admit the inferiority of her Oriental ways to those of the Occident. The last twenty-five years have accordingly given rise to strident arraignments of all things Islamic, particularly of the theologians and rulers, who have been branded corrupt, and also of the governmental system which would permit so much influence to reactionary religious bigotry. While at first the critics leveled their attacks indiscriminately against the whole complex of Islamic civilization, a tendency is gradually noticeable to make a differentiation between the religious nucleus and its secular appurtenances.

Of the numerous denunciations of the Islamic system, none has had more influence than the poetic diatribe by Tewfik Fikret called *Tarihi Kadim* (Ancient History). Though the poem was not formally published until 1927, it had for many years circulated from person to person and enjoyed great popularity among students and others impatient with the vicious system to which they were bound. Tewfik Fikret portrays the glorious victories of his ancestors as actual savagery, and the heroes of the faith are shown to have been killers, devastators of land and destroyers of homes. What kind of God can it be, he asks, who permits such cruelty in the name of religion? Does God hear or pay any attention to the prayers or the blasphemies which drift upward to heaven? Everywhere doubt is assailing the strongholds of religion; stratagems and deviltry are removing God from his throne and blowing out the torches in his

temples. God has fallen from his throne, but no cries of pain are heard. Instead one hears everywhere derisive laughter. Only the stupid would bemoan the passing of such a gross deception.

A large share of indignant vituperation has been directed against the Moslem theologians and doctors, whose ignorance, laziness, and dishonesty are blamed for the dominance of tradition, form, and superstition in a religious system which had once been progressive and vital. Hans Kohn, in his masterly *History of Nationalism in the East,* quotes the expression of a typical critical Moslem attitude: "The Ulemas of to-day occupy themselves with outward forms alone; they do not understand the philosophic spirit of Islam, and cannot therefore apply their religion advantageously in practice. Our ignorant clergy expound Islam according to their own ideas, and instead of benefiting, they injure us." A scathing denunciation of the corruption, worldliness, and ignorance of the theological teachers and students who posed as leaders of Islam is contained in a strong novel published three or four years ago in Istanbul from the pen of Rechad Nuri Bey. The book, entitled *Green Night,* centers around the sacrificial devotion of a young teacher to the cause of his nation and his people. The hero, Shahin Effendi, enthusiastically enters a *medresseh* or theological school only to suffer painful disillusionment when he perceives the knavery and incompetence of his theological professors.

Along with the holy men, the Sultans of Turkey are subjected to criticism for their subservience to the forces of religious bigotry. The unholy alliance of secular despotism and religious obscurantism is frequently and bitterly denounced. As an example we may quote from a textbook which is used in the schools of the Turkish Republic. From a Fifth Grade text in Civics, written by Mitat Sadullah, and approved by the Department of Public Instruction, comes the following selection:

> The Padishahs ruled in Turkey for many years. These men thought only of their own amusement and considered the nation as a group of slaves. In Europe there had been founded well-organized states according to new principles. On the other hand, when a movement toward modern ideas started in Turkey, the conservatives, the fanatical people would step in and say, "This modernization is un-religious, and it is sinful." With such trifling talk they would prevent modernization. And already all the laws of the Padishah's Government were based on the principles of religion.

> So it was impossible to separate worldly and religious problems. As you know, religion teaches man more about heavenly things, although it teaches at the same time truth and goodness. One must not confound heavenly things with problems of the world. As if it were not enough to crush the people under the title of Padishah, the old Padishahs took the title of Caliph also, in order to give themselves importance in the public eye. These men who used to live in palaces with all kinds of amusements and pleasures were supposed to be representatives of the Prophet. They never thought that religion is a concept of the conscience and that nobody has the right to interfere with people's religious problems. The reason why men have organized states is not to deal with heavenly problems, but it is only to assure the living of a comfortable and joyous life in the world.

Similar sentiments from numerous other sources might be cited if space were available. Let us, however, limit ourselves to one more extensive quotation, this one condemning a governmental system which permitted the dominance of religious laws. In an explanatory introduction to the new civil code which Turkey adapted from that of Switzerland in 1924, the Minister of Justice, Mahmud Essad Bey, laid the blame for Turkey's backwardness directly on the deadening influence of the Islamic laws which for centuries had formed the basis of Turkey's government and society. He writes:

> ....the need for religions to be nothing more than a simple affair of the conscience has become one of the principles of modern civilization and one of the characteristic differences between the old civilization and the new.
>
> Laws which derive their inspiration from religions fetter the societies in which they are applied to the primitive epochs in which they arose, and they constitute invincible factors which prevent progress. It is indubitable that our laws, which came out of the changeless precepts of religion, and which ensured a permanent place to divine elements, have been the most powerful and the most effective factor which, in modern times, has enslaved the destinies of the Turkish nation to the mentalities and institutions of the Middle Ages....
>
> In the march of our evolution one notices that all progressive steps which have been attempted in the interest of the masses have been thwarted by a class of men whose interests were compromised by the projected innovations. These men have always sought to turn people aside from the path of progress in preserving among them, in the name of religion, obscure superstitions and false beliefs. Let us not forget that the

> Turkish people have resolved to accept without any reservation the principles of modern civilization. The most striking proof of this appears in the Revolution itself. If in certain quarters the civilization of to-day appears irreconcilable with the needs of Turkish society, that does not indicate an aptitude lacking in the people, but in the superannuated traditions and religious institutions which have hindered their development....
>
> When religion has sought to rule human societies, it has been the arbitrary instrument of sovereigns, despots, and strong men. In separating the temporal and the spiritual, modern civilization has saved the world from numerous calamities and has given to religion an imperishable throne in the consciences of believers.

From what we have seen thus far, two important factors in Turkey's change process are plainly apparent: 1) the penetration—by battering and conducting agencies—of Western notions into Turkish society; and 2) the consequent agitated dissatisfaction with the traditional Islamic heritage, gradually developing into a conviction that religion's influence must be allowed no specific control over public affairs.

Although these factors of Western penetration and internal dissatisfaction had been evident in Turkey during the last half of the nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth, up to the close of the World War in 1918 little had actually been done, even by the Young Turks, to incorporate Western ways into the life of the Turkish mass. Europeans had brought their new techniques into Turkey, and a relatively small number of Turkish individuals had taken over Western customs to an extent which varied from superficiality on the one hand to extremity and consequent excommunication from their own society on the other. Turkey had begun to sense more and more the strength and vitality of the West, and had begun to find fault with some of her own weaknesses, but on the whole her Orient-sprung social forms had undergone but slight changes. What innovations had been introduced were really only modifications of existing forms, not radical alterations or substitutions of Western practices in place of the venerable customs of the Orient.

During the World War, however, and particularly in the years immediately following it, a number of cataclysmic events occurred which threw Turkish society into a state of flux. This stirring of the Turkish population into a condition of fluidity stands as the

third important factor which made possible the transformation of civilizations. On each of the cataclysmic events one might write a volume. We must here content ourselves, however, with a mere listing of them. First might be mentioned the Arab revolt which broke out in the later years of the Great War and opened the Turkish Empire to attack from the Allies. Rebellions by subject Christian groups were no doubt taken as a matter of course, but it was a great disil-

ENTRANCE TO MODERN HOTEL AT ANKARA

lusionment to Turkey to be betrayed by co-religionists. The fact that Moslem Arabs should have been disloyal made the Turks more than ever hostile to the Islamic features of their civilization, which they associated with Arabia. A second cataclysmic event was Turkey's collapse at the end of the Great War and the subsequent series of humiliations which her foes sought to impose upon her as provided in the Treaty of Sèvres. Third must be noted the downfall of the last Sultan-Caliph, Vahid-ud-din, whose compliance with Allied demands and hostility to the Nationalist movement was regarded by his subjects as treachery. Fourth was the ill-fated invasion of Anatolia by the Greeks. Fifth might be the aid and encouragement offered by Soviet Russia to the budding Nationalist

movement as a blow at France and England. Sixth and last, the division of counsels which ended the coöperation of France and England in enforcing the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres.

In the course of this extraordinary sequence of events Turkey was grievously shaken; in her Anatolian homeland she stood alone facing a hostile world; she realized that her very existence depended on heroic devotion and sacrifice. A new spirit of patriotic dedication thrilled every loyal Turkish heart. Men were ready to go to any extreme to insure the continuance and welfare of the newborn nation. Turkish society had been melted into a malleability which it had never experienced before. In those trying days, fired by the new spirit of nationalism, Turkey was ready to be molded by wise and courageous leadership.

The opportune appearance of capable leadership comprises the fourth and final factor, which with the three already noticed, assured the Westernization of Turkey. Outstanding figures such as Mustapha Kemal, Ismet, Kiazim, Raouf, Adnan, and Halidé Edib, all admirers of the West, at first worked together to bring about the new era of progress after the War of Independence had been won. It so happened as a result of personal and political disagreements that active leadership came into the hands of Mustapha Kemal, whose generalship in the war against the Greeks had made him the great national hero, and his efficient comrade, Ismet. The grateful and admiring Turkish nation, new-born from the turbulence and turmoil of the post-war years, was theirs to do with it what they willed. And their will was sweeping reform.

Kemal's policy, as he presented it in his classic *Six-Day Speech* in the fall of 1927, was "to raise the nation to that position to which she is entitled to aspire in the civilized world," which being interpreted, means the Western world. Any feature of her civilization which might be construed as archaic, as smacking of the primitive Orient, was to be eliminated. Thus using his enormous prestige and his efficient, Fascist-like political machine, the National People's Party, change after change was effected in Turkey's social and political structure. The venerable Sharia Law was replaced by a legal system modeled on those of Western states. The Caliphate, reminder of a day when Islam played too large a part in the administration of government, was abolished. Men were ordered to adopt the Western mode of dress. A thoroughly modern system of education, using Western techniques and admitting the radical princi-

ple of coeducation, was established. The Arabic alphabet was abandoned as not fitted to the Turkish language, and Latinized letters were substituted. The study of the Arabic and Persian languages in the schools was given up in favor of English and German, French being already in the curriculum. Adult education on an ambitious scale was instituted. In the new enthusiasm of national pride, the studies of history and literature were purged of Oriental Islamic features as much as possible, and new stress was laid on the achievements of men distinctively Turkish. Marriage reforms were instituted to enforce monogamy. In private houses and public buildings Western architecture was employed. In Ankara a school of music now introduces Turks to the instruments and compositions of the European masters. Students in all lines of endeavor regularly are selected and sent to Europe for study under government supervision. In commerce, industry, and agriculture, energetic attempts are under way to master the techniques and methods of the West, for no longer are there large populations of Greeks and Armenians to carry on Turkey's business. One might go on to enumerate dozens of important examples of the way Turkey's life is being reshaped in an effort to bring her thoroughly up-to-date. While many of them are still far from achieving the efficacy and completeness which are visualized, the point is that the reforms have been undertaken and are being pursued with great perseverance. And firmly behind each progressive innovation stands the stern and visionary figure of Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

In the realm of customs, practices, and ideas not regarded as religious, there has been, as we have seen, a wholesale substitution of Western ways for those inherited from Arabia and Islam. In the midst of all this readjustment, what has been the fate of those institutions, rituals, and beliefs which are classified as religion? There has, of course, been no tendency to replace this kernel of Islam by a general conversion to Christianity, the religion of the West. The new Government, having eliminated religious influences from its political and social institutions, and having driven out of the country the Dervish Orders and other elements regarded as reactionary, has adopted an opportunist attitude toward religion. On large segments of the population religion had a powerful hold. To have attempted to disestablish the Islamic faith altogether would have provoked a hostility which might have hindered the prompt achievement of other reforms. The policy, therefore, has been to

tolerate its continuance, eliminating such features as may not be in harmony with the general policy of reform, and encouraging any developments or modifications which might strengthen the spirit of national progress. Control of religious affairs has been kept in government hands through the constitution of a Committee on Religious Affairs, which functions as a sub-department under the Prime Minister. Among the interesting and important modifications which have taken place are the replacement of the old *medressehs* by schools which equip the modern *hodja* to serve both as religious leader and primary school teacher in his community; the preparation of sermons on national issues to be preached in the mosques during holy festivals; and the translation of the Koran into Turkish, thus making it generally intelligible.

In bringing to a close this brief study of Turkey's cultural transformation, it is to be hoped that these points have been brought out: that the successful implantation of Western reforms is no mere vagary of chance—there are reasons for their success in Turkey where other countries have met with failure; that André Servier's certainty regarding the incompatibility of Islam and the West is open to question; and that the following formula may be taken as descriptive of the present situation: Purified Islamic religion plus Western ideas and practices plus a newly awakened nationalism equals modern Turkey.

WOMAN'S PART IN TURKEY'S PROGRESS

BY HALIDE EDIB
Paris, France

HISTORICAL events must have certain laws governing them although they are not yet discovered. Henry Adams had some reason in proposing to depersonalize history. Great personalities who seem to shape human destiny are nothing but vital expressions of forces working within that particular society. Just as great civilizations spring up in fertile valleys along great rivers, geniuses are the outcome of societies where there are constant undercurrents of thoughts and life. Let those who take the part of woman in Turkey's progress as a sudden phenomenon, due to the activities of a single or a few men and women, look more carefully into the forces at work in Turkish society throughout history. I believe that a brief account of the nearest Turkish background in history is necessary here. Because the period was the most stabilized I will take women in Turkey between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries.

In the domain of thought and literature woman played a secondary but by no means a negligible part. Tahir-el-Mevlevi, a Turkish writer, in his book entitled *Ottoman Authors,* mentions twenty-three women writers within those centuries. As far as I can judge none of them was first-rate but on the whole none was very much below the mark of any secondary man author. I met a Russian Orientalist in New York who told me that he had discovered in the British Museum a manuscript of Zeineb, a woman poet of the fifteenth century, and that he was going to surprise the world by proving that she was the greatest Turkish writer of all ages. I have no right to doubt his knowledge of Turkish literature, but I do not know the extent of his critical powers—Orientalists like archaeologists are apt to overestimate the value of old things.

The Turks of those centuries resembled the Americans at least in one way—they emphasized social welfare and were very efficient organizers in that respect. And women stood shoulder to shoulder with men in that particular activity. The Turkish woman of those centuries founded soup kitchens, hospitals, hostels, even lunatic asylums, as far back as the seventeenth century. She founded primary schools for both sexes, higher schools for both sexes, higher schools for men. She built roads, bridges, fountains, mosques and inns for travelers. Education, such as it was in those

MME. HALIDE EDIB

centuries, was a domain where she distinguished herself. Public utility and public health were her special concerns. And it was not restricted to the rich and the mighty women of the land either. If some of the fine school buildings in use today (parts of the University and a few principal women's Colleges) were founded by women of fame and name, the unknown and the humble woman founded smaller schools, built tiny street fountains, or at least paid for the education or the upkeep of a few orphans in her particular quarter. The endowment charters of those days of public institutions created by women form a very important and interesting part of the archives of the Ministry of Pious Foundations. Even a partial reading of those documents proves that women vied with each other to add a new feature to their Foundations. Music for a lunatic asylum and money to take the children to the country in the summer are rather modern ideas in those centuries.

Generally speaking the Turks of those centuries meant to keep Turkish society in its Islamic and Eastern frame. Woman was man's equal in economic rights according to the laws of Islam, but in all other respects woman was dominated by man. It is somewhat interesting to note how far women ventured out into other fields of activity. On the whole it was an Islamic society and, at least in its social laws, women were bound to remain within traditional ground. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that the Turkish woman of those days must have been keenest for social changes if she had any desire for change. There is not much literature on the subject in the earlier part of this period. We have only royal decrees ordering women of the people to veil in the traditional

way. It may mean that women of the people had not accepted the veil up to the early part of the eighteenth century. It may also mean that they were effecting changes contrary to the Sultan's idea of an orthodox society.

The West, as represented in the French school of thought, entered Turkey in the early days of the nineteenth century. Turkey began to face the West. All progress from 1800 onwards became synonymous with the adoption of some Western method or way. Progress is a misleading word anyway. Some call it a change for the better and some call it a change for the worse. Those who are for or against it are found mostly among the Romantics. The Right Romantics look at it as a destroyer of dreams and beauty in life. On the other hand the Left Romantics advocate all progress which tends to better and advance mankind. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the supreme type of a left Romantic, had a telling effect in the minds of some Turks, Selim the Third being the foremost among them.

It is also curious to note how the position of Western women was attracting the attention of the Turks. The Turkish ambassador, Seid Ali, in an official report on the political situation in France, cannot keep himself from inserting the following lines: "Women are free and most respected here. The most highly placed men rise reverently at the entrance of the humblest woman."

Selim the Third himself depended on his favorite sister, Princess Hadijé, for encouragement and approval to carry out his reforms. He visited her often and consulted her on every important action. The Princess aimed to influence the women in her surroundings. She received some members of the diplomatic corps in her palace and entertained them, although she did not appear in person at those entertainments. Her relations with the Christian architect Melling aroused unfavorable comments among the conservatives. She had learned the Latin letters and he had learned Turkish. So the interpreter was dispensed with as they conversed. She punished severely the members of her house who made Melling's work and position difficult in her household. Melling represented progress to her, and she had courage enough to stand by him.

The Sultan paid with his life for his progressive ideas and the palace women remained behind the veil very long. But there was another significant expression of the change which was taking place among the people themselves. A school of literature with a naturalistic tendency was rising. There was frankness and spontaneous-

ness in the way they expressed the life of the time. The poets of this school were mostly second-rate but without them it would have been impossible to study the woman of the age.

We have a unique human document in a poem written at the time. It was a dialogue between two women—a mother and a daughter. The poem is written with the rich idiomatic Turkish used by the women of Istanbul. The poet belonged to the poorer classes and the women he describes could easily have been his wife and daughter, and they are really representative of the masses since they belong to the class of women who do their own cooking and pine for leisure and riches.

The daughter, Pembé Hanim is a girl of thirteen. She is being lectured by her mother and we get a living picture of the girl. She is always going out instead of occupying herself with housework and embroidery. She is affecting the manners and the dresses of public dancers. She is throwing her handkerchief at men and exchanging jokes with them from behind the lattices—in short, she is a flirt. And all this is not favorable to being asked in marriage by some rich and serious man with a villa on the Bosphorus. "Be a womanly woman and not a Street Broom," is the refrain of the mother.[1] If the words denoting the fashions, the amusements and occupations of the time were changed, the lecture might be that of a conservative mother of today addressed to a present flapper daughter. The Street Broom (Flapper) of the early nineteenth century imitated the public dancers, threw her handkerchiefs at men or spoke with them from behind the lattices: the present Turkish flapper imitates Greta Garbo or some other film star; she has joy-rides with her boy friends in Ford cars. There is a remark in the mother's lecture which gives food for thought. She tells the daughter to study hard and obey the "Lady Teacher," and acquire a profession which might enable her to earn her own bread. It is evident that the girls of the poorer classes, after leaving the Mosque schools, could follow their studies with a private woman teacher, and the profession of a lady teacher is preferable to a rich marriage. There is almost a note of early suffragettes in it.

The daughter's answer is a long cry of revolt. She will do as she pleases and marry whom she chooses. "I will seek a boy of

[1]The poem is by Vassif. A translation is given by Gibb in his "History of Ottoman poetry." Although the translation is pretty good the author's ignorance of Turkish idioms make some terms inexact. The term Street Broom is given as a "Slut"; it meant merely a flapper.

fifteen and him my sweetheart make," is her refrain. She has no difficulty in managing her father. "I can wheedle daddy, just let me pass my white fingers through his beard," she says.

This tendency of the woman of the time to live her own life and to express herself is not restricted to women of the lower classes either. The poet, Fitnat Hanim, circulates freely at fashionable Turkish resorts, exchanges remarks with men poets. The reaction to the past restrictions and inhibitions at times steps over the boundaries of refined language. A revolt against social bondage is evident in general among the Turkish women of the age. As the Turkish woman has never been under economic tutelage, it is natural that her entire struggle for freedom and equality should be on social lines. If life had followed a normal course this reaction against social restrictions might have developed a Turkish Suffragette movement on social lines. But it did not. This spontaneous naturalism in life and art gave way in two generations to a stronger and more organized movement of thought.

In the middle of the nineteenth century the Left Romantic influence of France had triumphed. A Western school of literature was creating a tremendous urge to bring about changes, political or otherwise. This school is commonly called the Tanzimat. Never had Turkey produced such a galaxy of first-rate men of letters. And like the philosopher poets of France they had an aim and a purpose in their art. They were advocating the union of races and their equality; they were struggling to bring about a liberal and constitutional régime. There were quite a number of minor women writers and a single great one, who unfortunately produced only three poems. All of them were ardent admirers of J. J. Rousseau and Condorcet. Due to their influence they began to talk somewhat vaguely but strongly about bettering the position of the Turkish women and giving them the high place in society they deserved. They were not definite about what they wanted to accord women, but they were clear about the cause which made them lay stress on the value of woman as a factor in progress.

The writers of the Tanzimat were distinguished students of history. They made an exhaustive study of the East in general and of the Islamic world in particular. At the moment the East and the whole Islamic world, except Turkey, were almost entirely under the domination of the Christian West. The position of the Turkish Empire seemed not very secure either. Zia Pasha, a poet of the

school, expresses their thought in these lines: "I have passed through Christian Realms and have seen castles and prosperous cities; I have wandered through Islam and have seen only desolation and a heap of ruins." I could point out passages down to this day, in prose and verse, which express exactly the same thought.

What was it that gave the Christian West this superiority? The only difference between the men of the East and the West, according to those writers, was the attitude of mind towards their women. This was a superficial way of looking at things but it created a new point of view. Evidently they saw nothing wrong in the status of Western and Christian women. None of them had read *The Subjection of Women,* by John Stuart Mill. With a naïve logic they affirmed that if the East and Islam adopted the same attitude of mind towards women as that of the Christian West, regeneration and restoration would be immediate. The greatest poet among them, Abdul Hak-Hamid, said: "The measure of a people's progress is the status of its women"; and this motto hangs on the walls of the present training school of women teachers in Istanbul.

The forces which have built the Turkey of to-day within the last twenty years have outrun almost every item of the platform of the Tanzimat writers. Their ideals of democracy and the "union of races" gave way to nationalism and to dictatorships of parties or persons. But the ruling element remained faithful to the doctrine of emancipating women. They continued to believe that the greatest force in progress is woman. This persistent idea had immediate results for Turkey, but it will go far into the future of the changing East and Islam as a working force. Turkey is the first Islamic country which has succeeded in standing on its feet after adopting the idea of emancipating its women. And this will affect the destiny of millions of women. Curious that the indirect part of the Turkish woman in progress has a greater world significance than her actual part in progress, although the latter is by no means negligible. It is as it should be. For neither in Turkey nor in the changing Eastern and Islamic world is the struggle confined to the adopting of a particular form of government modelled on the West. It is deeper than that. It is a struggle for change, from the old to the new. The boiling pot contains age-old ingredients as well as brand new elements. The Turkish idea of consider-

ing woman as the essential feature of national salvation has a chance of being raised into a universal dogma in the East.

It was the influence of the Tanzimat writers which led to the education of high-class Turkish women in Western languages. French and English became the languages which the Turkish woman of the better class had to learn instead of Arabic and Persian. When Abdul Hamid replaced the benevolent despotism of his two predecessors (an age which had made the Tanzimatist writers possible) by his reactionary and obscurantist régime, he was unable to stop the education of women entirely. His ministers, who had adopted a reactionary attitude in public affairs to please their sovereign, were different in private life. They continued to educate their women on Western lines. In addition to foreign tutors and governesses girls managed to go to foreign schools which were unfavorably looked upon by Abdul Hamid. It is at this period that Pierre Loti visited Turkey and met a group of highly educated Turkish women. He found them speaking French and English like their native tongue, reading Western literature, and playing Bach and Beethoven with a great deal of skill and emotion. He also noted that his heroines yearned for hats and balls and the free life of the Western women, the kind of life where they could exhibit their accomplishments and pretty persons. They were the Western editions of Pembé Hanim, the girl of thirteen of the early nineteenth century in Vassif's poem. If life had gone on in the normal way the "Désenchantées" of Pierre Loti also might have developed a superficial stratum of women

A LITTLE TURKISH GIRL

with a great deal of refinement and ability but altogether restricted. Side by side with these attractive ladies there were some women among the poorer classes, receiving training as teachers. They spoke neither English nor French and the education they received was old-fashioned, But they were the first women officials. They were sent to the provinces as teachers in the primary schools which the state was opening for girls. They seemed to have a wider range of influence. The age had some worthwhile women writers as well; a paper, *The Women's World,* was being published by them. Fatima Aliyé and Eminé Semiyé, two women novelists, and a number of other women poets were keeping alive the desire and necessity of doing something for women.

Although women were not interested in politics still there was a great reaction among women of all classes against the tyranny of Abdul Hamid. He often issued decrees ordering women to adopt the old costumes and stop the somewhat general tendency toward imitating Western attire. His police were helpless where women were concerned. But it was easier for women than for men to defy Abdul Hamid. For the tradition of Islam which handicapped woman in some ways also gave her great security.

With the constitutional Revolution of 1908, Turkey entered an intensively active stage. Women took no part in the preparation of that Revolution. Among the early members of the Committee of Union and Progress in Macedonia there was only one woman, Eminé Semiyé, the novelist. But if they had nothing to do with the establishment of the Constitutional Régime, they welcomed it warmly, partly because they had all hated Abdul Hamid's tyranny and partly because the New Régime stressed the necessity of doing something for women seriously. Among the vast number of demonstrators who celebrated the New Régime there were large crowds of women for the first time.

In a few years, partly from the difference of temperament and partly from the external and internal events which forced their hands into drastic action, the Young Turks abandoned the democratic ideals of the Tanzimat for a more radical, violent and nationalistic platform. But they remained even more determined to train women, to educate women on equal terms with men. The State made great efforts to establish a Western system of education. In six years the change brought about in the system, and in its generalization and efficiency, constitutes the best feature of

the Régime which came into existence in 1908. And the system offered equal opportunities to women. In 1908 there was only one old-fashioned training school for women teachers and a few primary schools and Mosque schools for girls. About 1914 the number of training schools and Lycées for girls was nine; they had spread out into provincial centers. Primary schools for girls had multiplied and the Mosque schools had been thoroughly modernized. There were women students sent by the State to the American College in Istanbul, and women students in Germany and Switzerland. Into this educational activity women threw themselves heartily. Quite a number of secluded young women who had specialized in languages, music, and drawing during the Hamidian Régime became teachers in the state schools. Besides the new state schools there was a general educational mobilization throughout the country. Women as well as men organized classes for adult education.

The sudden rise of nationalism among the Turks, which has some tragic aspects in the domain of politics, has helped the cause of woman. The writers of the period were studying the pre-Islamic past of the Turks, emphasizing the position and the importance of women in that early period. It was important for the masses to know that the desire to emancipate women, to make them coöperate in the building of a progressive Turkey, was not an imported Western idea. It had been inherent in Turkish society itself. It gave women a broader view and developed a public responsibility. They were expected to serve and to save the country and the nation. It prevented sex antagonism and promoted unity among all the progressive elements. The first woman's club, called "The Elevation of Women," for the first time inaugurated lectures for women. Men began lecturing to women's audiences and women began lecturing to men's audiences. The Nationalist club, Turk Ojagi, played an important part; mixed audiences began in the Turk Ojagi. With the youth of the Turk Ojagi, to restore Turkish woman to her old responsible and honored position in the Turkish Society was almost a religious duty. As early as 1912 it was evident that the Turkish women meant to share men's service and men's responsibility. The Balkan disaster found them nursing in hospitals, and creating useful institutions for the orphans and the widows of the Balkan refugees.

The Great War brought events to a crisis. Turkey was fighting with forces at least twenty times her superior numerically or other-

wise. All her manhood was at the front. The ordinary business of life, even the governmental machinery, was threatened with collapse. Women stepped into the breach. The provincial women, even the peasant women who had been kept away from the rapid changes taking place in the cities, were obliged to invade those cities in search of work or for markets. Woman had to take charge of the family. The army was dressed and fed by the organized activities of women labor battalions. The vacancies in the governmental departments were filled by them. Furthermore, the war years which took away boys from colleges, filled the colleges with girls. The difference of centuries, at least in education, was being reduced as between men and women.

In 1916 women entered the University. And in the same year the state passed the revised family law. Interpreting marriage in Islam as a contract between a man and a woman, the new law gave the woman the right to divorce her husband as freely as her husband could divorce her, provided she had such a clause put in her marriage contract. Polygamy, which was a grievance with woman, was not abolished by a law, but both public opinion and economic distress had made it rare. Furthermore, under the new revised law she could at once divorce a husband who took a second woman.

The veils in general had disappeared from the faces of the younger generation and the women who had work. The world was too busy to take any notice of the fundamental change which had taken place in the life of the Turkish woman. She herself was hardly conscious of it; the bigger issues of national life mattered most; woman was occupied in the general struggle for survival and for progress.

In 1918 Turkey was invaded and threatened with annihilation. A national disaster of such magnitude would have touched women of any period. But in 1918 the Turkish woman had a strenuous and practical training of ten years behind her. Her sense of responsibility towards the country had grown and had become general. She threw herself into the great nationalistic movement and struggle from 1918 to 1922 as she had never done before.

The first objective of the struggle was to clear the country of the invaders, to obtain a lasting peace, and to secure universal recognition that the Turks were to be left free in a smaller Turkey where the Turks were in an incontestable majority. From the humble peasant woman to the highly educated city woman this point was

clearly understood. The organized guerrilla fighting, the prelude of the struggle in Anatolia, has a list of women martyrs. For the transport and alimentation of the entire country in the second and more organized military struggle, women were the principal figures.

A VILLAGE WOMAN WITH A PRIMITIVE WOODEN JUG

The second objective was to create a more up-to-date Turkey. That also was understood by all classes of women. In 1921, I addressed in Angora an assembly of women which included a large crowd of peasant women. The gist of the talk was this: an armed struggle, however necessary for the moment to clear the country from the invaders, would not create the strong and civilized Turkey we needed; there must be another kind of mobilization to reach our objective. After the talk, a half-blind and old peasant woman came to me and embraced me. She told me that she already knew what I meant by another kind of struggle. She was the washerwoman of the training school for women teachers in Angora. She was working daily in spite of her age and infirmity in order to send her daughter to that school as a student. She believed that the daughter was going to help create the country we had in mind. I could multiply the example indefinitely.

The first objective was reached in 1923 when the Treaty of Lausanne opened a new era of peace for Turkey. And the date is a turning point in Turkish history and in the life of the Turkish woman. Woman's part in Turkey since 1923 is different from her part in the earlier stages of progress. All historic epochs in Turkey before 1923 were created mainly by men. The Republic is built on the equal sacrifice, suffering, and effort of women. They have faced persecution, imprisonment, and death in order to create the present Turkey. Any simple peasant woman in the country has as much

right as any general who commanded an army during the struggle to say: "Lo! I have my share also in saving and building the Turkish State."

Turkish women are better prepared and trained for their present work. No wonder that in the Turkey of today woman is a most intelligent and important factor of progress. In their age-old profession, that of teacher, they have multiplied enormously and have obtained a high efficiency. Women doctors have increased in numbers. As assistants in hospitals they do useful work. Quite a number of them marry men doctors and go out into the interior to work. The woman lawyer often pleads in public. Government departments have a considerable number of employees. Women secretaries, stenographers and typists are the principal elements which have made the conduct of business in Latin letters possible. The banks and all commercial institutions employ them in large numbers. They open modest commercial houses and conduct business quite ably. They have equal chances of training and equal wages in whatever department of life they may be employed. The number of Turkish women students in the Turkish University and in European universities is constantly increasing. In short there is no section of life where one does not meet women doing distinguished or useful work. The fact is that the progress of women as an idea and as a reality has been the outcome of an evolution, slow up to 1908, and accelerated within the last twenty-two years; therefore it has a steadier and more serious aspect than some of the other reforms in Turkey.

There are two important changes touching the woman in Turkey which have taken place since 1923.

The new civil code which was accepted in 1926 is the first and the greatest reform which touches the constitution of Turkish society profoundly. It takes away from the Islamic Church its supreme right of legislation in regard to marriage, divorce, and inheritance. The revised family law of 1916 had been abolished by the Sultan's government in 1919. In 1924, after the establishment of the Republic, the National Assembly took up the question. At a large meeting of women in the Nationalist Club in Istanbul, a committee of women was chosen to study the situation and to send a petition to the National Assembly. On the whole women did not care to have the revised family law of 1916 restored. Although the extreme modernists think that the revised family law of 1916 was more liberal

and in keeping with the spirit of the present day, Turkish women did not think so. Contrary to the modern Western woman the modern Turkish woman desires a more rigid stability in marriage and more difficult divorce. Therefore the committee of women in 1924 made a special study of the family laws of Sweden, France, England, and Russia, and having found the Swiss law most suitable, they sent a translated copy of it to the Assembly with a petition attached. In 1926, the young and progressive element in the National Assembly, working for the adoption of a western code, managed to get adopted the present civil code which is based on the Swiss civil code. The present law takes away from the individual the right to divorce and gives it to a court. Polygamy is punished by the law. Woman's desire for the betterment of her social position has been on this line for centuries. No reform expresses the realization of such an old and forcible desire and need in the feminine part of Turkish Society.

In 1930 Turkish women were given the municipal vote. It was not due to any particular agitation on the part of the Turkish women. It was rather due to the recognition of their value as a political force by the People's Party, the only ruling party at the moment. Although women had not shown a great desire, from a personal point of view, to enter the political arena in the principal cities women voted in large numbers. In 1930 was a curious moment in our dictatorial régime. The Turkish dictator had launched a second Party under the name of Free Republicans, with a more liberal political outlook. It seemed is if Turkey was becoming a constitutional country (it is only constitutional in name and form at the present time). The Free Republicans, who lasted only a few months and then were obliged to dissolve, had their candidates in the municipal elections of 1930. Women who owed their vote to the People's Party voted for the Free Republicans. The People's Party bitterly accused women of ingratitude. The situation resembled that of the English Conservatives who extended the vote to women of twenty. However the principal cities of Anatolia and Istanbul have women members in the Municipal Councils at present. The only significance of women's voting for the Free Republicans is that they are more favorable to a constitutional régime even if a Dictatorship gives them a few important privileges.

On the whole woman continues to be less interested in obtaining the political franchise than in her other activities. The



THE OLD ROMAN DAM OF ANKARA

Woman's League in Istanbul was formed in 1924, and has been the only organization agitating for the vote. Although it has been allowed a free hand in its activities by the present government it does not have a strong or large following. Woman's part in the social and the educational fields has a long past. Politics is a new field.

To conclude: the indirect part of woman in Turkey's progress will stand out and go far beyond the Turkish borders, as has been already stated. Beginning with women in Syria and Egypt, who are feverishly passing through the stages which Turkish women have already passed, it will go throughout the Moslem world as an irresistible wave.

The direct part of woman in Turkey's progress is much more complicated. The outstanding points in this historical phenomenon can eventually be summarized as follows: Turkish woman in the Near East had a far more telling part in the educational and social domains, in spite of the handicaps of her traditional seclusion and social inferiority.

The ideal of the Tanzimat to elevate woman to the status of man, at least educationally and socially, made woman go through a long preparatory period between 1839 and 1908. As the idea belonged to the intellectual and to the élite, woman's education on Western lines also began among the well-to-do and the enlightened minority and penetrated very gradually into the masses. The change in woman's life up to 1908 was personal and abstract. There was

very little activity on her side in the practical and national fields.

The revolution and change of 1908 was brought about by a group of people who rose from the masses. Although influenced by the ideas of the Tanzimat, there were almost no great intellectual figures among them. They were composed of young staff officers and young and second-rate officials. Practical and narrowed down to nationalistic aims, they were determined to use every Turkish element to create the state they had in mind. What element more forcible and vital than woman? Fortunately Zia Keuk Alp, the outstanding sociologist and historian of the age, managed to establish an ideology of the new movement. Although the writer of this article did not agree with the political ideas of Zia Keuk Alp, his social preachings were sound. He tied the social movement to an idealized past and saved it from becoming a mere imitation of the Western world in its externals. He tried to prove that woman was an essentially active figure of Turkish society. Therefore woman had to be trained, woman had to be made to work to the breaking point, if the Turkish nation was to survive. And it was the woman of the lower classes who threw herself into the general educational and economic activities. A normal time might have brought about a strong opposition. The constant menace of war, revolution and national disaster averted the public attention to other fields. The very nature of the critical times up to 1922 accepted woman's service in progress as a necessity.

In 1922 the threatening crisis had passed with the aid of woman. Relatively speaking, peace had come to Turkey for the first time after twenty years of armed struggle. Therefore it is natural to call the last ten years a new period in Turkey. It also is natural that the greatest reform in regard to woman's life and in regard to the family institution, should take place in this last period in the form of the Civil Code. It was the culmination of a desire and struggle of centuries.

Woman's activities as a wage earner did not frighten man in Turkey. Those who travel and study in the interior of Turkey see that the fields in which woman has gone to work follow the old tradition with a slightly better equipment. A large number of looms for carpet weaving or homespun material are starting in homes. Small and humble machines for knitting stockings and dresses are being adopted on a very large scale. The woman remains still the principal factor in agriculture. As nearly ninety percent of the

population is agricultural and woman still a drudge, the greatest need of the future is to spend the greater part of national energy, brains, and resources in improving her condition.

There are occasional signs which denote that woman's coming into the political activity, if ultimately realized, will arouse opposition. There is already a youthful association in Smyrna under the name of "The Defence of Men's Rights," against woman's probable political franchise. If woman gets the political vote the opposition might stiffen. But so far there has been no steady and general desire on the part of woman to invade the political field. The somewhat sinister and detrimental political activities of the palace woman in old Turkey ended in the eighteenth century. It was an essentially Byzantine influence. And it would be well not to tolerate a veiled and irresponsible political activity. However, during the municipal elections of 1930, there was a working woman in Istanbul, a certain Hava, who became quite a figure in the electioneering campaign. There may be individual women who are prepared or who have political ambitions, and the National Assembly may enfranchise women at any moment, but on the whole at least for a generation women in Turkey will be content to serve without demanding the political franchise.

The characteristics of woman in Turkey's progress offer complex and contradictory aspects. But the general features can still be traced to the trends and influences which have been dominating Turkey within the last century.

There are women who are the survivals of the Tanzimat. They want education and approve of the Civil Code but they are bitterly opposed to the rapid external changes. Bars, dances, beauty contests, and disregarding of the veil shock them. In 1930 there was a "Miss Turkey" in Paris. She paraded with the rest of the candidates. An elderly woman of the class mentioned said to me:

"Alack for the day in which a young Turkish woman exposes herself to crowds of men of strange countries, degrading herself by being personally inspected like a Mediaeval slave."

This sort of woman believes that progress taken from an alien civilization should be restricted by tariff walls. However these are mostly women above fifty and will pass away entirely in a generation.

The two classes of women who dominate present Turkey are the following:

I. Women who believe that progress means external change



GIRLS' SCHOOL IN NEW ANKARA

and a complete adoption of everything that is Western. For them hats, dances and beauty contests are as essential for progress as railways and schools. They are a repetition of Pierre Loti's Désenchantées, without the extreme culture of the latter. Only, while Pierre Loti's heroines pined for change for their own pleasure, their successors believe those purely external changes are necessary for the creation of that type, the "European," at which the limited but influential minority of the People's Party aim. This class of women will be limited and will depend on economic prosperity or depression, above all, on the attitude of mind of the ruling party in regard to progress. For the leading women among them are mostly either the wives of high officials with large salaries or the wives of the new rich, which each ruling party creates by political backing. The present ruling party, beyond its aim of creating the "European," has no ideology as yet. A vague mixture of Europe, America, Sovietism and personal innovation vacillates in the launching of reforms. However, the stranger usually takes this class of woman as the typical new Turkish woman. For they are the only ones who can afford to travel or entertain.

II. The majority of women, who play a bigger and more telling part in Turkey's progress, however, are different from those

mentioned above. An army of women teachers, women students, an ever increasing number of women doctors, social workers, lawyers, writers, small traders, officials, and employees constitute the class of women in progress. Their numbers will be increasing and one may call them a more stable element. Those who are young and have leisure, join in the new forms of Western ways of amusement. Some are almost fanatically against such, but on the whole none of them considers those externals as essential or important. There are a number of young writers among them. Halidé Nusret has standing as a novelist (she is not to be confused with the writer of this article). Suat Dervish, another woman novelist, has also been quite successful in producing critical and analytical articles on the influence of the present changes. The modern Turkish theater has able Turkish actresses, and the world of painters counts talented young women. There is a brilliant woman lawyer, still in the early thirties, who pleads quite frequently in court. One of our most famous lawyers, Kenan Bey, engaged her two years ago to plead a personal lawsuit of his.

Space forbids going into a more detailed account of the groups of women who interpret progress in Turkey in as many contradictory ways as men. There will be confusion and contradiction until a big enough mind synthesizes the forces at work and produces the ideology which will be universally acceptable in Turkey. After all we are a people who are changing our skins. The change of skin is not merely skin deep. It affects the entire physical and psychic make up. Until we shed our old skin and grow a new one, until the new one loses its rawness and tenderness in its contact with the harsh realities of life—the fever, the struggle, to establish a new and progressive Turkey will continue.

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